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SUMMARY 
 
Since the late 1940s, South Africa and South Korea were ruled by authoritarian 
governments, which oppressed the people’s freedom and rights. The governments 
created the deeply divided societies that resulted in racism in South Africa and 
regionalism in South Korea. These similarities may have played a major role in 
allowing Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung to develop strong emotional bonds with 
their followers and to articulate their visions for the future. 
 
The two leaders, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung, fought for freedom and human 
rights against the apartheid government in South Africa and military dictatorial 
government in South Korea. During these processes of democratisation, the two leaders 
displayed common transformational and social learning leadership styles and presented 
their visions of the end of the authoritarian regimes and the establishment of democracy; 
shared these visions with the people and encouraged and mobilised them in struggling 
together against authoritarian government. 
 
Subsequently, the two leaders’ transformational and social learning leadership styles 
provide a successful role model to countries in which there are conflicts between the 
constituents of the society, as in East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East; a 
desire for transformation towards democracy by the people, and where countries are 
confronted with new challenges. 
 
OPSOMMING 
 
Beide Suid-Afrika en Suid-Korea was sedert die laat 1940’s onder die bewind van 
outoritêre regerings met gepaardgaande onderdrukking van die mense se vryhede en 
regte. Dié regerings het diep-verdeelde gemeenskappe daar gestel wat in Suid-Afrika op 
rassisme en in Suid-Korea op regionalisme uitgeloop het. Hierdie ooreenkomste mag 
grootliks daartoe bygedra het dat beide Nelosn Mandela en Kim Dae-jung sterk 
emosionele verbintenisse met hul volgelinge kon ontwikkel en hul toekomsvisies kon 
artikuleer. 
 
Die twee leiers, Nelson Mandela en Kim Dae-jung, het onderskeidelik teen die 
apartheidsregering in Suid-Afrika en die militêre diktatuur in Suid-Korea geveg vir 
vryheid en menseregte. Gedurende hierdie demokratiseringsprosesse het die twee leiers 
gemeenskaplike transformasie en sosiale leer leierskapstyle openbaar, hulle visies oor 
die beëindiging van outoritêre regimes en die vestiging van demokrasie bekend gemaak 
en die mense aangemoedig tot en gemobiliseer vir strydvoering teen die outoritêre 
regerings. 
 
Gevolglik verskaf hierdie twee leiers se transformasie en sosiale leer leierskapstyle ‘n 
geslaagde rolmodel vir alle lande waar daar konflik binne gemeenskappe bestaan, soos 
in Oos-Asië, Suid-Sahara Afrika asook die Midde-Ooste; lande waar die mense smag na 
transformasie tot demokrasie en lande wat hulleself met nuwe uitdagings gekonfronteer 
vind. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following people who have 
contributed to the completion of this dissertation:  
 
− My father, Il-gun Jeong, my mother, Sang-hwa Nam, loving sisters and bother, for 
their being exceptional mentors. 
− My supervisor, Prof. Erwin Schwella, for his academic input, guidance and 
enthusiasm, as well as his unfailing support. 
− My examiners, Dr. Frederik Uys and Prof. Young-key Park, for their interest and 
enthusiasm. 
− My English teacher, Jeanne Ellis, for proofreading this dissertation.  
− My friend, Seung-woo Nam, for his infinite love and support. 
− My colleagues, Sun-ju and Ji-hi for their continuous willing help and 
encouragement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
 
 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   BACKGROUND        1 
1.2   PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  4 
1.3   THE AIM OF THE STUDY      6 
1.4   LAYOUT OF THE STUDY      7 
1.5   CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS     8 
1.5.1  DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION    8 
1.5.2  LEADERSHIP        9 
1.6   METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY     10 
1.7   LIMITATION OF THE STUDY      11 
1.8   CONCLUSION        12 
 
CHAPTER TWO: DEMOCRATISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND 
SOUTH KOREA 
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION       13 
2.2   THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY  
OF SOUTH AFRICA        14 
2.2.1  NATION FORMATION       14 
2.2.2  THE EMERGENCE OF APARTHEID     16 
2.2.3  BLACK RESISTANCE       18 
 ii
2.2.4  TRANSITION FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY   22 
2.3   THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
    OF SOUTH KOREA       25 
2.3.1  NATION FORMATION       25 
2.3.2  AUTHORITARIANISM OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT  29 
2.3.3  TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIANISM    31 
2.4   THE CURRENT STATE OF DEMOCRATISATION OF  
SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH KOREA     32 
2.4.1  THE CURRENT STATE OF DEMOCRATISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA  33 
2.4.1  THE CURRENT STATE OF DEMOCRATISATION OF SOUTH KOREA  34 
2.5    THE ROLE OF NELSON MANDELA IN THE DEMOCRATISATION 
      PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA      36 
2.6   THE ROLE OF KIM DAE-JUNG IN THE DEMOCRATISATION  
PROCESS IN SOUTH KOREA      39 
2.7   CONCLUSION        42 
 
CHAPTER THREE: LEADERSHIP THEORY 
 
3.1   INTRODUCTION       44 
3.2   DEFINING LEADERSHIP      46 
3.3   THE TRAIT APPROACH      47 
3.3.1  RESEARCH ON THE TRAIT APPROACH    49 
3.3.2  CRITICISM OF THE TRAIT APPROACH    51 
 
 iii
3.4   THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH     52 
3.4.1  RESEARCH ON THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH   53 
3.4.2  CRITICISM OF THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH   58 
3.5    THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH     59 
3.5.1  RESEARCH ON THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH   60 
3.5.2  CRITICISM OF THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH   67 
3.6    TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH     68 
3.6.1  RESEARCH ON THE TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH  69 
3.6.2  CRITICISM OF THE TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH  73 
3.7    THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH     74 
3.7.1  RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH  75 
3.7.2  CRITICISM OF THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH   79 
3.8    CONCLUSION        80 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: A COMPARISON OF THE LEADERSHIP OF 
NELSON MANDELA AND KIM DAE-JUNG 
 
4.1   INTRODUCTION       82 
4.2   THE CASE STUDY OF NELSON MANDELA    84 
4.2.1  AS YOUNG MAN AND DEVELOPING POLITICIAN   84 
4.2.2  AS YOUNG LEADER OF THE ANC     89 
4.2.3  AS FREEDOM FIGHTER AND POLITICAL PRISONER  98 
4.2.4  AS LEADER OF SOUTH AFRICA WORKING TOWARDS  
DEMOCRACY        110 
 iv
4.3   THE CASE STUDY OF KIM DAE-JUNG    116 
4.3.1  AS YOUNG MAN AND DEVELOPING POLITICIAN   117 
4.3.2  AS YOUNG LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION PARTY   121 
4.3.3  AS POLITICAL PRISONER      128 
4.3.4  AS LEADER OF SOUTH KOREA WORKING TOWARDS 
      DEMOCRACY        132 
4.4    CONCLUSION        139 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF THE LEADERSHIP 
APPROACHES OF NELSON MANDELA AND KIM DAE-JUNG IN 
THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATISATION 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION       140 
5.2   ANALYSIS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF NELSON MANDELA AND 
KIM DAE-JUNG AGAINST THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES 142 
5.2.1  ANALYSIS BASED ON THE TRAIT APPROACH   142 
5.2.2  ANALYSIS BASED ON THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH   147 
5.2.3  ANALYSIS BASED ON THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH   152 
5.2.4  ANALYSIS BASED ON THE TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH  158 
5.2.5  ANALYSIS BASED ON THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 167 
5.3    PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND LEADERSHIP MODEL  170 
5.4 CONCLUSION        173 
 
 
 v
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1   INTRODUCTION       175 
6.2   THE RECOMMEMDATION      177 
6.3   CONCLUSION        178 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY        181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 2.1: Constitutional and Political Development in South Korea  28 
Table 3.1: Traits and Skills Found Most Frequently to be Characteristic  
of Successful Leaders       48 
Table 3.2: Studies of Leadership Theories     81 
Table 5.1: Comparison of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s  
Behavioural Leadership Styles      151 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s 
        Situational Leadership Styles      157 
Table 5.3: Comparison of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s 
        Transformational Leadership Styles     165 
Table 5.4: Comparison of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s 
        Social Learning Leadership Styles     169 
Table 5.5: Review of Comparison of the Five Leadership Styles   171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Framework of Leadership Approaches Studied in Chapter Three 45 
Figure 3.2: The Ohio State Leadership Quadrants     54 
Figure 3.3: The Leadership Grid○R      57 
Figure 3.4: Situational Leadership Model      61 
Figure 3.5: Contingency Model       65 
Figure 5.1: Transformational Learning Leadership Model    173 
 
 1
  LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRATISATION: 
THE CASE OF NELSON MANDELA IN SOUTH AFRICA AND KIM 
DAE-JUNG1 IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The transition from an authoritarian to a democratic government revealed a remarkable 
story of two countries - South Africa and South Korea. The successful democratisation 
of these two countries was a consequence of an unusual confluence of historical events, 
such as the end of the Cold War, the Asian economic crisis that affected South Korea 
and the existence of sanctions in South Africa and the equally unique quality of its 
leadership, the two Nobel Prize-winners Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung. 
 
Former South African President Nelson Mandela received the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1993 in recognition of his vital role in the historical transition towards democracy after 
                                                     
1 In Korea, the surname appears first and is followed by the first names of the person 
concerned. 
 2
46 years of apartheid rule. This transition was considered a miracle by international 
observers because it was the first of its kind in the history of Africa. A few years later, in 
2000, former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung was elected as a recipient of the 
Nobel Peace Prize as a result of his contribution to the democratisation of South Korea 
and the improvement of relations with North Korea. It also recognised his work in 
promoting peace in the North East region of Asia. These events honoured Kim who 
went to efforts in successfully leading his country from authoritarian to democratic 
government.  
 
Nelson Mandela, who was the leader of the ANC, fought to transform a government of 
racial division and oppression into an open democracy. However, he was arrested and 
convicted of treason in the landmark Rivonia trial. He entered prison in 1962 and spent 
the next twenty-seven years giving direction to the liberation movement quietly and 
clandestinely from prison. Black protest grew more fervent in the 1970s. Finally, in 
February 1990, he was released and demonstrated courage when he called for national 
reconciliation. He embraced white leaders with no sign of bitterness and steadfastly led 
the ANC in the first full-franchise election in 1994.  
 
Kim Dae-jung, who was the leader of the opposition, also fought for peace on the 
Korean Peninsula, human rights for the Korean people and democracy for the country. 
Ever since his nomination as a presidential candidate for the opposition party in 1971, 
former president Kim Dae-jung has been subjected to imprisonment, international 
kidnapping, house arrest, exile and a death sentence. His work for the common good 
was rewarded when he won the presidential election in 1997. Although he won by a 
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small margin, his victory was a historic achievement for the Korean people who had 
suffered turmoil and hardship under intermittently successive authoritarian regimes for 
nearly half a century. It was the first peaceful transfer of power between the ruling and 
opposition parties in the 50 years of modern Korean political history which started on 
August 15, 1948 when the Korean government was established. He has thus far shown 
respect for constitutional democracy, awakening hopes that democratic state institutions 
can finally be stabilised for the first time since South Korea’s foundation. 
 
The two leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Nelson Mandela, suffered under dominant 
authoritarian governments during their struggle for human rights and democracy. These 
struggles resulted in the first peaceful transfer of power in South Korea and South 
Africa. Since the start of their political lives, both leaders tried to reconcile their people 
to the consolidation of democracy through the forgiveness of the former authoritarian 
leaders. Although there are distinct differences - such as history, culture and ethnic 
composition - between Korea and South Africa, they share the common legacy of 
colonialism and authoritarianism as well as racism and regionalism, amongst others. 
Regionalism is narrowly defined here by Gurr (1993) as the value-orientation to favour 
or disfavour persons from a particular region in recruitment, promotion and other 
rewards and perquisites. A more detailed study follows in chapter two. 
 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung are without any doubt two of the greatest leaders of 
democracy in the world. With their international reputation, their particular personal 
characteristics and their carefully constructed leadership images, they were to a large 
extent able to create a democratic climate in their respective countries. This study 
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analyses the impact of their leadership styles and the effect each leader’s approach to 
leadership had on the democratisation projects in South Africa and South Korea.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In South Africa, the electoral victory of the National Party (NP) in 1948 legally 
entrenched white privilege through racial domination to control the majority of black 
people. From the 1948’s, apartheid (meaning “separateness” in Afrikaans, the language 
of the descendants of Dutch and French settlers in South Africa) legislation sought to 
reconstruct South African society on the basis of race distinction. Blacks were assigned 
separate services such as public transportation and toilets, and they were denied 
education, health services and other opportunities despite the fact that it was on their 
backs that a prosperous, modern industrial country was being built.  
 
The continuous security problem, especially after the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, 
has given the South Korean military an exceptionally prominent role in the country’s 
political life, providing a convenient pretext for authoritarian rule. Korea was divided 
into two states after gaining independence from Japan in 1945 and, consequently, South 
Korea has maintained a sizable military force in constant vigilance against a potentially 
aggressive North Korean communist regime. For all but a few years of its history, South 
Korea has been governed by non-democratic state institutions. Its leaders routinely 
ignored the rule of law and indulged in blatant corruption. They also manipulated the 
regional minorities that are unique to Korea, to intensify social inequality and political 
discrimination. As a result, authoritarian regimes of the past five decades left deep 
 5
regionalism and authoritarianism in political culture.  
 
In South Africa and South Korea, the desire for democratic governance manifested itself 
in a demonstration of the people against dictatorship. In this process, Nelson Mandela 
and Kim Dae-jung fought for human rights and democracy and motivated the people to 
sustain these movements. 
 
This study attempts to find the answers to the following questions: 
 
a) Why has the democratisation process of South Africa and South Korea taken 
place almost simultaneously since the late 1980s? 
b) What were the roles of the two leaders, despite profound differences between 
South Africa and South Korea? 
c) To what extent have their historical differences and similarities affected the 
leadership styles of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung?  
d) What is the common denominator of Mandela and Kim’s leadership? 
e) What can their leadership demonstrate to countries that are currently undergoing 
liberalisation and democratisation? 
 
The first and second questions are described in chapter two; the third question is 
researched in chapter four; the fourth question is analysed in chapter five; and, the last 
question is answered in chapter six. The answers to these questions provide insight in 
the implementation and modelling of the leadership for democratisation as portrayed by 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung. An examination of the historical and cultural 
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backgrounds of the two countries that shaped the styles of the two leaders is necessary 
for the comparison of the similarities and differences of the two leadership styles.  
 
1.3 THE AIM OF THE STUDY 
 
It is the aim of this study to offer an analytical framework within which to analyse the 
relationship between democracy and leadership and the similarities in the leadership 
styles of former President Nelson Mandela and former President Kim Dae-jung at the 
different stages of democratisation of South Africa and South Korea. Further more, the 
study aims to come up with an alternative approach to the authoritarian leadership styles 
which still maintained in other developing countries, situated in Africa, Asia and South 
America, in their movement towards democracy. 
 
This analysis attempts to find the similarities in the leadership styles of the two. It aims 
to prove that in order to have a successful democratic system, certain traits or 
characteristics are required in the leader who heads the process of transformation and 
development. The study will show – through investigation of the leadership styles of the 
South African former President Nelson Mandela and South Korean former President 
Kim Dae-jung – what these characteristics are.  
 
The theoretical framework developed in this study can be used in areas of conflict to 
assist in the development of democratic leadership. This dissertation also studies the 
similarities between the leadership styles used by the two leaders at different stages of 
the democratisation process in each country. 
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1.4 LAYOUT OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is composed of further five chapters: 
 
Chapter two provides an overview of democratisation in South Africa and South Korea. 
It focuses, in particular, on the two countries’ political and constitutional histories, how 
democratisation took place, the challenge in the democratisation process and the current 
state of democratisation. Furthermore, the roles of former president Nelson Mandela 
and Kim Dae-jung had during the democratisation in their countries, are discussed.  
 
 
Chapter three consists of a theory of leadership, with specific focus on the history of 
theoretical development in respect to leadership. Commonalities in the leadership styles 
of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung are exposed with reference to relevant leadership 
theories.  
 
Chapter four is a comparison of the speeches and actions of Nelson Mandela and Kim 
Dae-jung during the democratisation processes of their respective countries. As primary 
sources, the leaders’ autobiographies were used for this analysis.  
 
Chapter five provides a case-study of the leadership approaches of Nelson Mandela and 
Kim Dae-jung. This section analyses how the two leaders’ leadership style related to 
their own political background. It will attempt to find the similarities and differences in 
leadership style between the two leaders based on the theories discussed in chapter three.  
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Chapter six is a summary of the above mentioned chapters and concludes with a 
framework of leadership style which is recommended for other developing countries to 
develop democratisation. There is a formulation of an alternative framework with regard 
to the leadership style that is required for the successful transition to democracy. 
 
1.5 CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
 
This section briefly describes and clarifies the key concepts used throughout the 
dissertation. More detail will be provided in the course of the chapters that follow.  
 
1.5.1 DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION 
 
Discussions of democratisation have frequently been complicated by disagreements 
over the meaning of democracy. Currently, most political scientists define democracy 
procedurally. That is, democracy is explained in terms of essential procedures such as 
the governing of election and responsible behaviour of government officials 
(Handelman, 2003). 
 
In a democracy, elections are largely free of fraud and outside manipulation and 
opposition-party candidates have a real chance of being elected to important national 
offices. Minority rights and general civil liberties, including free speech and a free press, 
are respected. These conditions help to guarantee that democratic governments are 
accountable to their citizens in a way that authoritarian regimes are mostly not (Sodaro, 
2001). 
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Modern democracy is more accurately described as representative democracy. In 
Schumpeter’s view (1950), representative democracy - as it actually exists - is not 
“government by the people,” but rather “government chosen by the people.” Dahl 
(1967) argued that “Representative democracy, in short, can be characterised as 
democratic elitism. It involves a complicated mixture of popular sovereignty and 
government by elites.” The success of democracy therefore depends to a considerable 
degree on the attitudes and behaviour of society’s political and social leaders.  
 
Meanwhile, democratisation refers to the process of building a democracy following the 
collapse of a non-democratic regime (Sodaro, 2001). It is a transition process from one 
form of authoritarian government to a different one democratic government.  It can be 
hoped that the democratisation processes now going on around the world will succeed 
and countries on the verge of democracy will find a way to overcome authoritarian rule. 
The task of democratisation and consolidation, in particular, require leadership skills of 
the highest magnitude in view of the political, economic and attitudinal changes that 
they impose on the population. Countries that lack capable leaders during these critical 
phases risk losing their opportunity to build democracy altogether. 
 
1.5.2 LEADERSHIP 
 
Researchers define leadership according to their individual perspective and the aspect of 
the phenomenon of most interest to them (Yukl, 1994). Bass (1990) suggested that some 
definitions view leadership as the focus of group processes. From this view, the leader is 
at the centre of group change and activity and embodies the will of the group. Another 
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group of definitions conceptualises leadership from a personality perspective, which 
suggests that leadership is a combination of special traits or characteristics that 
individuals possess and that enable them to induce others to accomplish tasks. Other 
approaches to leadership have defined it as an act or behaviour – the things leaders do to 
bring about change in a group. 
 
A review of other writers reveals that most management writers agree that leadership is 
the process of influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts toward 
goal achievement in a given situation (Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 2000). More detail 
will be provided in the course of the chapter three that follow. 
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 
This dissertation assesses the existing leadership theories to reach a more 
comprehensive understanding of leadership styles of the two leaders. Special attention 
is given to the role played by Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung during the 
democratisation process in their respective countries.  
 
This study focuses on the leadership theories developed by Stogdill (1948), Mann 
(1959), McCall (1985), Kirkpatrick (1991), the Ohio State Studies (late 1940s), the 
University of Michigan Studies (early 1950s), Blake and Mouton (1964), Hersey and 
Blanchard (1969), Fiedler (1978), Evans and House (1971), House and Mitchell (1974), 
Bass (1985), Bennis and Nauns (1985), Tichy and Devanna (1990), Senge (1994) and 
Heifetz (1994). 
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The main sources for this thesis are comprised of existing studies and relevant articles 
concerning the theories on the trait, behavioural, situational, transformational and social 
learning leadership. Moreover, to analyse the histories of the two countries, South 
Africa and South Korea, and the roles of the two leaders, Nelson Mandela and Kim 
Dae-jung, this study aims to utilise a literature review method, based on primary sources 
- such as official government documents, academic journals, news magazines, 
newspapers and reports - and secondary literature as well as various politically related 
websites. Care is taken to utilise and evaluate mainly primary sources to ensure a high 
degree of reliability. 
 
1.7 LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In the study of the two leaders’ leadership styles there are bound to be limitations in the 
written sources, thus an interview plan with people of significance will be employed. 
Care will be taken to utilise and evaluate mainly primary sources to ensure a high 
degree of reliability. 
 
To analyse Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s behavioural leadership style 
comprehensively, however, questionnaire research through collection of questionnaires 
from themselves and their followers – such as their fellow politicians or comrades as 
well as ordinary South African and South Korean – is required. There is a limitation to 
investigation through this form of research.  
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1.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This study of the relationship between democratisation and the leadership style required 
to attain such a political dispensation, focuses on the role and personal leadership 
required of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung to achieve transformation. 
 
The common characteristics that Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung share are a desire 
for peace, respect for human rights, a willingness to forgive their oppressors and the 
promotion of reconciliation to consolidate democracy. The processes in South Africa 
and South Korea can serve as a role model for other countries on the verge of 
democratisation. 
 
This dissertation attempts to answer the above given questions through researching the 
two countries’ political histories and the two leaders’ roles during the transformation 
processes to democracy. It also explains which leadership styles can have the most 
profound effect on these processes of democratisation in developing countries.  In 
addition, the result of the study suggests a role model which can serve as a guideline for 
other counties on the verge of democratisation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
DEMOCRATISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH KOREA 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1970s, the upsurge of political freedom in the developing world, coupled with 
the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communism, has caused the greatest 
advance ever towards democracy. Furthermore, the economic crisis that devastated so 
many third world countries in the 1990’s, revealed that their newly elected authoritarian 
governments were no more effective and no less corrupt than the colonial governments 
that they had earlier so contemptuously swept aside.  
 
The trend of establishing democratic government did not fail to reach South Africa. In 
the early 1990’s, during the wave of democratisation, Nelson Mandela left his cell in 
Victor Verster Prison and was transported to Cape Town, ending 27 years of 
incarceration. He and other freed leaders of his recently legalised political party, the 
African National Congress (ANC), eventually negotiated an end to white minority rule. 
Mandela’s triumph accelerated Africa’s “second independence”- a wave of political 
liberalisation that has in some cases culminated in electoral democracy (Handelman, 
2003). After the far-reaching victory of the ANC in the first full-franchise elections in 
1994, Mandela was elected president.  
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During the 1980’s, in South Korea, massive student pro-democracy protesters were 
crushed by army tanks in Kuangju in 1980 and the government blamed Kim Dae-jung 
for fomenting that trouble. Chun’s administration charged him with treason and 
sentenced him to death. On 18 December 1997, after one hundred and eighty three days 
of house arrest, six years in prison, two exiles and sixteen years of forced retirement 
from politics, Kim Dae-jung was elected President of South Korea. Some compare his 
election to Nelson Mandela’s election in South Africa. Each of these men was 
considered a danger to the ruling establishment, each was jailed for years and faced 
death sentences, and each persevered to become his nation’s leader.  
 
In this chapter, a study is made of a number of factors such as: the political and 
constitutional history and challenges that have affected the processes of democratisation 
in South Africa and South Korea, the role played by the two leaders - Nelson Mandela 
and Kim Dae-jung – and how they founded democratic institutions and procedures in 
their respective countries. 
 
2.2 THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA  
 
This section describes nation formation, the emergence of apartheid, black resistance 
and transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. 
 
2.2.1 NATION FORMATION 
 
Much has changed since the Dutch founded the first permanent European settlement in 
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South Africa during the 17th century. The settlers imported slaves and indentured labour 
from Dutch colonies in East Asia and began to implement strict policies of racial 
segregation. Imperial conquests ended Dutch rule by the turn of the 19th century, and the 
British took over the Southern African colony.  
 
At the same time, African tribes - such as the Zulus and Xhosas - had settled into the 
east and south and, consequently, black-white conflicts and wars erupted on the frontier. 
In 1838, for example, the well-known battle of Blood River occurred in which Afrikaner 
(Dutch descendants who had developed their own Africanised culture and dialect) 
commandos -known as Voortrekkers - defeated the army of King Dingane of the Zulus.  
 
Instability was not limited to white-black conflict, but was also experienced amongst 
white settlers of differing nationalities. By the mid 19th century, the British controlled 
the Cape Colony as well as the eastern coastal zone of Natal. The Voortrekkers set up 
independent Republics known as the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) and the 
Orange Free State. In 1867, diamonds and later gold deposits were discovered in the 
deep interior of the country and a rush for wealth began. Hundreds of thousands of new 
European settlers migrated into the Boer (means farmer in Afrikaans, the language of 
the Afrikaners) republics as the tremendous mineral deposits were discovered. Conflict 
among the whites soon grew over the new found treasure. Britain was determined to 
wrest political control of the goldfields from the Boers in the Transvaal and after several 
unsuccessful attempts at annexation, it resorted to all out war to guarantee imperial 
supremacy. The British governor, Cecil John Rhodes, sought to undermine the Boer 
republics and the result was the Boer War (1899-1902) in which British control of the 
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entire territory of southern Africa was secured. British troops committed untold 
atrocities, including the incarceration of Boer women and children in concentration 
camps. Although South Africa became a union in 1910, conflict among the whites and 
domination over blacks became the hallmarks of South African society. 
 
Steadily throughout the early twentieth century, in a society where whites represented 
less than 17 percent of the population, the white communities considered it essential to 
control the movement of black people for political, economic and logistical reasons 
through a system of racial oppression. The native African was controlled and oppressed 
by the white’s firearms and their discriminatory “pass law,” which ruled that no 
unemployed African could stay in former Republic of South Africa without a valid 
identity document. This law was designed to prevent black economic competition and to 
ensure the supply of cheap black labour to farms, mines and industry.  
 
2.2.2 THE EMERGENCE OF APARTHEID 
 
The period of the white-run Union (later Republic) of South Africa can be divided into 
two periods: first, when English speakers occupied the government (1910-48), and later 
when Afrikaner nationalists took over (1948-94). Public policies during these periods 
differed in degree rather than kind: both aimed at racial segregation. The post-1948 
apartheid (separateness) regime, however, extended this idea to a deranged extreme by 
building barriers between the races into the institutional structure of the state. 
 
With the electoral victory of the National Party (NP) in 1948, the guiding principle for 
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rule in South Africa became the legal entrenchment of white privilege and racial 
domination. The National Party argued for stricter policies of racial segregation and 
discrimination against the burgeoning black population. They also claimed a Christian 
basis for their policies, locating its origins in a highly puritan form of Calvinism that 
they claimed ordained white domination over black people in South Africa (Halisi & 
O’Meara, 1995) 
 
As the basis for apartheid, the government classified every citizen under the Population 
Registration Act of 1950 into one of four racial categories: African, Coloured (an 
emerging community of mixed-race people), Indian and White. The National Party 
created a harsh and intrusive security system and expanded unequal and separate 
education, job reservation, and residential segregation. New laws were introduced to 
prohibit sex and marriage between people of different races; the authorities even went 
so far as to break up existing mixed-race families. In order to control and intimidate 
opponents further, the government enacted extensive security legislation, including the 
Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, the 
Unlawful Organisations Act of 1960, the General Laws Amendment Act of 1962 – the 
so-called sabotage act – and the Terrorism Act of 1967 (Thompson, 1995). 
  
The architect of apartheid and Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd (1958-66) had an even 
grander vision that called for the complete geographical partition of the races. Under the 
Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1957, Africans were stripped of citizenship, 
expelled from the choicest parts of the country and consigned to “homelands” or 
“independent states.” The “homelands” (or reservations) were created for the ten major 
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black linguistic groups and gradually they became independent black states in a broader 
white South African Republic. The South African government regarded the homelands 
as independent states, and their residents were not regarded as South African citizens. 
As a result, the impoverished homeland administrations could neither generate 
employment nor deliver basic services, and relocation exacted a harsh toll of 
malnutrition, disease and death. Apartheid was set to exclude the black majority 
population from political and economic opportunity in the former Republic of South 
Africa. 
 
2.2.3 BLACK RESISTANCE 
 
In the late 1940’s, when the pernicious policies of apartheid were being implemented, 
black leaders also realised that ethnic identity could not be ignored as a fact of political 
life. It is therefore not surprising that a vast number of liberation movements arose and 
black leadership began to mobilise around the black movement known as the African 
National Congress (ANC) founded in 1912. During the 1940’s, young leaders - such as 
Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela - recommitted the ANC to multiracial 
democracy.  
 
In 1955, the ANC’s Freedom Charter declared that “South Africa belongs to all who live 
in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is 
based on the will of the people.” The charter’s mix of liberal values (equality before the 
law, freedom of speech, the right to vote) with more socialist ideas (free education and 
health care, public ownership of mines and industry), reflected the ANC’s openness to 
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various political tendencies. Other liberation movements – like the South African 
Communist Party (SACP, formed 1921), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC, formed 
1959) and the Black Consciousness movement (which coalesced in the 1970s around 
the ideas of Steve Biko) – expounded more radical and Afro-centric themes (Friedman, 
1994)  
 
Resistance against apartheid started out peacefully as civil disobedience and the anti-
apartheid movement first took the form of the burning of “passes” or defiance of other 
discriminatory laws. In response, Afrikaner nationalist regime reacted with increasing 
force, for example, when white police opened fire on a mass demonstration at a police 
station in the township of Sharpeville in 1960 and sixty-seven demonstrators died as the 
result of police brutality. Today that date (March 21) is celebrated in South Africa as 
Human Rights Day. 
 
Due to this and other atrocities, some members of the African National Congress (ANC) 
and the South African Communist Party organised “Umkhonto We Sizwe” (MK) or 
“Spear of the Nation” to conduct an armed struggle against the regime in 1961. This 
anti-apartheid movement embarked on bombing campaigns against state installations, 
such as electricity switching stations and post offices. Then a young ANC activist, 
Nelson Mandela, was arrested and convicted of treason in the landmark Rivonia trial; he 
was sentenced to incarceration for life on Robben Island in 1964. 
 
There followed a long hiatus while the resistance movement gathered again, 
strengthened by a wave of strikes led by militant black workers’ organisations in 1973 
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and by a youth uprising in Soweto (short for the South-western Townships of 
Johannesburg) in 1976. In Soweto on 16 June 1976, thousands of African high-school 
students demonstrated against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in school. 
The Soweto uprising came as the result of the NP’s educational policy which caused 
African schoolchildren grievances over a long period of time. An undetermined number 
of African schoolchildren were killed or wounded during the first few days. Over the 
next few months at least one thousand were killed and many thousands more wounded 
and arrested. This dynamic youth movement found an articulate popularisation of its 
message in Steve Biko, whose death at the hands of security police, while in detention 
in September 1977, caused yet another round of protests, violence, further repression 
and the banning of most Black Consciousness organisations.  
 
In 1977, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo on South Africa and a litany of 
denunciation by the international community against apartheid began. Subsequent 
sports and cultural boycotts heightened pressure on the white government to reform. By 
the 1980’s, more comprehensive economic sanctions dried up new foreign investment, 
technology transfers and trade opportunities, and apartheid had entered a crisis born of 
its own contradictions and of new pressures emanating from a changing world. 
Internally, the economy suffered from recession, currency inflation and the excessive 
costs of administering a maze of oppressive social controls.  
 
The National Party, furthermore, was rocked by a scandal over misappropriated public 
funds that forced the resignation of Prime Minister John Vorster. His successor, P. W. 
Botha, pursued a mixed strategy of repression and reform. Under a new 1984 
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Constitution, Botha’s government began to ease some of the more discriminatory laws 
of apartheid while reinforcing its commitment to maintain white dominance in general.  
 
The half-hearted reforms of the 1980’s eliminated some of the more overtly 
discriminatory laws – such as separate public amenities like drinking fountains – but not 
the foundation of the system, the race-based categories of citizenship. Far from 
diffusion of black anger and international disapproval, the reforms led instead to a 
renewed protest movement. In 1983, the United Democratic Front - which pulled 
together a large number of diverse groups and trade unions opposed to the new 
Constitution - was established and did little to hide its sympathy for the ANC. Indeed, 
the imprisoned Nelson Mandela was one of its patrons, and it hailed the ANC’s 
Freedom Charter as the blueprint for a new South Africa (Thompson, 1995).  
 
In effect, the Constitution of 1983 accomplished the exact opposite of what the white 
government had intended. Widespread protests erupted again in September 1984 in 
black townships in the Pretoria Witwatersrand-Vereniging (PWV) area; protestors were 
not only angered by the reassertion of white supremacy in the Constitution of 1983, but 
also expressed a popular upsurge of demands for democracy, human rights and full 
enfranchisement of the black majority. Subsequently, the Defence Force troops of 
government were used in domestic affairs to suppress resistance, and hundreds of 
people were killed or injured. In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act, which included a ban on new investment and promised new 
sanctions if further reforms were not enacted. The South African state had been isolated 
not only at home, but also abroad (Halisi et al., 1995).  
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2.2.4 TRANSITION FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY 
 
With internal and external pressures mounting, the white minority reached a turning 
point by 1989, the same year that the Berlin Wall collapsed. White leaders could try to 
defend their indefensible policies of racial domination and face an all-out race war with 
the majority of the black people in their country, or they could seek to achieve 
reconciliation with black leaders such as Mandela before it was too late. They chose the 
latter.  
 
A series of unpredictable events unleashed the process of transition in South Africa. 
President P. W. Botha relinquished the leadership of the National Party in February 1989. 
He was succeeded by the Minister of National Education, F. W. De Klerk, who had been 
leader of the National Party in the Transvaal province since 1982. Despite losses to both 
the right-wing Conservative Party and the more liberal Democratic Party (DP), De 
Klerk, who was elected president in August 1989, interpreted the combined votes for his 
party and the DP as a mandate for reform (Halisi et al., 1995).  
 
Meanwhile the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
deprived the ANC of its main sources of political, financial and military support, and 
that created the climate for negotiation and compromise between the black leaders and 
the white government. The stage was now set for a dramatic change of fortune for South 
Africa. On 2 February 1990, De Klerk shocked white South Africans and the world. He 
announced the release of Nelson Mandela and scores of other political prisoners; lifted 
the ban on the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations, invited exiles to return home, 
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and promised to negotiate in good faith to end apartheid and start the process to 
establish a fully inclusive democracy for all South Africans.  
 
Despite the historic events of February 1990, there were significant forces that were 
opposed to the end of apartheid. Negotiation over the country’s political future began at 
the end of 1991 when delegates from the government, the ANC and seventeen other 
political organisations, including leaders from the ethnic homelands, gathered in the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Some political parties held 
back: leftist black-power movements, such as the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), 
continued to favour an armed struggle (“one settler, one bullet”) and conservative 
groups - such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which appealed to Zulu traditionalists 
- launched attacks on ANC supporters, which was primarily Xhosa, with the covert 
connivance of the South African security forces. In particular, the Zulu-based IFP, led 
by Mangosutho Buthelezi, instigated violence, especially in the urban areas outside 
Johannesburg and in the already simmering province of KwaZulu-Natal where included 
the traditional Zulu homelands. Clashes between ANC and IFP supporters left more than 
two thousand people dead in 1992 alone.  
 
Within this context of violence, a series of preliminary meetings were begun. As a result 
all the parties – not only the ANC and IFP - made a commitment to work to create a 
peaceful and stable climate for negotiations, including the granting of amnesty to agents 
of both the government and the black liberation movement. At the end of June 1993, a 
compromise was reached between the South African government and the ANC at the 
multiparty negotiations taking place in Johannesburg. Negotiations toward the country’s 
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first truly non-racial democratic election began in early 1994, but the level of violence 
continued unabated.  
 
Mandela’s renowned qualities as a conciliator, however, ensured a number of 
breakthroughs. Firstly, in early 1994 the far – right Afrikaner Volksfront joined into the 
election. Furthermore, political action and international mediation produced a last-
minute agreement between Mandela’s African National Congress, the National Party 
government and the Inkatha Freedom Party, leading to an end to the latter’s election 
boycott (Rothchild, 1997).  
 
Remarkably, the elections held on 26 and 27 April 1994, brought South Africa some of 
the most peaceful days in the troubled country’s history. Except for isolated incidences 
of political violence that were reported, the vote was relatively free and fair and the 
mood in the country was joyous. The ANC won the majority of 63 percent of the vote, 
the NP garnered 20 percent and the IFP 10.5 percent. All three parties would be in the 
government of National Unity. Nelson Mandela, the great conciliator and guardian of 
national reconciliation, would be president. De Klerk, along with the number-two leader 
in the ANC, Thabo Mbeki, would be vice president. Buthelezi was offered a cabinet 
post as Home Affairs Minister, which he readily accepted.  
 
The new South Africa was imbued with hope for reconciliation, economic revival and 
new-found legitimacy in the world. The elections of 1994 not only produced a new 
power-sharing government, they also produced a Constitutional Assembly that would 
create a new national charter to permanently guide South Africa’s newfound democracy. 
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In a process known for its thoughtful deliberations, its progressive embrace of human 
rights, and its delicate balance between majority demands and minority fears, the 
Constitutional Assembly produced a new Constitution in 1996. In many ways the 
greatest achievement of the democratisation process is that today all the major political 
actors in South Africa see the Constitution as a legitimate set of rules for ordering the 
country’s political life.  
 
2.3 THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF SOUTH KOREA 
 
This section describes nation formation, authoritarianism of military government and 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy in South Korea. 
 
2.3.1 NATION FORMATION 
 
Ever since the first kingdom, named Chosŏn (ancient Chosŏn), was established in 2333 
B.C., the following three kingdoms - Shilla (668-918), Koryŏ (918-1392) and Chosŏn 
(1392-1910) - were ruled by one single government and maintained their political 
independence, culture and ethnic identity. Despite a thousand foreign invasions, each 
kingdom developed its own political system and social culture under Buddhism and 
Confucianism. In the late 19th century, Korea became the focus of intense competition 
among imperialist nations - China, Russia and Japan. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea and 
instituted colonial rule, bringing the Chosŏn to an end and with it, traditional Korea.  
 
With the defeat of Japan of World War II in 1945, thirty-five years of Japanese colonial 
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rule over Korea came to an end and a new dispensation was ushered in. An agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union divided the country at the 38° parallel. 
These two parts were then placed under separate military controls exercised by the 
Soviet Union and the United States - that had accepted the Japanese surrender in the 
northern half and southern part - respectively. The alliance’s rule lasted for three years 
from 1945 until 1948, and was known in South Korea as “The American Military.” In 
1948 local but mutually hostile regimes took over in North Korea and South Korea from 
the Soviet Union and the United States military rule. 
 
The American occupation authorities had no knowledge of Korea and thus were ill 
prepared to administer it. Compounding the immediate problem of maintaining law and 
order, was the split of the domestic political forces in South Korea into Leftists and 
Rightists – a legacy of the pre-liberation Korean independence movement which was 
now aggravated by the division of the country. Leftist and Rightist movements fought 
against their ideological opponents, often bloodily, about the underlying issues of the 
ongoing presence of the American Military Government, the proposed system of 
government (liberal democracy vs. Marxism) and other ideological and nationalistic 
concerns regarding the best course for Korea’s independence and unification. Faced 
with the power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the 
reality of inter-Korea competition, the efforts to reunify the country on the basis of free 
election ended in failure. In 1948, South Korea became the Republic of Korea. At the 
same time, under Moscow’s aegis, North Korea became the People’s Republic of Korea, 
a rigid communist dictatorship led for nearly forty years by Kim Il-sung. Upon his death 
in 1994, power devolved upon his fifty-two-year-old son, Kim Jong-il (Lee, 2000). 
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The South Korean people initially hoped that the new Republic would develop stable 
democratic institutions. But the country’s first president, Syngman Rhee2, disappointed 
these hopes, ruling largely through the bureaucracy, the military and the police. When 
North Korean troops invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, setting off a bloody three-
year conflict, the Korean people had little choice but to tolerate Rhee’s autocratic rule. 
The Cold War (the Korean War) conflict against North Korea and its communist allies, 
the Soviet Union and China, took precedence over democratisation in South Korea. The 
war proved costly: 1.3 million South Koreans were killed and the economy was 
devastated. 
 
Syngman Rhee strengthened the military power and took advantage of the Korean War 
under the pretext of national security. In the late 1950’s, however, corruption at the 
highest levels, rigged elections, and lacklustre economic performance triggered student 
riots and forced Rhee’s resignation. Finally, on 18 April 1960, three thousand students 
of Korean universities went on a sit-in demonstration in front of the National Assembly 
and scores of students were attacked and injured by political hoodlums on the way to 
their universities. On 19 April, university students in Seoul rose in protest against the 
attack and marched to the central government buildings. This demonstration later 
evolved into the April 19th students uprising and forecast the demise of Rhee’s regime, 
but it also involved  the death of 186 people and the injury of 6,026 more (Shin, 1999). 
 
After Rhee’s government was dismantled by the April Revolution, the Second Republic 
                                                     
2 Syngman Lee did not conform to the Korean style of placing the surname before the first 
names whenever he dealt with the foreign Media. 
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was headed by Prime Minister Chang Myun with a new parliamentary-style constitution 
in 1960. During that period, Koreans expected to have the minimum constitutional 
shape of democratic politics. Chang Myun’s government adopted a parliamentary 
system of government and, subsequently, abolished the presidential government that had 
been monopolised by Rhee’s regime. This government, however, was unable to 
maintain social order. In May 1961, the South Korean military seized power in a coup 
d'état, putting a quick end to the democratic aspirations of Prime Minister Chang 
Myun’s Second Republic. Table 2.1 illustrated the constitutional and political 
development in South Korea from 1948 to 2003. 
 
Table 2.1 
 
Constitutional and Political Development in South Korea 
Period Constitution Leader Regime Type 
1948-1960 
1960-1961 
1961-1973 
 
1973-1980 
1980-1988 
1988-1993 
1993-1998 
1998-2003 
First Republic 
Second Republic 
Third Republic 
 
Fourth Republic 
Fifth Republic 
Sixth Republic 
Syngman Rhee 
Chang Myun 
Park Chung-hee 
 
Park Chung-hee 
Chun Doo-hwan 
Roh Tae-woo 
Kim Young-sam 
Kim Dae-jung 
Civilian authoritarian 
Democratic 
Military and civilian authoritarian; limited 
democratic procedures 
Military and civilian authoritarian; repressive 
Military and civilian authoritarian 
Military and civilian quasi-democratic 
Democratic 
Democratic 
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2.3.2 AUTHORITARIANISM OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
 
Major General Park Chung-hee, who seized power in a military revolution and who was 
the new ruler, promised an eventual return to civilian rule, but he prohibited thousands 
of pro-democracy politicians from participating in political life, while his government 
broke up the existing labour union.  
 
After three year long military rule, Park Chung-hee held elections in 1963 - after 
formally retiring from the military - and defeated several rivals for the presidency. A 
new Constitution establishing South Korea’s Third Republic soon followed, and Park 
Chung-hee was elected as president. Although he appeared to guarantee democratic 
procedures, Park, in fact, ruled with a firm authoritarian hand, backed by the repressive 
apparatus of the military and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Park’s 
government responded harshly to student demonstrators and parliamentary opponents of 
his policies (Lee, 1989) 
 
Nevertheless, Park also sought to court popular favour by significantly improving South 
Korea’s economic performance. Under his “export-oriented growth model,” as the 
economic development program since the mid-1960’s was known, South Korea 
developed into one of the most dynamic trading nations in the world. The government 
initiated a series of financial incentives, such as tax breaks and low-interest loans to 
South Korea’s top private companies (known as the chaebol), to encourage them to 
orient their production towards world markets. Meanwhile, Park’s regime continued its 
suppression of the labour movement. The government maintained tight restrictions on 
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the trade unions, limiting their right to strike and cramping their freedom to negotiate 
directly with private businesses (Han, 1990).  
 
However, these impressive economic achievements coincided with considerable 
political repression. Pack Chung-hee was re-elected as President, barely defeating a pro-
democracy reformer, Kim Dae-jung, who also garnered 46 percent of the vote in the 
April 1971 presidential election. Being a foremost political opponent, Kim Dae-jung 
was kidnapped by state police agents in 1973 and remained under arrest for six years. 
Despite the regime’s overpowering repressiveness, popular sentiment for democracy 
continued to simmer below the surface. 
 
With this political climate, the authority of Park Chung-hee ended when he was 
assassinated on 26 October 1979 by Kim Jae-kyu - who was then head of KCIA and 
also the First Aide to the President (Lee, 1989). The event released an outpouring of 
pent-up popular discontent over the government’s suppression of civil freedoms, 
democratic accountability and the rights of organised labour.  
 
But expectations for democracy were dashed once again as the military reasserted its 
dominance, declaring martial law. General Chun Doo-hwan, head of the Defence 
Security Command, assumed power and expanded martial law. Political activities were 
banned, the media were taken under direct government control, colleges and universities 
were closed and labour strikes were prohibited. Furthermore, Chun Doo-hwan also 
brutally suppressed a massive public protest in Kwangju in May 1980; hundreds died in 
the mêlée (Lee, 2000). 
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Chun Doo-hwan’s government promulgated a new Constitution, inaugurating South 
Korea’s Fifth Republic. Chun won a presidential election in 1981 only after imprisoning 
or banning his chief rivals such as Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. Kim Dae-jung 
was accused of inciting the Kwangju demonstrations and of belonging to pro-
communist groups, then, he was sentenced to death. Chun promised to relinquish power 
after the completion of his seven year term. But he picked Roh Tae-woo, a military ally, 
to run as his successor. The announcement of Roh’s candidacy sparked a firestorm of 
protest. Student demonstrations turned violent in several cities. Roh Tae-woo calmed the 
situation by proclaiming his acceptance of the opposition’s demands for civil liberties, 
direct presidential election and amnesty for political prisoners (Lee, 2000) 
 
2.3.3 TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
The Sixth Republic of Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) that came into being with the 1988 
Constitution was more respectful of democratic liberties than the previous South Korean 
government, with the exception of the short-lived Second Republic of 1960-1961. This 
paved the way for democracy in South Korea. In 1992, the democratic opposition 
parties won a major victory in a parliamentary election. In the same year, the pro-
democracy reformer Kim Young-sam – the nation’s first civilian leader in three decades 
- was elected to the presidency with 42 percent of the vote. Kim Young-sam promised to 
clean up political corruption. Within a few short years, however, hopes for a broader 
democracy were rudely disappointed while the administration of Kim Young-sam was 
wracked by factional strife, scandal and economic crisis. He failed to eliminate official 
corruption, widen the right of trade unions and reduce the chaebol’s excessive power in 
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South Korean economy (Kim, et al., 2000). 
 
As South Korea’s economic troubles peaked under the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the 
presidential election was held in December of the same year. Kim Dae-jung won the 
presidency and orchestrated the first transfer of power from the ruling party to an 
opposition party in the 50 years history of the South Korea. The promotion of 
democracy and human rights was a national policy of the new government, along with 
economic development and improvements in inter-Korean relations (Shin, 1999). 
 
2.4 THE CURRENT STATE OF DEMOCRATISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
AND SOUTH KOREA 
 
This section describes the challenges which resulted from prior authoritarian regimes in 
South Africa and South Korea, as well as the current changes in the democratisation of 
the respective countries. Furthermore, special mention is made of the development of 
democratic, political institutions and cultures that have made distinctive contributions to 
South Africa’s and South Korea’s development as democracies.  
 
For all but a few years of their histories, South Africa and South Korea were governed 
under non-democratic state institutions. The leaders routinely ignored the rule of law 
and indulged in blatant corruption. However, under a democratic regime - such as South 
Africa’s political arrangement since 1994 and South Korea’s since 1993 – the 
governments of both countries converted the demands of their people into concrete 
policies which are key institutions essential to a democracy. These include a 
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Constitution with a Bill of Rights, checks and balances among executive, judicial and 
legislative powers, and a regular cycle of open elections. 
 
2.4.1 THE CURRENT STATE OF DEMOCRATISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA  
 
South Africa faces economic, social and political problems. Some are new, but others 
are a direct consequence of the perverse nature of apartheid. Among the critical 
challenges the country faces are high levels of violent crime, economic stagnation, and 
uneven performance in delivering key services (housing, health care, education, water 
and environmental quality), corruption, tensions over employment and affirmative 
action, a highly unequal distribution of wealth and income and the AIDS epidemic. 
Furthermore ethnic conflict – which characterises the vast majority of contemporary 
civil wars and political violence – still remains a long-term threat to this decade old 
democracy (Horowitz, 1993).  
 
Nevertheless, the political system, over time, will likely encourage the continued 
integration of South African society - providing institutional remedies and protections to 
its various minority ethnic and religious groups. The South African Constitution, 
approved in May 1996, establishes a system of rules that provide incentives for 
moderation on divisive ethnic and racial themes. Even though it is essentially a 
majoritarian constitution, conferring primary governmental responsibility on the 
majority party or parties, the institutions it has created contain myriad features that may 
check majority powers and mediate current and potential inter-group conflicts. As well 
as a full gamut of civil and political rights, the Constitution’s Bill of Rights is included 
 34
in the Constitution.  
 
The judiciary and an independent Human Rights Commission, for example, have helped 
mediate disputes relating to own language education and to women’s rights, both in the 
workplace and in private issues, such as reproduction and birth control. Because South 
Africa’s past was marred by gross violations of human rights, the new order included 
special political institutions to deal with this legacy. Again to international acclaim, the 
government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 1995 under 
the supervision of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a Nobel Peace Prize winner in his own 
right. 
 
As long as South Africa’s home-grown culture of bargaining, consultation and inter-
group consensus seeking is maintained – however inefficient and laborious such 
decision making may be – the country’s transformation towards being the locus of one 
of the world’s most promising multi-ethnic democracies is likely to continue its present, 
relatively successful, course. This transformation has much to do with the quality of its 
leadership - particularly the exceptional efforts of the former President, Nelson Mandela, 
to keep nation building and reconciliation on the front burner of the country’s political 
life.  
 
2.4.2 THE CURRENT STATE OF DEMOCRATISATION OF SOUTH KOREA 
 
Since the modern nation was formed in 1948, South Korea has had a “stateness” 
problem. The division of Korea into two states has imposed political hardships on South 
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Korea. The country has had to maintain a sizable military force and constant vigilance 
against a potentially aggressive North Korean communist regime. In 1998 South Korea 
spent 3.4 percents of its GNP on the military, a figure that exceeded the relative military 
outlays of Britain (3 percent), France (3.1 percent) and Japan (1 percent) and fell only 
slightly lower than that of the United States (3.8 percent) (Kim, 1994). This permanent 
security problem has given the South Korean military an exceptionally prominent role 
in the country’s political life, providing a convenient pretext for authoritarian rule.  
 
The past authoritarian regime – as well as a concentration of economic resource in the 
private companies – has thwarted fair competition and efficiency in every sector of 
society. The individual rights of Koreans have been ignored for a long time in the name 
of economic development. Furthermore there has recently been consensus in South 
Korea that the past system may have brought temporary economic growth, but cannot 
result in long-term economic development because it fosters corruption and collusion 
between the political and economic communities (Park, 1991). At the end of 1997, as a 
result, South Korea faced an economic crisis and was forced to seek help from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).   
 
Kim Dae-jung administration began to work vigorously to help the nation overcome the 
economic crisis through reform. In addition, it undertook a spiritual revolution that 
would value the rights of the individual, pursued educational reform and attempted to 
end the Cold-War style confrontational relationship with North Korea. He formed the 
Tripartite Committee of Representatives, made up of representatives of labour, 
management and government (Chung Wa Dae, 2002). His transition team successfully 
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drew labour and management – which have sharply conflicting interests in such 
problems as layoffs and the reform of the economic structure during this era of IMF 
bailout loans – to the negotiation table and helped them reach an agreement. Since then, 
government has established a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which has 
addressed many of South Korea’s outstanding human rights problems.  
 
Since Kim’s inauguration, he steadily pursued a policy of engagement towards North 
Korea. This policy of engagement, popularly called the “Sunshine Policy,” is widely 
considered as a solution to the South-North relationship. The Policy calls for the South 
to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, along with reconciliation and 
cooperation with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung’s efforts bore fruit in June of 2000, when 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il met him in Pyongyang for the first South-North 
summit talks on 13-15 June 2000. The two leaders signed the historic South-North Joint 
Declaration. The two Korean leaders have since been working together to reduce 
tension on the Korean Peninsula; solve humanitarian problems resulting from the 
Korean War, and increase economic cooperation for mutual prosperity.  
 
Kim Dae-jung’s dedication to democracy and human rights in South Korea and 
neighbouring region, and his work for peace and reconciliation with North Korea have 
help to consolidate democracy in South Korea.  
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2.5 THE ROLE OF NELSON MANDELA IN THE DEMOCRATISATION 
PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela led the independence struggle from his jail cell on Robben 
Island for nearly three decades, finally emerging from prison to negotiate with the white 
regime a Constitution that would guarantee voting rights to the majority black 
population. He served as the country’s first President under a new political order from 
1994 to 1999. He is popular among all segments of the population – including the white 
minority – and is hailed as the one individual most responsible for South Africa’s 
dramatic transition to democracy. In 1993, he and F. W. De Klerk were awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize for their dedication to a negotiated settlement.  
 
Born July 18, 1918, Mandela was the son of Henry, the Acting Paramount Chief of 
Thembuland. Since Nelson Mandela dedicated himself to the study of law, he entered 
the University of Fort Hare, where he was suspended for a time due to protesting 
against discriminatory racial policies in the country. He eventually migrated to 
Johannesburg, where he studied law and began his political career by joining the 
African National Congress in 1942 (Halisi et al., 1995). 
 
In the booming Johannesburg metropolis, Mandela forged ties with other young, black 
activists, such as Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu, and they banded together to found 
the ANC Youth League. The League and these fraternal ties became extremely 
important to South Africa’s trajectory; Mandela and his companions espoused an 
ideology of African nationalism and began to organise and mobilise the ANC to 
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challenge the powerful white minority establishment. The youth organisers were 
eventually elected to the National Executive Committee of the ANC. 
 
After the end of World War II, when the National Party won elections and began to 
implement policies of apartheid, Mandela and the ANC became more militant, 
organising boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience campaigns and other acts of non-
cooperation with the authoritarian regime. In the early 1950s, Mandela helped organise 
the Defiance Campaign, travelling around the country and organising passive resistance 
to apartheid. In 1955, Mandela created a plan of further non-violent resistance, 
particularly against the system of inferior education for blacks (known as Bantu 
education), and he was also instrumental in the drafting of the Freedom Charter, which 
committed the ANC to a tolerant, multiracial South Africa with freedom and equality 
for all (Mandela, 1994). 
 
In the early 1960’s, as it became clear that the apartheid government’s policies were 
becoming ever more cruel and discriminatory, Mandela went underground to form the 
armed wing of the ANC and to launch a struggle for liberation. He later wrote that only 
the intransigence of the apartheid government – which refused many petitions for 
reform – led him and his ANC colleagues to turn to violent armed struggle. Eventually, 
Mandela was arrested by the government and charged with treason. At the Rivonia trial, 
he conducted his own defence, uttering words that continue to ring in the South African 
national psyche: 
 
“I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black 
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domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all 
persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I 
hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am 
prepared to die” (Mandela, 1995). 
 
Since Mandela was elected as President, his famous act of magnanimity toward white 
South Africans and his Inkatha foes – such as meeting with the widow of the former 
pro-apartheid prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd, donning the cap of the national (and 
historically all-white) rugby team and appointing Buthelezi acting president while he 
travelled abroad – did much to consolidate legitimacy for the government. From 1994 to 
1999 he served not only as the country’s chief executive, but as its moral force, 
launching the Republic on a path of tolerance, moderate policies and national 
reconciliation.  
 
2.6 THE ROLE OF KIM DAE-JUNG IN THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS 
IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
Kim Dae-jung, who had been the leader of the opposition as the democratic dissentient 
for four decades, became president of South Korea (after three unsuccessful election 
campaigns) in December 1997. His election marked the first change of power to another 
party since Korea began holding elections in 1948. This was also the first time in the 
fifty years since the Korean Peninsula was split into separate nations, North and South, 
that South Korean people had elected an opposition figure as president.  
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Born December 3, 1925, Kim Dae-jung was the second son of a farmer on the tiny 
island of Ha-uido in South Cholla province. When the family moved to the nearby port 
of Mokpo, Kim got an education and completed high school. While working in the 
shipping industry, Kim began dabbling in anti-establishment politics. After his fifth 
attempt for political office, Kim was elected to the National Assembly in 1961. One 
month later, General Park Chung-hee seized control of the government through a 
military coup, launching Kim’s career as a key opposition figure. After General Park 
became a President, the more Park persecuted Kim, the more Kim’s popularity grew – 
especially in the region of Cholla. Many residents of the provinces of North and South 
Cholla felt disadvantaged during the regime of President Park, who was from the Taegu 
region in the southeast - their political rival (Kim, 2000a). 
 
During the height of the Vietnam War, in 1971, Kim proclaimed his liberal views on the 
reunification of North and South Korea. He was branded a communist by the 
government, but in his first presidential race he won 46 percent of the votes even though 
he lost to Park Chung-hee. Park tightened his hold in 1972, scrapping the Constitution 
and doing away with any pretence of democratic rule. Kim travelled to Japan for 
medical treatment and continued his anti-Park campaign. In August 1973, KCIA (Korea 
Central Intelligence Agency) kidnapped Kim from a Tokyo hotel and took him out to 
sea in a small boat where he spent several harrowing days (Goldstein, 1999). Although 
he could return to Seoul as a result of the intervention of the United States, another 
assassination attempt by KCIA followed in 1979.  
 
Nonetheless, Kim resumed his quest for the presidency, but General Chun Doo-hwan 
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imposed martial law as he moved to take over the presidency. As a result, Kim and other 
leading opposition figures were arrested as tens of thousands of protesters gathered in 
Kwangju, in South Cholla Province. Troops used force to quell the demonstrations, 
killing at least 200 people by some estimates. Kim was charged with sedition and nearly 
executed, but again the United States intervened and Kim’s life was spared. As the result 
of a deal with the Reagan Administration, Kim boarded a plane to the United States in 
1982. When he returned to his homeland a few years later, he was brutally assaulted by 
KCIA and dragged back into house arrest (Kim, 2000a)  
 
Despite this oppression by authoritarian regimes, Kim Dae-jung was finally elected 
president in 1997 at the height of the economic crisis. Subsequently, the maverick 
politician forged a dramatic coalition with Kim Jong-pil, another opposition leader and 
the founder of the KCIA. Shortly after winning the presidency, Kim Dae-jung told Time 
magazine: 
 
“Throughout my life I have faced death five times. For six years I was in prisons, 
and for ten years I was in exile or under house arrest. I never lost hope that 
someday there would be something like this” (Time, 1998). 
 
His inauguration marked the first peaceful transfer of power between rival parties in 50 
years. The economic crisis presented Kim with a huge problem at the beginning of his 
presidency, but it also rallied the patriotism of the population. Passion for regional 
politics was subdued by a spirit of cooperation needed to help alleviate the country’s 
dire financial circumstances. South Korea’s economic growth rate shrank to minus 5.8 
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percent in 1998 but bounced back in 1999 to plus10.2 percent. Kim has been largely 
credited with the economic turnaround, but he has not rested on his laurels (Shin, 1999). 
 
Despite his advanced age, Kim Dae-jung’s outlook remained relevant to economical 
progress. He stressed the need for technological development for South Korea to 
assume its rightful place as a first-rate nation with a strong economy backed by a 
democratic system. “In the new millennium, an electronic democracy will be realised,” 
Kim said in an address posted on his web site. He continued: 
 
“We must forge a clean nation where corruption and irregularities are rooted out 
completely through active public participation and surveillance…If we cannot cope 
creatively and positively with the knowledge revolution in the new age, we will be 
pushed aside to the periphery of world history.” 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The fledgling democracies of South Africa and South Korea face innumerable 
challenges and yet there is also an anticipation of eventual success. The newly formed 
democratic governments face the enormous challenge of reforming virtually every 
social economic and political institution.  In addition, the remains of authoritarianism 
are a daunting obstacle. Nevertheless, the people's spontaneous and continued call for 
democracy during the previous authoritarian regimes indicated a real desire for reform 
and a true willingness to support their leaders - both in government and society at large. 
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South Africa and South Korea’s respective guiding figures undoubtedly had an immense 
influence on their current political dispensations. Since Nelson Mandela was elected as 
president of South Africa, the lifting of sanctions and the promise of a new 
constitutional arrangement greatly increased the chance for improvements in human 
rights and economic conditions. This was especially due to the fact that South Africa 
now became eligible for support from a host of national and international donors - 
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Simultaneously, 
Kim Dae-jung's presidential victory ensured that the Korean government established 
legal and institutional devices to guarantee human rights. Furthermore, the economic 
crisis in Korea was averted by accepting IMF demands for a major overhaul of financial 
institutions and economic policies, including the structural reform of private companies 
(chaebol) as well as public sector.  
 
South Africa and South Korea have overcome tremendous odds in order to achieve their 
goals of true and lasting democracy. The two leaders were instrumental in this process 
and led the transition to democracy through reconciliation in their respective countries.  
Both Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung devoted their lives to democracy and the 
achievements of human rights. They were well-rewarded for their efforts by the 
successful implementation of systems of governance rooted in those values. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
LEADERSHIP THEORY 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
While the attitudes and actions of society’s leaders are of significance at every stage of a 
democracy’s evolution, there is evidence to suggest that they are particularly relevant in 
the earliest stages. One piece of evidence is in the roles played by the leaders of both 
South Africa and South Korea. It was the determination and ongoing negotiations of 
Frederik W. De Klerk (the leader of the predominantly white National Party) and 
Nelson Mandela (the leader of the largely black African National Congress) that led to 
the establishment of a multiracial democracy and brought about South Africa’s first 
truly democratic elections on the basis of “one person, one vote” in 1994. Similarly, it 
was through the victory of Kim Dae-jung (the leader of the Democratic Party) against 
his political opponents, who had made an attempt on his life, and his reluctance to 
retaliate, that made the first peaceful transition from the ruling to the opposition party 
possible in South Korea in 1997.  
 
This chapter reviews and analyses current research in the field of leadership studies, and 
focuses on five specific leadership theories. Each of the sections dealing with the five 
theories briefly defines and discusses various research studies applicable to that 
particular approach, followed by an evaluation of the approach and criticism levelled at 
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Transformational 
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• Definition 
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it. Special attention is given to how the approach contributes or fails to contribute to an 
overall understanding of the leadership process. Below, Figure 3.1 shows the framework 
of leadership approaches studied in chapter three. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Framework of Leadership Approaches Studied in Chapter Three 
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3.2  DEFINING LEADERSHIP 
 
The study of leaders and leadership has a long history (from the rise of civilisation). 
Both earlier and recent research developed convenient classification systems of types of 
leadership, which are either simple lists of types of leaders or multilayered classification 
systems of formal rules for classifying the leaders by their characteristics or behaviours. 
Types of leaders can be differentiated according to differences in functional or 
institutional roles. 
 
In the past 50 years, as many as 30,000 research articles, magazine articles and books 
about leadership have been written. Various types of leaders have been studied within 
their specific socio-historical context, and these research results are frequently used to 
draw conclusions about leadership in general. As a result, leadership has been defined in 
different ways. DuBrin (2001) lists several representative definitions of leadership as 
follows: 
 
• Interpersonal influence directed through communication toward goal attainment 
• The influential increment over and above mechanical compliance with directions 
and orders 
• An art that causes others to act or respond in a shared direction 
• The art of influencing a people by persuasion or example to follow a line of 
action 
• The principal dynamic force that motivates and coordinates the organisation in 
the accomplishment of its objectives 
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The definition used as the basis of this dissertation defines leadership as the process of 
influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts toward goal achievement 
in a given situation. 
 
The following sections review the five most influential leadership approaches. These 
are: 
• Trait approach 
• Behavioural approach 
• Situational approach 
• Transformational approach 
• Social Learning approach 
 
3.3 THE TRAIT APPROACH 
 
In the early 1900s, the most common approach to the study of leadership suggested that 
certain traits – such as physical energy or friendliness – were essential for effective 
leadership. It was believed that leaders and non-leaders could be differentiated by a 
universal set of traits, and twentieth-century researchers were challenged to identify 
these definitive traits.  
 
This approach attempted to determine whether some people have traits and skills that 
will make them more likely to seek and attain positions of leadership and to be effective 
in these positions. Bernard, Bringham, Tread, Page and Kilbourne all explained 
leadership in term of traits of personality and character (Northouse, 2004). 
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The term trait refers to a variety of individual attributes, including aspects of personality, 
temperament, needs, motives and values. Personality traits are relatively stable 
dispositions that cause people to behave in a particular way. The term skill refers to a 
person’s ability to perform various types of cognitive or behaviour activities in an 
effective manner. Like traits, skills are determined jointly by learning and heredity (Yukl, 
1994).  
 
Table 3.1 
 
Traits and Skills Found Most Frequently to be Characteristic of Successful Leaders 
TRAIT SKILL 
Adaptable to situations 
Alert to social environment 
Ambitious and achievement-oriented 
Assertive 
Cooperative 
Decisive 
Dependable 
Dominant (desire to influence others) 
Energetic (high activity level) 
Persistent 
Self-Confident 
Tolerant of stress 
Willing to assume responsibility 
Clever (intelligent) 
Conceptually skilled 
Creative 
Diplomatic and tactful 
Fluent in speaking 
Knowledgeable about group tasks 
Organised (administrative ability) 
Persuasive 
Socially Skilled 
Source: Gary A. Yukl, Leadership in Organisations, 1994, p.256. 
 
Leadership traits were studied to determine what made certain people great leaders. The 
theories that were developed were called “great man” theories because they focused on 
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identifying the innate qualities and characteristics possessed by great social, political 
and military leaders (Northouse, 2004). It was believed that people were born as leaders 
with these traits. Yukl offered some suggestions developed by Stogdill (1974), shown in 
Table 3.1 above.  
 
3.3.1 RESEARCH ON THE TRAIT APPROACH 
 
There have been numerous studies based on the trait approach. According to Yukl 
(1994), Bird compiled a list of 79 such traits from 20 psychologically oriented studies. 
A similar review was completed by Smith and Krueger for educators and by Jenkins for 
military leaders. Until the 1940s, most research about leaders and leadership focused on 
the individual trait of consequence. Leaders were seen to have various attributes and 
personality traits that were different from non-leaders (Bass & Stogdill, 1990). However, 
Stogdill’s (1974) critique concluded that both person and situation had to be included to 
explain the emergence of leadership.  
 
In an early review by Stogdill (1948) of more than 124 trait studies that were conducted 
between 1904 and 1947, he suggested that no consistent set of traits differentiated 
leaders from non-leaders across a variety of situations. An individual with leadership 
traits, who was a leader in one situation, might not be a leader in another situation. 
Rather than being a quality that individuals possessed, leadership was re-conceptualised 
as a relationship between people in a social situation.  
 
Mann (1959) conducted a similar study that examined more than 1,400 findings 
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regarding personality and leadership in small groups, but he placed less emphasis on 
how situational factors influenced leadership. Mann suggested that personality traits 
could be used to discriminate leaders from non-leaders. His results identified leaders as 
strong in the following traits: intelligence, masculinity, adjustment, dominance, 
extroversion and conservatism. 
 
Other reviews argued for the importance of leadership traits: McCall and his associates 
(1985) found that a need for power is expressed in different ways depending upon the 
trait identified as “activity inhibition,” which was measured by coding the TAT 
(Thematic Apperception Test) responses. Additionally, Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) 
argued that leaders differ from non-leaders based on six traits: drive, the desire to lead, 
honesty and integrity, self-confidence, cognitive ability and knowledge of the business.  
 
From the number of research studies that have been conducted on individuals’ personal 
characteristics, it is clear that many traits contribute to leadership. Some of the 
important traits that are consistently identified in many of these studies are intelligence, 
self-confidence, determination, integrity and sociability (Northouse, 2004). Recent 
researches, however, stress the interactions that occur between leaders and their context 
instead of focusing only on leaders’ traits.  
 
In the mid-1900s, the trait approach was challenged by research that questioned the 
universality of leadership traits. The early trait research studies did not pay attention to 
the question of how traits interact as an integrator of personality and behaviour, or how 
the situation determines the relevance of different traits and skills for leader 
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effectiveness.  
 
3.3.2  CRITICISM OF THE TRAIT APPROACH 
 
The trait approach has been criticised for a number of reasons. Hundreds of research 
studies of the trait approach have, for instance, failed to delimit a definitive list of 
leadership traits. The list of traits (which have been pinpointed over the past years) is 
seemingly limitless. Furthermore, this approach failed to take contextual information 
into account and ignored the influence of the specific socio-historical situation on the 
leader in question. Since the particularities of the situation influence leadership, it is 
difficult to identify a universal set of leadership traits in isolation from the context in 
which the leadership occurs (Northouse, 2004).  
 
Another criticism levelled against the trait approach is that it questions the value of 
training individuals to assume leadership positions. Teaching new traits is a difficult 
process because traits are not easily changed. According to this approach, it is therefore 
not reasonable to train managers in organisation.  
 
In spite of these criticisms, the trait approach provides valuable knowledge about 
leadership. Although a definitive set of traits is not offered, the approach does offer 
guidelines for identifying traits that contribute to effective leadership. Stogdil as quoted 
by Yukl (1994) makes it clear that recognition of the relevance of leader traits is not a 
return to the original trait approach. The premise that some leader traits are absolutely 
necessary for effective leadership has not been substantiated in several decades of trait 
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research. Possession of particular traits increases the likelihood that a leader will be 
effective, but it does not guarantee effectiveness, and the relative importance of different 
traits is dependent upon the nature of the leadership situation. 
 
Most studies attempt to identify how traits and skills are reflected in behaviours that 
explain why a person is effective in a particular managerial position, or why the person 
is promoted to a higher position. As a result, better-designed research slowly 
accumulated over the years and thus researchers have made progress in discovering how 
leader attributes are related to leadership behaviour and effectiveness. 
 
3.4 THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH 
 
While the trait approach emphasises the personality characteristics of the leader, the 
behavioural approach emphasises the behaviour of the leader. The behavioural approach 
is different from the trait approach because the behavioural approach focuses on what 
leaders do rather than who leaders are. Although there are many behaviour models and 
theories, this section will focus on three: the Ohio State Leadership studies, The 
Michigan Leadership studies and the Leadership Grid○R. 
 
The behavioural approach emphasises what leaders do and how they act. This shift 
expanded the study of leadership to include the actions of leaders toward subordinates 
in various contexts. Behaviour research is concerned with two general types of 
behaviour: task behaviour and relationship behaviour. Task behaviour assists goal 
accomplishment and helps group members to achieve their objectives. On the other 
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hand, relationship behaviour helps subordinates feel comfortable with themselves, with 
each other, and with the situation in which they find themselves. The important purpose 
of this approach is to explain how leaders combine these two types of behaviour to 
influence subordinates in their efforts to reach a goal.  
 
3.4.1 RESEARCH ON THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH 
 
The main period of the behavioural approach to leadership studies occurred between 
1945, with the Ohio State and Michigan studies, and the mid-1960s, with the 
development of the Leadership Grid○R. 
 
3.4.1.1 The Ohio State Leadership Studies 
 
The leadership studies initiated in 1945 by the Bureau of Business Research at Ohio 
State University attempted to identify various dimensions of leader behaviour (Hersey, 
et al., 2000). Stogdill (1974), who directed the research, defined leadership as the 
behaviour of an individual when directing the activities of a group toward goal 
attainment. He eventually narrowed the description of leader behaviour to two 
dimensions: initiating structure and consideration. Daft (1994) defines these terms as 
follows: 
 
Initiating structure: A type of leader behaviour that describes the extent to which a 
leader is task oriented and directs subordinates’ work activities toward goal achievement.  
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Consideration: A type of leader behaviour that describes the extent to which a leader is 
sensitive to subordinates, respects their ideas and feelings, and establishes mutual trust.  
 
At the same time, Ohio State researchers developed the Leader Behaviour Description 
Questionnaire (LBDQ), to be completed by leaders’ followers for the collection of data 
about leader’s behaviour. The LBDQ was designed to evaluate how leaders carry out 
their activities, and contained fifteen questions pertaining to consideration and fifteen to 
initiation structure. Furthermore, the researchers developed a second questionnaire, the 
Leader Opinion Questionnaire (LOQ) to collect data about leaders’ self perceptions of 
their leadership style. As a result of this research, the Ohio State researchers developed 
quadrants to show various combinations of initiating structure and consideration as 
illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 The Ohio State Leadership Quadrants 
 
 
High Consideration 
And 
Low Structure 
 
 
High Structure 
And 
High Consideration 
 
 
Low Consideration 
And 
Low Structure 
 
 
High Structure 
And 
Low Consideration 
 
  
  
(L
ow
) 
  
  
 C
on
sid
er
at
io
n 
  
  
 (
H
ig
h)
 
(Low)       Initiating Structure        (High) 
  Source: Paul Hersey, Kenneth H. Blanchard and Dewey E. Jonson, 2000, p. 94. 
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Figure 3.2 shows a high score on one dimension does not necessitate a low score on the 
other. The behaviour of a leader is described as any mix of both dimensions. Thus, it 
was during these studies that leader behaviour was first plotted on two separate axes 
rather than on a single continuum (Hersey, et al., 2000). Quadrants were developed to 
show various combinations of initiating structure and consideration, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
3.4.1.2 The Michigan Leadership Studies 
 
While researchers at Ohio State developed the LBDQ and LOQ to observe the 
behaviour of leaders, researchers at the University of Michigan also conducted 
leadership studies by locating clusters of characteristics that seemed to be related and by 
determining various indicators of effectiveness (Kahn and Katz, 1960). The studies 
identified two types of leadership behaviour called employee orientation and production 
orientation, as follows (Yukl, 1994): 
 
Employee orientation: The behaviour of leaders who approach subordinates with a 
strong human relations emphasis. 
Production orientation: The behaviour of leaders that stress the technical and 
production aspects of the job.  
 
Employee-oriented leaders emphasised that every employee is important and took 
interest in everyone, accepting their individuality and personal need. Production-
oriented leaders, on the other hand, regarded employees as tools to accomplish the goals 
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of the organisation.  
 
Despite similarities to the Ohio State studies, the Michigan studies conceptualised 
employee and production orientations as opposite ends of a single continuum differently 
from the Ohio State studies. This means that leaders who were oriented towards 
production were less oriented to employees. 
 
3.4.1.3 The Leadership Grid○R 
 
In discussing the Ohio State and Michigan Leadership studies, researchers concentrated 
on two theoretical concepts, one emphasising task accomplishment and the other 
emphasising personal relationships. Blake and McCanse (1991) modified these concepts 
in their Leadership Grid (formerly the Managerial Grid by Blake and Mouton) and have 
used them extensively in organisation and management development programs. 
 
The Leadership Grid was designed to explain how leaders help organisations to reach 
their aims through two factors, namely concern for production and concern for people. 
Blake and Mouton (1984) defined the meanings of the two terms as follows: 
 
Concern for production: How a leader is concerned with achieving organisational tasks.  
Concern for people: How a leader attends to the people within the organisation who are 
trying to achieve its goals. 
 
One significant difference between the Leadership Grid and the Ohio State Studies is a 
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“concern for” which is a predisposition about something, or an attitudinal dimension. 
Therefore, the Leadership Grid tends to be an attitudinal model that measures the value 
and feelings of a leader, whereas the Ohio State framework attempts to include 
behaviour concepts as well as attitudinal items (Hersey, et al., 2000).  
 
Figure 3.3 The Leadership Grid○R 
 
 Source: Peter G. Northouse, 2004, p. 70. 
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3.4.2 CRITICISM OF THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH 
 
The behavioural approach also has several weaknesses. Firstly, this approach does not 
adequately show how leaders’ styles are associated with performance outcomes (Yukl, 
1994). Researchers have not been able to establish a consistent link between task and 
relationship behaviours and outcomes such as morale, job satisfaction and productivity. 
Secondly, this approach failed to find a universal style of leadership that could be 
effective in almost every situation. Furthermore, this approach implies that the most 
effective leadership style is always the high-high pattern (high task and high 
relationship style). In fact, there can be other situations which require different 
leadership styles; some may require high task behaviour, and others may require 
supportive behaviour.  
 
Nevertheless, the behavioural approach has broadened the scope of leadership research 
to include the study of the behaviour of leaders rather than only their personal traits or 
characteristics. In addition, this approach is valuable because it emphasises the 
importance of the two dimensions of leadership behaviour: task and relationship. As a 
result, this approach can provide a useful frame in searching for an understanding of our 
own leadership behaviour. Overall, due to the lack of attention to situational variables, 
the behavioural approach has been credited with the emergence of the situational 
approach, which studies leadership behaviour in various situations, and transformational 
approach, which has the strongest effect on subordinate motivation. 
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3.5 THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH 
 
The situational approach observes the behaviour of leaders towards followers in specific 
situations. Leadership is not ascribed to any hypothetical inborn or acquired ability or 
on a potential for leadership. The situational approach was developed by Hersey and 
Blanchard (2000) and has been refined and revised several times since its inception. It 
has been used extensively in training and development for organisations throughout the 
world. Although there are situational studies, this section briefly explains three theories: 
the Hersey-Blanchard Situational Model, Fiedler’s Contingency Theory and the Path-
Goal Theory. 
 
The situational approach focuses on leadership in a given situation. The basic frame is 
that different situations demand different kinds of leadership. This research has two 
major subcategories. One treats managerial behaviour as a dependent variable and 
researchers seek to discover how this behaviour is influenced by aspects of the situation, 
such as the type of organisation or managerial position. Therefore, this research 
investigates how managers cope with demands and constraints. 
 
The other subcategory of situational research attempts to identify aspects of the 
situation that “moderate” the relationship of leader behaviours to leadership 
effectiveness. This research is based on the assumption that different behaviour patterns 
will be effective in different situations. Theories describing this relationship are 
sometimes called “contingency theories” of leadership (Yukl, 1994).  
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This emphasis on behaviour and environment allows for the possibility that individuals 
can be trained to adapt their style of leader behaviour to varying situations. Therefore, it 
is believed that most people can increase their effectiveness in leadership roles through 
education, training and development.  
 
3.5.1 RESEARCH ON THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH 
 
The main period of the situational approach to leadership occurred in the early 1960s 
and it was subsequently developed by Hersey and Blanchard in the late 1960s. At the 
same time, widely respected as the father of the contingency theory of leadership, 
Fiedler developed the Leadership Contingency model in the late 1960s. Furthermore, 
the Path-Goal Theory appeared in the early 1970s. Even though these theories vary 
considerably in some aspects, they all utilise the situational variable as a basis. 
Therefore, they are classified under the common heading of the situational approach.  
 
3.5.1.1 Hersey-Blanchard Situational Model 
 
One of the most widely recognised situational approaches to leadership is the Hersey-
Blanchard theory, based on Reddin’s 3-D Management Style Theory. This model refers 
to the behaviour pattern of an individual who attempts to influence others. Hersey and 
Blanchard (2000) emphasise both a directive and a supportive dimension and each has 
to be applied appropriately in a given situation, as follows: 
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Figure 3. 4 Situational Leadership Model 
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Source: Paul Hersey, Kenneth H. Blanchard and Dewey E. Johnson, 2000, p. 236. 
 
 
 
LEADER BEHAVIOUR 
S3 S2 
(S
up
po
rti
ve
 B
eh
av
io
ur
) 
  
  
  
  
  
RE
LA
TI
ON
SH
IP
 B
EH
AV
IO
UR
  
  
  
  
(H
ig
h)
 
S4  S1 
(Low)                             TASK BEHAVIOUR                        (High) 
(Guidance) 
Share ideas  
and facilitate 
in decision 
making 
Explain decision 
and provide 
opportunity for 
clarification 
Turn over 
responsibility 
for decisions 
and 
implementation
Provide specific 
instructions 
and closely 
supervise 
performance 
Hi Rel. 
LoTask 
Hi Task 
Hi Rel. 
Lo Rel. 
Lo Task 
Hi Task 
Lo Rel. 
 62
Directive (task) behaviour:  The extent to which the leader spells out the duties and 
responsibilities of an individual or group. It includes giving direction and setting goals. 
Supportive (relationship) behaviour: The extent to which the leader engages in two-
way or multiway communication. It includes such activities as listening, providing 
encouragement and coaching.  
 
This situation model can be classified further into four distinct categories of directive 
and supportive behaviours as shown in Figure 3.4. Each quadrant calls for a different 
leadership style. Consequently this model shows how the following descriptions apply 
to the four leadership styles (DuBrin, 2001): 
 
Style 1 (S1): High task and low relationship. The “telling” style is directive because the 
leader produces a lot of input but a minimum amount of relationship behaviour. 
 
Style 2 (S2): High task and high relationship. The “selling” style is also very directive 
but in a more persuasive, guiding manner. The leader provides considerable input about 
task accomplishment but also emphasises human relations.  
 
Style 3 (S3): High relationship and low task. In the “participating” leadership style, 
there is less direction and more collaboration between leader and group members. The 
consultative and consensus subtypes of participative leader generally fit into this 
quadrant. 
 
Style 4 (S4): Low relationship and low task. In the “delegating” leadership style, the 
 63
leader delegates responsibility for a task to a group member and is simply kept informed 
of progress. If carried to an extreme, this style would be classified as free-rein.  
 
Each four leadership styles related to “readiness,” see Figure 3.4, which is defined as 
the extent to which a follower demonstrates the ability and willingness to accomplish a 
specific task. Readiness is not a personal characteristic, but how ready a person is to 
perform a particular task. Readiness has two components - ability and willingness 
(Hersey et al., 2000). 
 
Ability: The knowledge, experience and skill an individual or group brings to a 
particular task or activity.  
Willingness: The extent to which an individual or group has the confidence, 
commitment and motivation to accomplish a specific task.  
 
Followers are at a high readiness level (R4) if they are interested and confident in their 
work and they know how to do the task. Therefore followers become responsible for 
task direction and the decisions are follower-directed. As followers move from low 
levels of readiness to higher levels, the combinations of task and relationship behaviour 
appropriate to the situation begin to change (Hersey, et al., 2000). 
 
As a result, the situational leadership suggests the high probability leadership style for 
various readiness levels and it also indicates the probability of success of the other style 
configurations if a leader is unable to use the desired style. 
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3.5.1.2 Fiedler’s Contingency Theory 
 
Fiedler (1971) developed the contingency theory by studying the style of different 
leaders who worked in different contexts, but primarily military organisations. After 
analysing the styles of hundreds of leaders, Fiedler and his colleagues were able to 
make an empirically grounded generalisation about which style of leadership were best 
and which styles were worst for a given organisational context (Hersey, at al., 2000). He 
suggested that three major situational variables determine whether a given situation is 
favourable to leaders: 
 
Leader-member relations: Their personal relations with the member of their group. 
Task structure: The degree of structure in the task that their group has been assigned to 
perform. 
Position power: The power and authority that leaders’ position provides. 
 
Based on research findings, the contingency model (see Figure 3.5) proposes that 
certain styles will be effective in certain situations. This model suggests eight possible 
combinations and develops the Least Preferred Co-workers (LPC) scale. This scale is 
use to measure a person’s leadership style. For example, it measures leader’s style by 
having leader describes a co-worker with whom he had difficulty completing a job.  
Leaders who score high on this scale are described as relationship motivated and those 
who score low on the scale are identified as task-motivated (Fiedler, 1971). 
 
Figure 3.5 indicates that contingency theory stresses that leaders will not be effective in 
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all situations. Situations that are rated “most favourable” are those having good leader-
follower relations, defined tasks and a strong leader position of power. Situations that 
are “least favourable” have poor leader-follower relations, unstructured tasks and a 
weak leader position of power (Fiedler, 1971). It emphasises the importance of 
matching a leader’s style with the demands of the situation.  
 
Figure 3.5 Contingency Model 
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Source: Stephen P. Robbins, Organisation Behaviour, 1993, p. 375. 
 
3.5.1.2 Path-Goal Theory 
 
In contrast to the Hersey-Blanchard model, which suggests that a leader must adapt to 
the development level of subordinates, and unlike Fiedler, which emphasises the match 
between the leader’s style and specific situational variable, the path-goal theory 
emphasises the relationship between the leader’s style, characteristics of the 
subordinates and the work setting (Northouse, 2004).  
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This theory was developed by Evans and House and has been refined and extended by 
various writers such as House and Mitchell, Stinson and Johnson and Fulk and Wendler 
(Hersey, et al., 2000). The path-goal theory is designed to explain how leaders can help 
subordinates along the path to their goal by selecting specific behaviours that are best 
suited to subordinates’ needs and to the situation in which subordinates are working. By 
choosing the appropriate leadership style, leaders can help to increase subordinates’ 
expectations for success and satisfaction. To explain these leaders’ behaviour, House 
and Mitchell (1974) defined the four leadership behaviours as follows: 
 
Supportive leadership: Giving consideration to the needs of subordinates, displaying 
concern for their welfare, and creating a friendly climate in the work unit. 
Directive leadership: Letting subordinates know what they are expected to do, giving 
specific guidance, asking subordinates to follow rules and procedures, scheduling and 
coordinating the work. 
Participative leadership: Consulting with subordinates and taking their opinions and 
suggestions into account. 
Achievement-oriented leaders: Setting challenging goals, seeking performance 
improvements, emphasising excellence in performance, and showing confidence that 
subordinates will attain high standards. 
 
According to House and Mitchell (1974), directive leadership is effective for repetitive 
tasks; participative leadership is effective when tasks are unclear and subordinates are 
autonomous; achievement-oriented leadership is effective for challenging tasks. House 
and Mitchell (1974) also argued that subordinates are motivated [path] by leader 
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behaviour to the extent that this behaviour influences expectancies [goal].  
 
3.5.2 CRITICISM OF THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH 
 
Despite its extensive use in leadership training and development, the situational 
approach does have some limitations. Most of all, the situational approach is too 
complicated to have much of an impact on most leaders. It seems desirable for a 
situational model to include many relevant aspects of the situation, but to do so make a 
model difficult to test. Managers are also so busy dealing with problems that they do not 
have time to stop and analyse the situation with a complicated model (Yukl, 1994). 
 
Furthermore, this approach is not clear in explaining how subordinates move from low 
development levels to high development levels, nor is clear on how commitment 
changes over time for subordinates. As a result, the validity of the basic prescriptions 
for matching leader styles to subordinates’ development levels is questioned. In addition, 
the situational approach is concerned with management rather than true leadership. The 
various models deal more with conducting transactions with group members than with 
inspiration and influence.  
 
The situational approach, however, contains the first leadership theory to emphasise the 
impact of situations on leaders; it is predictive of leadership effectiveness. Further, it is 
prescriptive. It tells a leader what he or she should and should not do in various contexts. 
As a result, the situational approach has proved to be useful as the basis for leadership 
training.  
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3.6  TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH 
 
The term transformational leadership was first used by Downton; however, its 
emergence as an important approach to leadership began with a classic work by the 
political sociologist James MacGregor Burns, titled Leadership. Burns (1978) described 
transforming leadership as a process in which “leaders and followers raise one another 
to higher levels of morality and motivation.” This approach has been researched by, 
amongst others, Bass (1985), Bennis and Nanus (1985) and Tichy and Devanna (1990).  
 
Transformational leadership, which is also termed visionary leadership, strategic 
leadership, or charismatic leadership, refers to the process of building commitment to 
the organisation’s objectives and empowering followers to accomplish these objectives 
(Northouse, 2004). Therefore, this approach stresses that leaders need to understand and 
adapt to the needs and motives of followers.  
 
According to Burns (1985), this type of leadership may be exhibited by anyone in the 
organisation in any type of position, and it may involve people influencing peers or 
superiors as well as subordinates. In the process, both leader and followers may emerge 
with a stronger and higher set of moral values. Another important source of 
transformational leadership is found by research in organisational culture because the 
culture is influenced by several aspects of a leader’s behaviour. This includes examples 
set by the leader, what the leader attends to, how the leader reacts to crises, how the 
leader allocates rewards, and how the leader makes selection, promotion and dismissal 
decisions (Bryman, 1992).  
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3.6.1 RESEARCH ON THE TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH 
 
Most studies of charismatic or transformational leadership identify the types of 
behaviour used by the leader and the traits that facilitate the leader’s effectiveness. This 
approach is concerned with the process of how certain leaders are able to inspire 
followers to accomplish goals.  
 
The following section analyses the research on the transformational theory developed 
by Bass in the mid-1980’s and briefly explains the research of Bennis and Nanus and 
the work of Tichy and Devanna in the late 1980’s.  
 
3.6.1.1 Research by Bass 
 
Bass (1985) extended Burns’s work by giving more attention to the leader’s effect on 
followers. Followers of a transformational leader feel trust, admiration, loyalty and 
respect toward the leader, and they are motivated to do more than they expected to do. 
The leader transforms and motivates followers by:  
 
• raising followers’ levels of consciousness about the importance and value of 
specified and idealised goals; 
• getting followers to transcend their own self-interest for the sake of the team or 
organisation; and 
• inspiring followers to address higher-level needs (Bass, 1985). 
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In addition, Bass (1985) developed the Multi-factor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) 
which is widely used to measure various aspects of transformational leadership. The 
MLQ is made up of questions that measure follower’s perceptions of a leader’s 
behaviour in seven areas: 
 
• Individualised consideration (charisma) 
• Inspirational motivation 
• Intellectual simulation 
• Idealised influence 
• Contingent reward 
• Management-by-exception 
• Laissez-faire behaviour (Bass, 1992) 
 
Bryman (1992) and Bass and Avolio (1994) have suggested that the charisma and 
motivation factors on the MLQ are most likely to be related to positive effects.  
 
According to Bass (1985), transformational leaders make followers more aware of the 
importance and value of task outcomes, activate their higher-order needs and induce 
followers to transcend self interest for the sake of the organisation. As a result of this 
influence, followers feel trust and respect toward the leaders, and they are motivated to 
do more than they expected to do. Transformational results are achieved by use of 
charisma, inspirational leadership, individualised consideration and intellectual 
stimulation (Yukl, 1994).  
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3.6.1.2 Research by Bennis and Nanus  
 
Bennis and Nanus (1985) collected the data of 90 leaders using unstructured interviews 
at times supplemented with observation. The researchers asked leaders basic questions 
such as:  
 
• What are your strengths and weaknesses?  
• What past events most influenced your leadership approach?  
• What were the critical points in your career?  
 
The leaders who participated in the study differed greatly in their style and approach 
and few fit the common stereotype of a transformational leader. Most were ordinary in 
appearance, personality and general behaviour. Nevertheless, from the answers leaders 
provided to their questions, Bennis and Nanus provided common strategies utilised by 
leaders in the transformation of organisations (Northouse, 2004). These common 
strategies are: 
 
• Vision: Transformational leaders had a clear, attractive, realistic and believable 
vision of the future state of their organisations.  
• Trust: Transformational leaders create trust in their organisation by making their 
own positions clearly known and then standing by them. 
• Social Architects: Transformational leaders acted as social architects for their 
organisations by creating an institutional space for the shared meanings/values 
of the individuals within the organisation.   
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• Creative Deployment through Positive Self-Regard: Transformational leaders 
knew their strengths and weaknesses and they emphasised their strengths rather 
than dwelling on their weaknesses. 
 
It is also important for the leader to articulate a clear and appealing vision relevant to 
the needs and values of followers (Yukl, 1994). This research helps identify the types of 
leadership behaviour typical of transformational leaders.   
 
3.6.1.3 Research by Tichy and Devanna 
 
Similar to Bennis and Nanus, Tichy and Devanna (1990) conducted a study of 12 CEOs 
in a variety of organisations, most of which were large corporations. Tichy and Devanna 
(1990) focused on how leaders worked under the challenging conditions caused by 
rapid technological change, social and cultural changes, increased competition and 
increased interdependence with economies of other nations.  
 
As a result, Tichy and Devanna (1990) identified a three-act process. 
 
• Act 1: This process involves recognising the need for change. Transformational 
leaders are change agents and they have the responsibility of pointing out to the 
organisation how change in the environment could positively or negatively 
affect the operation of the organisation.  
• Act 2: This process requires the creation of a vision. A vision should be 
constructed by everyone employed by an organisation. A central aspect of 
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creating a vision is developing a mission statement that describes the vision and 
the values implied by it. 
• Act 3: This process involves institutionalising changes. To do this, leaders need 
to break down old structures and establish new ones. In this process, individuals 
will need to be helped to find new roles in the organisation. 
 
Research by Bennis and Nanus (1985) and Tichy and Devanna (1990) provides insights 
into the way transformational leaders develop commitment to a vision among internal 
and external stakeholders, implement strategies to accomplish the vision and embed the 
new values and assumptions into the culture of the organisation. Moreover, the two 
studies suggest that transformational leaders are likely to take actions to empower 
followers and change the organisation in ways that will institutionalise new values, have 
responsibility, provide coaching and training skills to followers, encourage open sharing 
of ideas and information and also modify the organisation’s structure and management 
systems. 
 
3.6.2  CRITICISM OF THE TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH 
 
Several negative features of the transformational approach have been identified. These 
include: a lack of conceptual clarity that creates the impression that transformational 
leadership has a trait-like quality; it is sometimes seen as elitist and undemocratic and it 
has the potential to be used counterproductively in for example, to usurp power by 
dictatorships (Northouse, 2004). 
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Despite these weaknesses, the transformational approach has strong intuitive appeal 
because it goes beyond traditional transactional models and broadens leadership to 
include the growth of followers and places strong emphasis on morals and values. It 
contributes to the understanding of leadership processes by acknowledging how 
important the symbolic aspects of leadership are, how valuable shared leadership is and 
it recognises that leadership processes are embedded within the cultures of the 
organisation – shaping it and being shaped by it (Yukl, 1994). 
 
3.7 THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 
 
In an interview on emerging leadership approaches, Schwella (29 July 2003) 
commented that there is an emerging leadership approach that can be called the social 
learning approach. This approach is similar to the one DuBrin (2001) describes as the 
knowledge management and/or learning organisation approach. The most prominent 
authors in this approach are Senge (1990) and Heifetz (1994). 
 
According to Schwella, the social learning approach is used to deal with circumstances 
relating to adaptive problems which are problems that have arisen due to new social 
occurrences. This approach enables leaders to inspire confidence in followers to answer 
questions and solve problems through the learning process in their organisation. The 
emergence of the current idea of social learning is related to notions such as ‘the 
learning society.’ Schon (1973) provides a theoretical framework in which he links the 
experience of living in a constantly changing environment with the need for constant 
learning. He explores the extent to which companies, social movements and 
 75
governments are learning systems and how those systems could be enhanced. He also 
suggests that the movement towards learning systems is a tentative and inductive 
process for which there is no adequate theoretical basis. 
 
3.7.1  RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 
 
This section analyses the research on the social learning approach in the early 1990’s 
and briefly explains the research of Senge and the work of Heifetz.  
 
3.7.1.1 Research by Senge 
 
Senge (1994) argues that learning organisations require a new view of leadership and he 
suggests that the shared leadership model can be found in such an organisation. The 
leaders are responsible for building organisations where people continually expand their 
capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision and improved shared mental 
models. Taking this stand is the first leadership act, the start of inspiring the vision of 
the learning organisation. 
 
Senge (1994) distinguishes the learning organisations from more traditional 
organisations based on the mastery of certain basic disciplines. The five disciplines are: 
 
• Personal mastery: Learning to expand personal capacity to create the results 
people most desire and creating an organisational environment which 
encourages all its members to work towards the goals and purposes they choose.  
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• Mental Models: Reflecting upon, continually clarifying and improving group 
members’ internal pictures of the world, and seeing how they shape their own 
actions and decisions. 
• Shared Vision: Building a sense of commitment in a group by developing a 
shared vision of the future where group members create the principles and 
guiding practices by which they will achieve their aims. 
• Team Learning: Transforming conversational and collective thinking skills to 
enable groups of people to develop competence that exceeds the sum of 
individual members’ talents. 
• Systems Thinking: A way of thinking about, and a language for describing and 
understanding, forces and interrelationships that shape the behaviour of systems.  
 
The last discipline, systems thinking, helps to identify ways to change systems more 
effectively and to act more in tune with the larger processes of the natural and economic 
world. According to Senge (1994), systemic thinking is the conceptual cornerstone of 
his approach. It is the discipline that integrates the followers, fusing them into a 
coherent body of theory and practice. He identifies three aspects of the leadership model 
as follows: 
 
• Leader as designer: The leader’s task is to design the learning processes 
whereby people throughout the organisation can deal productively with the 
critical issues they face and develop their mastery in the learning disciplines. 
• Leader as steward: The leader develops a unique relationship to his or her own 
personal vision. They become a steward of the vision. One of the important 
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things to grasp here is that stewardship involves a commitment to and 
responsibility for the vision, rather the leader is caretaker, not owner. 
• Leader as teacher: The leader helps people to achieve their vision through 
more accurate, more insightful and more empowering views of reality. This 
improved view is gained by means of a facilitative approach through which 
followers learn. 
 
Senge (1994) concludes that leaders have to create and manage creative tension, 
especially around the gap between vision and reality. Mastery of such tension allows for 
a fundamental shift. It enables the leader to see the truth in changing situations. 
 
3.7.1.2 Research by Heifetz 
 
Heifetz (1994) suggests that organisations face adaptive challenges. Changes in 
societies, markets, customers, competition and technology around the globe are forcing 
organisations to clarify their values, develop new strategies and learn new ways of 
operation. According to him, adaptive challenges are often systemic problems with no 
ready answer because to adapt organisations’ behaviour - in order to thrive in new 
environments - is critical; executives have to break a long-standing behaviour pattern of 
their own, providing leadership in the form of solution and adaptive change is 
distressing for the people going through it.  
 
Heifetz (1994) offers six principles for leading adaptive work: 
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• Getting on the balcony: The leader has to be able to view patterns as if he or 
she were on a balcony and to see a context for change or create one. 
• Identifying the adaptive challenge: The leader has to: listen to the ideas and 
concerns of people inside and outside the organisation; see conflicts as clues-
symptoms of adaptive challenges; hold a mirror up to himself or herself, 
recognising that he or she embodies the adaptive challenges facing the 
organisation.  
• Regulating distress: The leader must realise that people can learn only so much 
so fast. Therefore, the leader has to: create what can be called a holding 
environment; have responsibility for direction, protection, orientation, managing 
conflict and shaping norms; have presence and poise. 
•  Maintaining disciplined attention: The leader has to get employees to 
confront tough trade-offs in values, procedures, operating styles and power.  
• Giving the work back to people: The leader has to let the people bear the 
weight of responsibility and develop collective self-confidence.  
• Protection voices of leadership from below: The leader has to rely on others 
within the organisation to raise questions that may provide cover to people who 
point to the internal contradictions of the enterprise. 
 
As seen in this light, Heifetz (1994) concludes that leadership requires a learning 
strategy. A leader, from above or below, with or without authority, has to engage people 
in confronting the challenges, adjusting their values, changing perspectives and learning 
new habits. The adaptive demands of modern time require leaders who take 
responsibility without waiting for revelation or request.  
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3.7.2  CRITICISM OF THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 
 
The social learning approach has been criticised because it is difficult to identify real 
examples. This might be because the vision is ‘too ideal’ or because it is not relevant to 
the requirements and dynamics of an organisation. Finger and Brand (1999) conclude 
that it is not possible to transform a bureaucratic organisation by learning initiatives 
alone. They believe that by referring to the notion of the learning organisation it was 
possible to make change less threatening and more acceptable to participants.  
 
Secondly, despite the powerful intuitive appeal of Senge’s five disciplines, consensual 
learning through experience does not always occur (Finger et al., 1999). Individuals 
often have different mental models, levels of personal mastery and systems thinking, so 
there is no guarantee of team learning and a shared vision. Some individuals may be 
reluctant to be forthright about their own views and beliefs when speaking to managers 
or peers, perhaps because of adverse experiences in the past. Some individuals simply 
do not want to take part in consensual, organisational decision making because they do 
not want the responsibility. 
 
Finally, the learning organisation concept may come into conflict with more traditional, 
hierarchical, even authoritarian organisational styles and structures in practice. In spite 
of these critiques, there is still substantial evidence of the success of this approach. The 
notion of learning organisation provides leaders with a picture of how an organisation 
can function. Senge (1994) also introduces a number of interesting dimensions that 
could contribute to personal development, and increase organisational effectiveness, 
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especially where the group is firmly rooted in the ‘knowledge economy.’ 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Leadership has been studied in many different ways, depending on the researcher’s 
methodological preferences and view of leadership. This chapter reviewed the major 
findings from the trait, behaviour, situational, transformational and social learning 
approaches to leadership research and theory as illustrated in Table 3.2.  
 
Each approach has strengths and weaknesses to provide a comprehensive frame on an 
effective leadership style. Leadership implies the proposition that individuals can make 
a difference. A leader is required to have the individual capacity to move, inspire and 
mobilise masses of people (followers) so that they can accomplish their goals together. 
Therefore, it is important that researchers provide the effective leadership style which is 
required of each different organisation.  
 
In the next chapter, the leadership approaches of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung 
will be analysed in terms of the summarised findings based on the leadership 
approaches.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
A COMPARISON OF THE LEADERSHIP OF NELSON MANDELA 
AND KIM DAE-JUNG 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Democratisation is a large scale process of which the success is influenced by complex 
circumstances. To be successful, the leader propagating democracy is faced with 
complex challenges. In the case of both South Africa and South Korea, there were 
limitations presented to the leaders. They nevertheless succeeded in establishing viable 
democracies. Therefore, it is worthwhile to attempt to learn from the leaders who were 
at the forefront of the emerging democratisation process in South Africa and South 
Korea. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the manner in which Nelson Mandela in South 
Africa and Kim Dae-jung in South Korea instituted their leadership in the 
democratisation process mentioned in chapter two. This chapter, then, reviews the lives 
of these two leaders of opposition movements and analyses the constraining power of 
society on individual actions and the impressive power of individuals to modify that 
society.  
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For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is useful to point to the important actions 
and speeches of the two leaders, which are analysed to understand their capacities to 
bring about democracy in their respective countries. Leadership, Goldstein (1999) 
suggests, means leadership in thought as well as in action. In the long run, leaders in 
thought may well make the greater difference to the world, but Woodrow Wilson said, 
as quoted Goldstein (1999), “Those only are leaders of men, in the general eye, who 
lead in action.” It is at their hands that new thought gets its translation into the crude 
language of deeds. Leaders in thought often invent in solitude and obscurity, leaving to 
later generations the tasks of imitation. Leaders in action – the leaders portrayed in this 
series – have to be effective in their own time. This is shown by the analysis of their 
speeches, which portray their thoughts, and actions throughout their campaigns for 
democracy. 
 
To analyse the speeches and actions of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung respectively, 
the focus is mainly on Nelson Mandela’s autobiography Long Walk to Freedom and Kim 
Dae-jung’s autobiography My Life and My Way as well as other biographies. These 
books are personal accounts, full of detail never before documented. Had these books 
been available earlier, it would have been a rich resource to further contemplate the 
character of the two leaders. In addition, this chapter does not only rely on these 
autobiographies, but also on other books, newspaper and journal articles, government 
documents, radio recordings of speeches and video material of interviews. 
 
Each of the leaders, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung, is considered in the following 
sections and then the final section highlights both common and divergent characteristics 
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by way of a comparison. 
 
4.2 THE CASE STUDY OF NELSON MANDELA 
 
This section comprises a discussion of Nelson Mandela’s political life, divided into four 
stages in promoting democracy in South Africa. A brief explanation of his role in the 
democratisation process in South Africa was provided in chapter two, therefore, in this 
chapter, the research focuses more on the specific instances from his political career 
related to his opposition against the injustice of apartheid. Mandela’s roles are 
categorised: 
 
• As young man and developing politician 
• As young leader of the African National Congress (ANC) 
• As political prisoner and activist  
• As leader of South Africa  
 
In addition, this section comprises the major speeches – such as his court statement 
during the Rivonia trial, his address during the rally in Cape Town after his release from 
prison and his speeches as president – and writings of Nelson Mandela relating to his 
struggle for liberation in South Africa.  
 
4.2.1 AS YOUNG MAN AND DEVELOPING POLITICIAN 
 
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was born on 18 July 1918, in the small village of Mvezo in 
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Transkei of the Eastern Cape. The Xhosa name given to Mandela was Rolihlahla, which 
means “pulling the branch of a tree,” but more colloquially “troublemaker.” However 
the name by which he became popularly known was an English one, Nelson, given to 
him by an African teacher. His father, Chief Gadla Henry, was a member of the Thembu 
people’s royal lineage; his mother, Nosekeni Fanny, was one of the chief’s four wives. 
At the age of seven, Mandela became the first member of his family to attend school. 
When his father died two years later, Mandela was sent to the acting regent of the 
Thembu people, Chief Jongintaba Dalindyebo, who took responsibility for his 
continuing education. 
 
While growing up in the chief’s house in the “Great place” of Mqhekezweni, Mandela 
learned about Thembu history and the changes brought about by the arrival of whites. 
Mandela was impressed by the socialist structure of the traditional society; no one 
owned the land, although the whole tribe, under the authority of the chief, shared it. 
Later, in prison, Mandela would reflect: 
 
“One of the marks of a great chief is the ability to keep together all sections of his 
people, the traditionalists and reformers, conservatives and liberals, and on major 
questions there are sometimes sharp differences of opinion. The Mqhekezweni court 
was particularly strong, and the Regent was able to carry the whole community 
because the court was representative of all shades of opinion” (Sampson, 1999). 
 
As president, Mandela would seek to reach the same kind of consensus in Cabinet; and 
he would always remember Jongintaba’s advice that a leader should be like a shepherd, 
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directing his flock from behind by skilful persuasion: “If one or two animals stray, you 
go out and draw them back to the flock,” he would say. “That’s an important lesson in 
politics” (Sampson, 1999). 
 
By watching the interactions between the paramount chief and local chiefs, Mandela 
was being prepared for a future position of leadership. “Nelson … was groomed from 
childhood for respectability, status, and sheltered living” (Mandela, 1995).  
 
After Methodist school, he went on to Fort Hare College in 1939 to study for a BA 
degree. While at Fort Hare, Mandela became a friend of Oliver Tambo with whom he 
would later open a law practice. These young intellectuals became involved in student 
politics and were members of the Students’ Representative Council (SRC; Benson, 
1980). For helping to organise a boycott of the SRC election, however, the authorities 
threatened to expel him – with other students including Oliver Tambo – unless he served 
on the new SRC. As a result, he refused and was suspended in 1940. 
 
Mandela returned home and might then have been drawn back into tribal duties and 
politics in the Transkei, but with the threat of an arranged marriage, and since he wished 
to complete his studies, he then fled to Johannesburg. Mandela regarded a traditional 
arranged marriage as “undemocratic” (Mandela, 1995) and it is possible to see implicit 
in this action a rejection of the limitations imposed by traditional values and customs, 
reflecting the influence of his Western education (Juckes, 1995).  
 
In Johannesburg, Mandela met Walter Sisulu, several years older than himself, who had 
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worked as a miner, a servant and a factory worker and who had educated himself and 
had become a fighter against injustice (Philip, 1994). Sisulu arranged for Mandela to 
study law and later to be articled at a Johannesburg law firm, under the supervision of a 
white attorney (Meer, 1990). Sisulu was impressed by Mandela’s abilities and desire to 
continue studying. As he recalled to a newspaper reporter in 1990: “Well, he was a very 
bright young man, impressive and open about things. He appeared quite ambitious to 
develop educationally. I liked him very much” (Cruywagen, 1990).  
 
Sisulu had joined the African National Congress in 1940 and was at the forefront of 
those encouraging the ANC toward militant action (Karis & Carter, 1977). Most of the 
young organisers had finished high school, and many had trained further as teachers or 
attended Fort Hare. Many of these activists were entertained in the Sisulu home, and 
Mandela was able to develop friendships with them (Meer, 1990). Soon Mandela was 
one of the main agitators pressuring the ANC leadership. 
 
Mandela joined the ANC and, together with Sisulu, Oliver Tambo, Anton Lembede and 
other young men and women, helped to form its Youth League in 1944. Mandela rose 
through the ranks of the African National Congress Youth League in the early 1940s, 
organising resistance marches and, two decades later, masterminding sabotage attacks 
by the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), Umknonto we Sizwe (MK), 
which he formed and led.  
 
Through its first years, the Youth League (YL) expressed two divergent ideological 
positions. One was a racially exclusive Africanist stance, developed most forcefully by 
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its first president, Anton Lembede, and the other was African Nationalism, which 
maintained that all people committed to a democratic and non-racial society could be 
accommodated in the future system (Juckes, 1995). Initially, Mandela was among those 
YL leaders who were suspicious of communists and who wanted to avoid organisations 
like the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) that showed sympathy with communists 
and tried to speak on behalf of blacks (Karis & Carter, 1977). Mandela later said in 
court: 
 
“In my younger days I held the view that the policy of admitting communists to the 
ANC, and the close cooperation which existed at times on specific issues between 
the ANC and the Communist Party, would lead to a watering down of the concept of 
African Nationalism. At that stage I was a member of the African National Congress 
Youth League, and was one of a group which moved for the expulsion of 
communists from the ANC. This proposal was heavily defeated. Amongst those who 
voted against the proposal were some of the most conservative sections of African 
political opinion. They defended the policy on the ground that from its inception the 
ANC was formed and built up, not as a political party with one school of political 
thought, but as a Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of 
various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation. I 
was eventually won over to this point of view and I have upheld it ever since” 
(Mandela, 1995). 
 
While Mandela was becoming active within the Youth League, he was influenced also 
by fellow students at the University of the Witwatersrand, where he was studying law 
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from 1943 to 1949. The university was still a non-racial campus and Mandela’s friends 
included whites and Indians, communists and liberals. They discussed segregation, 
racism, culture and forms of resistance. This gave him interracial experiences quite 
unusual for YL activists (Gerhart, 1978). The interactions and long-term friendships 
fostered through the college and university were significant initial influences in his later 
acceptance of interracial cooperation in opposing state oppression (Juckes, 1995).  
 
Although on the Youth League Executive, Mandela did not take any important 
leadership roles in the YL until the end of the 1940s, his political education continued. 
He shared the YL’s perspective; especially its belief that the white government, 
irrespective of leadership, not only had no serious interest in integration, but also that it 
maintained a covert crusade against communists. 
 
4.2.2 AS YOUNG LEADER OF THE ANC 
 
In the late 1940s, changing circumstances in South Africa propelled Mandela’s political 
career into a new dimension. These changes were brought about by the occurrence of 
the Second World War and the 1948 victory of the National Party.  
 
The Second World War opened up huge industrial expansion in South Africa, attracting 
increasing foreign investment, with consequent intensifying exploitation of cheap labour. 
In 1948, the white voters of South Africa showed clearly their defiance against the 
change that followed in the wake of the Second World War. The Afrikaner Nationalist 
government came to power with its policy of apartheid (as referred to in chapter two), 
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under which increasingly drastic laws were introduced to separate and subjugate the 
black population.  
 
From the late 1940s to the late 1950s, Nelson Mandela developed his political 
experience in the African National Congress Youth League and organised the defiance 
movement against the white government. The following section describes Mandela’s 
political transformation from Africanist to African Nationalist and his mode of 
resistance from passive, in utilising to Defiance Campaign in the ANC, as well as the 
M-plan, to aggressive.  
 
4.2.2.1 The Role of Nelson Mandela throughout the Emergence of the Defiance 
Campaign of the ANC 
 
The early 1950’s, the ANC’s Youth League was becoming an increasingly important 
group within the ANC. The YL leaders were, however, impatient with the old guard, the 
older leaders of ANC, arguing that the moderate tactics of the past decades had failed to 
narrow the growing gulf between black and white visions of the future. In addition, the 
old guard’s approach had become ineffective in directing action, and, although the YL 
was committed to some form of mass action, its “Basic Policy” was vague concerning 
tactics: “the programme of organisation and action, may and shall be modified from 
time to time to meet new situations and conditions and to cope with the ever changing 
circumstances” (Karis & Carter, 1977). Mandela was drawn into the leadership of the 
YL only in 1948, although he had been active in YL discussions from its in inception. 
He played an important role in drafting the final version of the 1948 “Basic Policy” 
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(Benson, 1980).  
 
The Youth League captured the need for a significant change in ANC policy and was 
widely supported within the ANC. As a result, the Programme of Action was adopted at 
the 1949 conference. This crucial statement in the Programme of Action called for 
“active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation and such other means” as 
well as preparation for a one-day strike (Lodge, 1983). The YL, including Mandela, 
wished to limit their activity to blacks. At the same time, a multiracial committee that 
included the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the Communist Party of South 
Africa (CPSA) proposed the May Day protest, but the YL was opposed to this plan. 
Despite the YL’s opposition, the May Day protest was effective and there was 
widespread support among black workers for the strike (Lodge, 1983). Then, on 26 June 
1950, a stay-at-home strike was organised by Mandela with ANC support, but the 
response in the Transvaal was poor; only in Port Elizabeth and among Indians in 
Durban was there a significant result (Meredith, 1997).  
 
In 1950 Mandela, who still had his doubts about the inclusion of Indians and 
communists in the struggle, had been elected President of the Youth League in 
succession to Peter Mda. Mandela still maintained in discussions with Sisulu that 
Africans would resent cooperating with Indian shopkeepers and merchants, whom they 
saw as their exploiters. When the ANC’s Executive Committee met in June 1951 he 
argued again for Africans going it alone, against the majority of the committee who 
wished to include Indians and communists (Sampson, 1999). Only when faced with an 
overwhelming vote in favour of joint action, did Mandela commit the YL to support it 
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(Meredith, 1997). 
 
In January 1952, Mandela joined a committee of four, with Z.K. Matthews, Ismail Meer 
and J.N. Singh, which drafted a letter to the Prime Minister, Dr Malan, demanding the 
repeal of six “unjust laws” (Karis & Carter, 1977). Among the laws cited were the 
Suppression of Communism Act, the Group Areas Act, the Separate Registration of 
Voters Bill and the pass laws. Mandela drove down to the Orange Free State with the 
document for Dr Moroka to sign. When the Prime Minister’s secretary received this 
letter, he replied that the differences between the races were “permanent, not man-
made” and that the new laws were not oppressive and degrading, but protective (Benson, 
1966). Moroka and Sisulu reiterated their demand while promising “to conduct the 
campaign in a peaceful manner” (Karis & Carter, 1977).  
 
The date then set for the start of the Defiance Campaign was on 26 June 1952, the 
anniversary of the day of protest in 1950. Four days before the campaign was due to 
start, Mandela addressed a rally in Durban called the Day of the Volunteers, organised 
jointly by the ANC and the Indian Congress. Some Africans and Indians turned out to 
participate. It was the first occasion that Mandela had addressed a mass audience and he 
found the experience exhilarating (Meredith, 1997). The Defiance Campaign, he said, 
would make history. It would be the most powerful action ever undertaken by the 
masses in South Africa: “We can now say unity between the non-European people in 
this country has become a living reality.” For Mandela, the remark had personal as well 
as political significance in view of his long-held opposition to interracial cooperation 
(Meredith, 1997).  
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Mandela seemed full of optimism, as he showed in an article for the August 1952 issue 
of Drum magazine: 
 
 “Though it takes us years, we are prepared to continue the Campaign until the six 
unjust laws we have chosen for the present phase are done away with. Even then we 
shall not stop. The struggle for the freedom and national independence of the non-
European people shall continue as the National Planning Council sees fit” (Mandela, 
1952). 
 
Mandela also worked as the volunteer-in-chief of the Defiance Campaign, in which 
about 8500 volunteers defied selected laws and consequently were imprisoned. Mandela 
was one of twenty leaders who were charged and convicted at the end of 1952 for 
organising the Defiance Campaign; he was given a nine-month suspended sentence. In 
the same year, and in response to his rising popularity the government issued him on 11 
December 1952 with a banning order, prohibiting him from attending gatherings and 
confining him to Johannesburg for six months. His contribution had been so impressive 
that he was elected president of the Transvaal branch of the ANC in October 1952. His 
address to the Transvaal ANC in 1953 had to be read on his behalf. 
 
His close involvement with the Defiance Campaign had completed his transformation 
from Africans only to accommodating multiracialism in the struggle. For Mandela, this 
expression of defiance by the masses was significant; the impact on movement and the 
wider society made him gradually change his views on cooperation with other groups. 
Mandela recognised that the action of the masses was consistent with the views of the 
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multiracial alliance and was in sharp contrast to the YL’s determination to limit 
cooperation between groups. Direct experience challenged Mandela’s rigid Africanism, 
for if he was to remain concerned with the plight of his people, he had to modify his 
stance to reflect the concern of the ANC membership. Accordingly, Mandela moved 
away from exclusivist nationalism to multiracialism that could accommodate all who 
were working for a non-racial society (Juckes, 1995). 
 
4.2.2.2 Nelson Mandela’s Political Evolution throughout M-Plan and the Treason 
Trial 
 
In the mid-1950s, Mandela oversaw attempts to implement the so-called “M-Plan,” 
named after Mandela, a scheme to build a mass Congress membership that would be 
organised into cells at the grassroots level and, through a hierarchy of leaders at 
intermediate levels, would be responsive to direction without the necessity of public 
meetings.  
 
The ANC itself suffered because public meetings were frequently blocked by the 
authorities, printers refused to handle ANC pamphlets for fear of prosecution and most 
newspapers declined to publish ANC statements. “The old methods of bringing about 
mass action through public mass meetings, press statements and leaflets calling upon 
people to go into action have become extremely dangerous and difficult to use 
effectively,” Mandela warned an ANC meeting in the Transvaal, held in the aftermath of 
the Defiance Campaign (Meredith, 1997). In an attempt to avoid police harassment and 
to prepare the ANC for the possibility of an outright ban, Mandela drew up a new plan 
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for political action, advocating a radical departure from the methods previously adopted 
by the ANC. 
 
The M-plan was the most successful method of decentralising and strengthening the 
ANC organisation; in the words of John Gaetsewe, then General Secretary of the South 
African Congress of Trade Unions, “it made the townships ours during the fifties and 
sixties” (Workers Unity, 1978). Mandela’s decision to pursue what he called the M-plan 
at this stage shows the awareness that action seeking to transform the society must be 
appropriate to the circumstances. 
 
At the time, when Chief Albert Luthuli had become President of the African National 
Congress (ANC), its emphasis was on non-violence and passive resistance, an idea 
Luthuli had learned from Mahatma Gandhi. Mandela, however, began to suspect that 
the legal and extra-constitutional protests would become impossible because the state 
would tolerate them no longer. The Gandhian model was only effective if the opposition 
played by the same rules. The question of what to do if peaceful protest was met by 
violence even rose in the ANC National Executive. Here he was admonished, so he 
continued to follow the ANC’s official policy. “I saw non-violence on the Gandhian 
model not as an inviolable principle,” he said later, “but as a tactic to be used as 
situation demanded” (Mandela, 1995). “In my heart,” he revealed, “I knew that non-
violence was not the answer” (Mandela, 1995).  
 
Shortly after his six-month ban expired in June 1953, he addressed a public meeting in 
Freedom Square in Sophiatown, telling the crowd that the time for passive resistance 
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had ended, that non-violence would never defeat a white minority government bent on 
retaining power at any cost and that the Africans would have to resort to violence as the 
only weapon that could destroy apartheid. 
 
In 1953, Professor ZK Matthews, one of the ANC’s most respected leaders, influenced 
by the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (freedom of speech and 
expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear), suggested 
a Freedom Charter (Juckes, 1995). That year, the National Conference of the ANC 
called for the organisation of a Congress of the People. Convened at Kliptown, near 
Johannesburg, on 26 June 1955, the Congress drew up the Freedom Charter – a 
declaration of basic principles – that would become the ANC’s seminal organisational 
and policy manifesto for almost four decades.  
 
The government was not slow to react against the growing unity and militancy of the 
people. Mandela was among the 156 people – together with Luthuli, ZK Matthews, 
Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu – arrested at dawn on 5 December 1956 and charged 
with treason. This trial was followed by the Sharperville massacre in 1960 and the 
banning of the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) – a breakaway from the ANC 
led by Robert Sobukwe – and other groups.  
 
In the Treason Trial, the essence of the case, as the State put it, was the belief that the 
liberation movement was part of an international communist-inspired effort pledged to 
overthrow the government by violence. Four and a half years were spent trying to prove 
this: the Programme of Action of 1949 and the Freedom Charter of 1955 were key items 
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of evidence. As the years passed, the trial dragged monotonously on. It was a testing 
time for the thirty men and women who remained in custody after charges against the 
others had been dropped. Mandela was among the latter: from wearying days in court, 
he went to his office often working till late at night (Philip, 1994).  
 
The Treason Trial brought many opposition leaders together and rallied support for the 
ANC within the country (Karis & Carter, 1977). Although released on bail, many 
accused were still under banning orders and the continuation of the trial over four years 
limited the movement of these leaders and prevented their interaction with supporters. 
Effectively, this meant that younger, inexperienced leaders took over much of the 
organisation (Meer, 1990). When the Treason Trial came to judgement, the court found 
that the ANC and its allies were working “to replace the present form of State with a 
radically and fundamentally different form of State” but “violent means” had not been 
proved, nor was there proof that the ANC had been “infiltrated” by communists. All the 
remaining accused was acquitted (Mandela, 1995).  
 
Meanwhile, Mandela’s career as a lawyer had progressed while he was carrying out all 
his political activities. He established the first African law firm in South Africa in 
August 1952. Mandela persuaded Oliver Tambo, who had given up his teaching post at 
St Peter’s to take up law five years before and who had also just qualified as an attorney, 
to join him in a partnership. The firm became the official attorneys for the ANC, and 
was much in demand from other black clients with a host of claims and complaints. “We 
depended on Mandela & Tambo,” recalled Joe Mogotsi, who sang with the Manhattan 
Brothers “if we were arrested after giving a concert in town, without our passes” 
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(Samson, 1999). As partners, as well as political colleagues, they made an interesting 
contrast. Tambo was by nature quiet and thoughtful, with a cool, logical mind; in the 
courtroom he behaved calmly and unobtrusively, relying on his knowledge of the law. 
But Mandela was cultivated and assertive, with a combative and emotional style with 
sweeping gestures. Mandela ignored the segregation rules which applied to the court, 
choosing the whites-only entrance and was always ready with an answer when 
challenged. When a supposedly white clerk, whose features clearly suggested mixed 
parentage, shouted at him, “What are you doing in here?”, Mandela leaned over the 
counter towards him, staring straight into his eyes, and said quietly, “What are you 
doing in here?” (Meredith, 1997). 
 
His first marriage having broken up, Mandela married Nomzamo Winnie Madikizela, 
who had come from the Transkei to Johannesburg to qualify as a social worker and who 
from the start had to accept his enforced absences from their small block house in 
Orlando, in 1958. Both husband and wife were to make an exceptional contribution to 
the South African liberation struggle, inspiring others with the style and spirit of their 
endurance (Philip, 1994). 
 
4.2.3 AS FREEDOM FIGHTER AND POLITICAL PRISONER  
 
Mandela became an important leader in the transition of black resistance to an 
underground movement and the violent struggle precipitated by the remaining charges 
until the Treason Trial ended on 29 March 1961. In addition, Mandela helped create the 
ANC’s paramilitary wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or “Spear of the Nation,” which 
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carried out acts of sabotage against the government. Captured in August 1962, Mandela 
was charged with travelling outside the country illegally and inciting workers to strike. 
Several months into his five-year sentence, Mandela was charged with treason and in 
1964 was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  
 
The following section discusses Mandela’s role in MK’s formation and implementation, 
the Rivonia Trial and his political effort during his imprisonment. 
 
4.2.3.1 The role of Nelson Mandela in the “Spear of the Nation”  
 
In March 1961, before the Treason Trial ended, South Africa was about to become a 
Republic – a white minority Republic based on apartheid. Mandela made a dramatic 
public appearance – his first since he protested the forced removal of people from 
Sophiatown in 1953 – at the All-In African Conference being held in Pietermaritzburg. 
By the time of this conference, Mandela had been under successive banning orders for 
nine years, but the current order lapsed and was not immediately renewed. Again, 
Mandela’s action shows his awareness of his leadership role: his unexpected appearance 
was calculated to encourage his followers as it embarrassed the government. Inspired by 
his strength and courage, the people elected him to lead their protests and the demand 
for a truly representative National Convention to establish a new union of all South 
Africans instead of a white republic. Should the government not respond to these 
demands, a general strike would be called by the newly formed National Action Council, 
with Mandela as secretary (Philip, 1994).  
 
 100
Again, Mandela and the ANC organised a general strike for 29 to 31 May during which 
10,000 people, mostly African, refused to go to work, but a massive police clampdown 
had the strike faltering on the second day. Mandela devoted five pages of a 13-page 
report on the strike to lashing the press for its cowardly reluctance to report accurately 
on the build-up to the strike, and later publishing articles saying the strike had failed.  
 
The government’s immediate reaction was to instigate a fresh round of arrests. Mandela 
had to operate in secret. In an open letter he explained that going underground was the 
only course left open to him despite the hardship it entailed: “I have had to separate 
myself from my dear wife and children, from my mother and sisters, to live as an 
outlaw in my own land. I have had to abandon my profession and live in poverty and 
miseries, as many of my people are doing … The struggle,” he concluded, “is my life” 
(Mandela, 1995). 
 
Mandela’s skill in evading capture, however, soon caught the imagination of the press 
and the public. The press dubbed him the Black Pimpernel, an African version of the 
Scarlet Pimpernel, a fictional character who evaded capture during the French 
Revolution. Mandela moved about the country, from Port Elizabeth to Cape Town, to 
Durban, to Johannesburg, urging support for the strike, meeting journalists and 
advertising his activities through telephone calls to newspapers.  
 
A number of leaders had met during May and June 1961 and after much discussion 
agreed that a violent struggle had to be pursued, distinct from, but in tandem with the 
ANC. The conditions in the society severely constrained the coordination of mass action 
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and an increasing number of blacks were sympathetic to the idea of violent activity (Feit, 
1971). The militants, therefore, justified the expansion of their opposition activity to 
include armed resistance. Coinciding with these discussions, efforts were made to 
transmit this decision and its implications to the people. “Members were told of the 
abandonment of non-violence as the principal plank of ANC policy, and of the limited 
violence which was to be allowed to members of the organisation” (Feit, 1971). Despite 
the worries of the president of the ANC, Albert Luthuli, in November, the new 
organisation, Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), or Spear of the Nation, was formed, with 
Mandela a leading figure. Plans to begin a series of sabotage bombings of strategic, 
nonhuman targets began.  
 
As a commander-in-chief of MK, Mandela threw himself into his new military role with 
enthusiasm. On 16 December 1961, Dingane’s Day (which commemorated the 
Afrikaner’s massacre of Zulus in 1883, but which had now become a focus for African 
protests), MK made its first sabotage bombings, striking in Port Elizabeth, Durban and 
Johannesburg. In addition to sabotage, the banned opposition groups sought to capitalise 
on the international attention they had received as a result of the Defiance Campaign 
and the Treason Trial. They tried to change the society through their representations to 
international bodies, seeking in turn to weaken the resistance of the South Africa 
government (Juckes, 1995). As a result, MK saboteurs succeeded in attacking 
government offices and an electrical transformer despite a few failed attempts caused by 
unreliable equipment resources. 
 
On 11 January 1962, Mandela was smuggled out of the country to begin a six-month 
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international tour. It was a time when many revolutionaries around the world appeared 
to be triumphant. Mandela studied the rebellions throughout Africa – in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
the Cameroons, and particularly in Algeria, which the ANC saw as a parallel to their 
own struggle (Sampson, 1999). He travelled to a conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
where he joined an ANC delegation and presented a paper entitled “A Land Ruled by 
the Gun” (Mandela, 1995). In his presentation, he explained and justified the move to 
violent struggle: “It is understandable why today many of our people are turning their 
faces away from the path of peace and non-violence. They feel that peace in our country 
must be considered already broken when a minority Government maintains its authority 
over the majority by force and violence” (Mandela, 1995).  
 
Following the conference, Mandela travelled throughout Africa, meeting with many 
black leaders, collecting money for the campaigns at home and arranging for military 
training for those who would become soldiers of MK. Mandela returned to South Africa 
on 20 July 1962, and began reporting to relevant groups on his travels. On 5 August, 
while returning from a visit to Natal’s regional MK command and disguised as a black 
chauffeur for a white friend, Mandela was arrested.  
 
On 8 August 1962, Mandela was charged in court on two counts: inciting workers to 
strike in the May 1961 stay-at-home and leaving the country without a valid permit or 
passport. Mandela appeared at the opening of his trial on 22 October 1962 in a 
traditional Xhosa leopard-skin kaross instead of a suit and tie. In the spectators’ gallery, 
the crowd of his supporters rose to their feet with shouts of “Amandla!”(Power) and 
“Ngawethu!” (It is ours).  
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Mandela did not try to dispute the evidence of the hundred or so witnesses who testified 
to his incitement and his departure from the country without a passport. Mandela led his 
own defence. Mandela intended: “By representing myself I would enhance the 
symbolism of my role. I would use my trial as a showcase for the ANC’s moral 
opposition to racism. I would not attempt to defend myself so much as put the state 
itself on trial” (Mandela, 1995). Well aware of the discriminatory nature of the white 
judicial system, Mandela used the dock as a place from which to confront the 
government and whites of South Africa, as well as the world at large, with the history 
and realities of the life of his people and their long struggle. 
 
On 7 November, after being found guilty on both charges, Mandela made an hour-long 
address to the court intended not as a plea in mitigation but as a political testament 
explaining why he had taken the action which had led to his trial and why he would do 
it again if necessary. In the defence, Mandela concluded with a passionate denunciation 
of racial discrimination and the system of minority rule in South Africa that went with 
it: 
 
“Whatever sentence Your Worship sees fit to impose upon me for the crime for 
which I have been convicted before this court, may it rest assured that when my 
sentence has been completed, I will still be moved, as men are always moved, by 
their consciences; I will still be moved, by my dislike of the race discrimination 
against my people when I come out from serving my sentence, to take up again, as 
best I can, the struggle for the removal of those injustices until they are finally 
abolished once and for all” (Mandela, 1995). 
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Mandela’s articulate defence of African rights, his manner and bearing before the court, 
his skill in dealing with court officials and witnesses alike, marked him out as a leader 
of distinction. His 1962 trial marked the start of his international reputation. 
Nevertheless, Mandela’s fate was to be sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for 
incitement and two years’ imprisonment for travelling abroad without valid documents, 
five years in all, with no possibility of parole.  
 
Mandela remained incarcerated until, in October 1963, he was returned to court, to join 
his MK colleagues who had been arrested in a police raid of the farm in Rivonia. 
 
4.2.3.2 The Rivonia Trial 
 
On 11 July 1963 the liberation movement suffered a severe setback when Sisulu and 
other leaders were arrested at Liliesleaf farm in Rivonia, north of Johannesburg. A few 
months later, on 9 October 1963, Nelson Mandela was transferred from Robben Island, 
where he was serving his sentence, to join his comrades in the Pretoria Local prison. He 
was charged in the Rivonia Trial (officially known as “The State versus the National 
High Command and others”), on 156 counts.  
 
The Rivonia Trial began on 3 December 1963, and all accused faced a possible death 
sentence. Huge amounts of incriminating evidence had been found at the Rivonia 
farmhouse and other sites, and while the defendants admitted to acts of sabotage and 
preparation for a guerrilla campaign, they denied “that a decision had been made to 
begin guerrilla activity” (Karis & Carter, 1977). Counsel warned that they were likely to 
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be charged with trying to overthrow the state; that the penalty, if found guilty, was death. 
They readily admitted that most of them had taken part in a campaign designed to bring 
down the government and had known about or taken part in sabotage.  
 
They welcomed the opportunity to use the court as a platform from which to clarify, to 
the country and to the world, their position on what they considered to be the central 
issues of South African politics. The accused were interested in a confrontation in 
politics rather than in a trial of law. “They were determined to speak proudly of their 
ideals,” said Joffe, the defence attorney, “to be defiant in the face of their enemies” 
(Philip, 1994). 
 
Five months from the commencement of the trial, on Monday 20 April 1964, the 
courtroom of the Palace of Justice was packed for the opening of the defence case. 
Leading counsel, Bram Fischer, summarised what the defence would seek to prove, 
which parts of the State case it conceded, which it would deny and then he announced 
that Mandela would make a statement from the dock.  
 
Standing in the dock, Mandela began reading his statement slowly and with calm 
deliberation, his voice carrying clearly across the courtroom (Meredith, 1997). “I am the 
first accused.” There followed his famous court statement, where he explained the 
reasons behind the formation of Umkhonto and referred to the time in mid-1961 when 
the decision to turn to violence was taken. He went on to outline what he thought could 
be achieved by the use of violence: “Attacks on the economic lifelines of the country 
were to be linked with sabotage on government buildings and other symbols of 
 106
apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people … that we 
had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against government violence” 
(Mandela 1994). Finally, he spelled out the wants of his people, culminating in: “Above 
all, we want equal political rights … It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will 
result in racial domination … The ANC has spent half a century fighting against 
racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy. This then is what the ANC is 
fighting for … It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and 
their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live” (Mandela, 1994). 
 
Mandela stopped reading his statement at this point, put down his papers and turned to 
face the judge, speaking his final words from memory: 
 
 “During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people. I 
have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I 
have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live 
together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live 
for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die” 
(Mandela, 1994). 
 
Meanwhile, as the Rivonia trial reached its climax, Mandela’s defiant statement of his 
beliefs, his testimony declaring his willingness to die for the cause of democracy in 
South Africa and his bearing before the court had captured worldwide attention. 
Demonstrations were held in Europe and the United States. On 12 June 1964, finally, 
the eight accused were found guilty and were sentenced to life imprisonment. This, 
 107
according to the judge, allowed the government to show leniency and avoid inflicting 
the death sentence (Juckes, 1995). To an exchange of traditional salutes: “Amandla!” 
and “Ngawethu!” between the prisoners and the great crowd in the streets outside, and 
the singing of the anthem “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika,” they were taken to jail. Denis 
Goldberg, as a white man, was imprisoned in Pretoria; Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki and four 
others were flown to South Africa’s maximum-security prison for black male prisoners: 
Robben Island. 
 
4.2.3.3 The Prison life 
 
Until 1982, Mandela was imprisoned on Robben Island, located just offshore from Cape 
Town. Initially he lived in a cell measuring seven by seven feet, could write and receive 
only one letter every six months, and was forced to break rocks in the prison yard for 
hours daily. Despite this, he brought the universe into his cell: books, reflection on 
political debates, analyses of news broadcasts from smuggled radios, snippets of news 
from contraband newspapers and journals. 
 
Prison confirmed Mandela to be one of the greatest leaders in history. Mandela played a 
leading role in the prisoners’ struggles to improve some of their conditions with 
pressure of publicity and international campaigning. Before prison Mandela was a born 
leader who tended to be arrogant (Smith, 1999). Prison hardship taught him patience, 
the denial of rights, wisdom, empathy for others less privileged than himself and 
compassion. Mac Maharaj, former Minister of Transport, says, “His genius was that he 
gave leadership to a disparate body of prisoners to act in concert to improve prison 
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conditions. But he never made prison conditions the sole reason for any interaction as 
there was always a greater political purpose. [Mandela] also conducted himself in such a 
way that the authorities could never have the excuse to close the door on him” (Frost, 
1998). Maharaj, also said “[i]n prison, [Mandela] got his anger almost totally under 
control. That control has come about through a deliberate effort by Mandela, for 
political reason as well as personal” (Frost, 1998). In prison Mandela became a natural 
leader and spokesperson, meeting with prison authorities, journalists and visiting 
dignitaries (Alexander, 1994). 
 
Although the arrests at Rivonia proved a severe set-back for the liberation movement 
due to the absence of the leaders, resistance to apartheid continued. The movement 
devised new strategies and tactics. The ANC continued to fight for the isolation of 
South Africa and to rebuild the underground movement inside the country. The early 
1970s saw a dramatic rise in their resistance by black workers in South Africa, through 
strikes and organising in new, independent unions (IDAF, 1996). In June 1976, 
thousands of Soweto school students took to the streets in what was initially a protest 
against the enforced use of the Afrikaans language in black schools. The authorities 
reacted with armed force. Many students were shot dead, detained and imprisoned and 
as a result the protest turned into a nationwide uprising against apartheid.  
 
During all these years, it was illegal to quote Mandela in South Africa. He made 
periodic statements, however, that were smuggled from prison and published 
internationally. Fellow prisoners who were released also reported on prison conditions 
and Mandela’s activities and his continued strength and leadership (Mandela, 1994). In 
 109
later years, letters were published and while these were censored by prison authorities, 
their publication reminded friends and supporters of a person who loved and was 
concerned about his family, counted his letters annually, remembered anniversaries, 
dreamed of a better future and studied through correspondence (Meer, 1990). 
 
By the early 1980s, South Africa’s apartheid government, faced with not only internal 
resistance but also international sanctions, began to make gestures toward Mandela, its 
most famous political prisoner, including moving him to Pollsmoor Prison – a less 
brutal environment than Robben Island – in 1982. In January that year, the government 
was faced with the widespread and mounting resistance which was soon to force it to 
declare a State of Emergency. Finally, in 1985, President P.W. Botha publicly stated that 
he would release Mandela provided he “rejected violence as a political instrument,” a 
deal designed to alienate Mandela from other ANC leaders. Mandela rejected the offer 
and it was delivered in public by Zindzi, his daughter, on 10 February at a mass rally at 
a stadium in Soweto: 
 
 “I cannot sell my birthright, nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to 
be free. I am in prison as the representative of the people and of your organisation, 
the African National Congress ... Your freedom and mine cannot be separated. I will 
return” (Mandela, 1994).  
 
In 1988 Mandela was transferred to a private facility at Victor Verster Prison, where 
talks continued in secret. F.W. De Klerk succeeded P.W. Botha as president in 1988, and 
within a few months he lifted the 30 year-long ban on the ANC. On 2 February 1990, he 
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announced Mandela’s release from prison.  
 
4.2.4 AS LEADER OF SOUTH AFRICA WORKING TOWARDS 
DEMOCRACY  
 
The seventy-one-year old Mandela walked out of the prison gates on 11 February 1990, 
holding hands with his then-wife Winnie. It proved the most powerful image of the time, 
even in an era of charismatic heroes overcoming tyrannies in Eastern Europe and 
Russia; of Gorbachev, Walesa, Havel and the fall of the Berlin Wall (Sampson, 1999). 
The motorcade drove him off to Cape Town. Along the road spectators, black and white, 
waved or clenched fists in the ANC salute. Mandela eventually arrived at the City Hall 
in twilight to make his first public speech since his long statement from the dock in 
1964.  
 
Freedom, however, brought new challenges. Mandela’s long walk to freedom had 
ended; the steep climb to democracy had just begun. Long negotiations were awaiting 
Mandela to finish not only the existence of a white regime in government, but also 
violence between people in South Africa. The following section discusses the role of 
Mandela in promoting reconciliation between people of all races, religions and political 
ideologies through his forgiveness. 
 
4.2.4.1 Transition through Negotiations and Forgiveness 
 
Mandela’s desire for reconciliation encompassed all. At a press conference in Cape 
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Town shortly after his release he was asked about the fears white people had. “I knew 
that people expected me to harbour anger towards whites,” he commented subsequently. 
“But I had none. In prison, my anger towards whites decreased, but my hatred for the 
system grew. I wanted South Africa to see that I loved even my enemies, while I hated 
the system that turned us against one another” (Mandela, 1995).  
 
Mandela re-entered the ANC quietly but firmly. He succeeded Oliver Tambo as 
president of the ANC in 199l, at the age of seventy-two. Meanwhile, confronting the 
reality of endemic violence in South Africa horrified the returning ANC members. At 
first most of the killings were concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal, the impoverished 
heartland of the Zulu people. Between July 1990 and June 1993, an average of 101 
people a month died in “politically related incidents” in KwaZulu-Natal, reaching a total 
of 3,653 deaths (TRC, 1998). The violence was depicted by most whites as a 
straightforward tribal conflict between Zulu patriots and Xhosa interlopers seeking to 
dominate the nation through the ANC. The key to peace appeared to rest with Chief 
Buthelezi and his Zulu party Inkatha, which was extending its power. Inkatha could 
hold the balance in the ongoing negotiations, for De Klerk’s National Party clearly 
hoped to bring the party, together with other tribal groups, onto their side to outvote the 
ANC (Sampson, 1999).   
 
Mandela had made attempts to contain the growth of violence in KwaZulu-Natal. He, 
wanting to emphasise reconciliation, did not respond directly to statements made by 
Chief Buthelezi, choosing rather to thank him for trying to secure his release from 
prison (Frost, 1998). He cited, too, their long relationship and drew attention to the 
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things that united the IFP and the ANC. During private talks later the two made some 
progress and signed an agreement which contained a code of conduct between the two 
movements, but this had little effect. Another agreement signed in April 1991 and 
backed with strong statements from both leaders also had little effect. As a result, due to 
continuing violence, Mandela appeared incapable of controlling the “black-on-black” 
violence.  
 
By now, Mandela suspected that in some way the Government was behind the violence 
and began to wonder about F.W. De Klerk himself, a man he had hitherto regarded as 
someone with whom the ANC could do business (Mandela, 1995). De Klerk, despite a 
warning from Mandela that an attack was expected by Inkatha, did nothing to prevent it. 
In fact, De Klerk still hoped for Buthelezi’s support as a counterweight against the ANC 
(De Klerk, 1991). Shortly after, the South African correspondent of the Guardian 
published the story jointly with the Weekly Mail in Johannesburg, which slashed the 
suspected alliance on 18 July 1991: “Police paid Inkatha to block ANC.” Rarely has any 
news story had such an immediate impact on a government. As a result, on 14 
September, a national peace conference was held in Johannesburg under pressure from 
civil society. This was the first face-to-face meeting of Mandela, De Klerk and 
Buthelezi on one platform.  
 
Due to the process of negotiation and rising pressure against De Klerk’s government, 
finally, in September 1992, Mandela and de Klerk agreed on a framework within which 
to negotiate a transition to multiracial democratic rule. The Record of Understanding 
they signed in December 1993 provided for a new constitution and free elections to be 
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held on 27 April 1994.  
 
Mandela and De Klerk had found themselves together at Oslo to receive jointly the 
Nobel Peace Prize for 1993. In the citation the judges acknowledged that both were 
“politicians in a complicated reality and it is the total picture that was decisive” (SA 
Times, 1993). At Oslo Mandela was able to say he could envisage sharing power with 
De Klerk, “despite all the mistakes he had made and continues to make” (SA Times, 
1993). “He had the courage to admit that a terrible wrong had been done to our country 
and people through the imposition of the system of apartheid,” he wrote on reflection. 
“He had the foresight to understand and accept that all the people of South Africa must, 
through negotiations and as equal participants in the process, together determine what 
they want to make of their future” (Mandela, 1995).  
 
4.2.4.2 Promoting Reconciliation as President of South Africa 
 
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, who had himself voted for the first time at the age of 75, 
was elected as the president of South Africa. Before the election, while violence 
continued in the townships and throughout rural KwaZulu-Natal, there were widespread 
fears that the election would be derailed by violence and intimidation. But 20 million 
voters cast ballots in a peaceful and free election. With black South Africans voting for 
the first time in their lives in South Africa on 26 April 1994, the African National 
Congress, with Nelson Mandela, was the overwhelming winner, capturing 62.2 percent 
of the vote and thus 252 seats out of four hundred in the new parliament. 
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On 10 May 1994, Mandela was inaugurated as president in a resplendent ceremony in 
Pretoria. In his presidential speech, Mandela stressed regeneration and reconciliation:  
 
“Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long must 
be born a society of which all humanity will be proud … Never, never and never 
again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one 
by another, and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world” (Mandela, 
1995). 
 
The crowd – black and white – sang the two national anthems, “Die Stem,” the old 
anthem of the Republic, and “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika,” the ANC’s anthem. “Neither 
group knew the lyrics of the anthem they once despised,” Mandela reflected, adding 
hopefully: “They would soon know the words by heart” (Mandela, 1995).  
 
Mandela’s government had laid out the plans of an ambitious vision, the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme; it had announced a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission with far-reaching amnesty clauses; more black families moved into 
wealthy, previously white neighbourhoods; black entrepreneurs set up stands on the 
sidewalks of suburbs where they would never before have dreamed of establishing a 
business.  
 
Since assuming office Mandela had earned a reputation as an international peacemaker, 
helping to mediate conflicts both in Africa and abroad. In addition, Mandela worked to 
strengthen South Africa’s economy by pursuing international trade agreements and 
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foreign investment. Despite some difficulties with two old antagonists, De Klerk and 
Buthelezi, Mandela was much more concerned with the broader problems of 
transforming the nation from a white oligarchy into a multi-racial democracy (Sampson, 
1999). Parliament provided a visible pageant of the “Rainbow Nation,” Mandela wanted 
to use Parliament to consolidate a non-racial democracy, and was concerned that the 
Government of National Unity doesn’t go down to the grassroots (New York Times, 
1995). Parliament’s most important task was to approve a new Constitution – which was 
to be confirmed and fortified by a constitutional court chaired by Arthur Chaskalson, the 
lawyer who had helped defend Mandela in the Rivonia trial. The new Constitution was 
reaching compromises to reassure all the parties and working out safeguards for the 
Afrikaners. After some brinkmanship it came before Parliament in October 1996. 
 
As president, Mandela continued to show outstanding leadership qualities, urging South 
Africa “to come to terms with its past in a spirit of openness and forgiveness and 
proceed to build the future on the basis of repairing and healing. The burden of the past 
lies heavily on all of us,” he added, “including those responsible for inflicting injury and 
those who suffered” (Frost, 1998). All his dramatic gestures of forgiveness were greeted 
even by whites with surprise and relief. Graca Machel, who is now Mandela’s wife, 
said: 
 
 “He symbolises a much broader forgiveness and understanding and reaching out. If 
he had come out of prison and sent a different message, I can tell you this country 
could be in flames. So his role is not to be underestimated too. He knew exactly the 
way he wanted to come out, but also the way he addressed the people from the 
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beginning, sending the message of what he thought was the best way to save lives in 
this country, to bring reconciliation … Some people criticise that he went too far. 
There is no such thing as going too far if you are trying to save this country from 
this kind of tragedy" (Sampson, 1999).  
 
4.3 THE CASE STUDY OF KIM DAE-JUNG 
 
The following section includes the political life of Kim Dae-jung as categorised into 
various important roles during the democratisation of South Korea. A brief explanation 
of his role in the democratisation process in South Korea was provided in chapter two. 
Therefore, this section focuses more on the specific instances related to his opposition 
movement against authoritarian regimes and categorises them into the following four 
roles: 
 
• As young man and developing politician 
• As young leader of the Opposition Party 
• As political prisoner and activist  
• As leader of South Korea  
 
This section comprises the major speeches – such as his statement at his trial in 1976 
and 1980, his address after his release and his speech as president – and prison writings 
of Kim Dae-jung to his family relating to his struggle for democracy in South Korea. 
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4.3.1 AS YOUNG MAN AND DEVELOPING POLITICIAN 
 
Kim Dae-jung was born on 3 December 1925, in a small village on Ha-ui Island in the 
Cholla province. He was the second son of Kim Yun-shik, a middle class farmer, and 
Chang Su-kum, a strict but loving mother whom, he says, instilled in him a strong sense 
of right and wrong. Kim grew up with his father’s passion for books and philosophy – 
though without formal schooling until his parents moved to Mokpo, on the mainland, so 
that Kim could complete high school. 
 
During Kim’s childhood, Korea was under the rule of Japanese Imperialist regimes; the 
Korean people deeply desired independence and demonstrated and worked to achieve 
that goal. There were continuous anti-Japanese and independence movements, but 
nothing came of it until World War II and the defeat of Japan by Allied forces. When 
Japan grew more desperate toward the end of World War II, schools were closed and, as 
a result, Kim Dae-jung unexpectedly graduated one year early in 1943. Because of this 
situation, Kim started a career in the shipping business and renounced his dream to enter 
University.  
 
With the end of World War II, the U.S. military command required the Japanese to 
dispose of the businesses and properties they owned in South Korea and Kim worked 
successfully to take over the company, named Heung-Guk Marine Transportation. The 
marine transportation business was booming at the time and Kim, still in his twenties, 
prospered as a businessman (Goldstein, 1999). Kim was also interested in news and 
journalism, so when an offer came to take over the local “Mokpo Daily News,” which 
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had been started by a Japanese company, he eagerly accepted it. He served as its 
publisher from 1946 through till 1948. Meanwhile, on 9 April 1946, Kim married Cha 
Young-ae, the oldest daughter of a distinguished community leader and one-time officer 
of the Mokpo branch of the Democratic Party. It was a happy and relatively prosperous 
time until 25 June 1950. 
 
Meanwhile, the surrender of Japan brought with it a proposed plan by the United States 
that would separate Korea roughly in half, with the dividing line at the 38th parallel. As 
a result, the South was to be under the American rule with their Soviet ally taking 
control of the northern half – despite huge opposition by the Korean people. On 15 
August 1948, an election in South Korea resulted in the establishment of the Republic 
of Korea, with Syngman Rhee as its first president. On the other side, North Korea 
became the People’s Republic of Korea, a rigid communist dictatorship led for nearly 
forty years by Kim Il-sung. Tension between the two countries increased; and finally, on 
25 June 1950 North Korean troops invaded South Korea, setting off a bloody three-year 
conflict.  
 
On a business trip to Seoul, Kim Dae-jung was among the hundreds of thousands who 
were trapped in the city, which fell into the hands of the communists on 28 June 1950. 
Kim saw summary executions in the streets and worried, that he too would be 
“recruited” by the “volunteer corps.” He narrowly escaped bombing attacks by the 
North Koreans and twenty days later he reached Mokpo, his hometown. But Kim found 
his house and its belongings taken over by the communists. Kim was arrested, simply 
because he was a successful businessman. During the execution of prisoners on 18 
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September 1950, he once again escaped due to good fortune. Of the nine inmates in 
Kim’s cell, six were executed. Thousands of other civilians were branded as 
reactionaries and killed by the communists. A few days later, Mokpo was liberated by 
South Korean and American forces. 
 
When Kim started his business, he propagated communism and briefly sought out some 
political attachment. The above-mentioned experiences, however, turned him against 
communism and he was later to write: 
 
“Frankly speaking, I did not know clearly at that time as to what was communism or 
what was nationalism … I joined various groups and repeatedly experienced , first, 
expectations and then, disappointments … I studied with deep concern as to whether 
communism could be a useful doctrine which could bring forth independence and 
happiness to our people. Finally, I cut off all ties with communism” (Kim, 2000a). 
 
In addition, Syngman Rhee’s government disappointed Kim Dae-jung because of 
corruption at the highest levels, rigged elections and lacklustre economic performance. 
The Korean War and the new government’s failure dragged Kim’s future into anti-
establishment politics. In 1954, at the age of twenty-nine, Kim expressed dissatisfaction 
with the regime of Rhee and felt confident enough to run for the National Assembly as 
an independent candidate from Mokpo, saying, “I saw the suffering of the people 
caused by bad politics” (Kim, 1999). With the support of organised labour through the 
Port Labour Union, the Korean Youth League and journalists, he seemed a sure winner. 
But he lost to the government’s Liberal Party which had mobilised all its political power 
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to take the election.  
 
In late 1957, Kim joined the Democratic Party (DP) – the leading opposition party – to 
fight the government system. But Kim lost a parliamentary election in Inn-Jae District 
in 1958 and another supplementary election in 1959. Indeed, the government’s Liberal 
Party (LP) prohibited its soldiers from attending campaign rallies or reading campaign 
leaflets and warned them not to vote for the opposition. At the same time, there were 
several attempts by the ruling party to sway Kim and he was later to recall: 
 
“While I was living in such a destitute condition, the Liberal Party tempted me 
many times to switch my party affiliation with an offer of a huge sum of money. 
Between 1950 and 1960, many opposition members could not stand the strain of 
poverty and many assemblymen switched their party affiliations … But I overcame 
the temptations and carried on my struggle as my conscience dictated. It goes 
without saying that I owe my steadfastness to the encouragement and support 
rendered to me by my friends” (Kim, 1992).  
 
On 19 April 1960, President Rhee’s charges of fraud and corruption in the government 
and general dissatisfaction with the economy triggered student uprisings – forcing 
Rhee’s resignation. After four months, a new parliamentary-style Constitution gave 
greater political power to the legislature, though the real political power was wielded by 
the Prime Minister, Chang Myon, the leader of the DP. Finally, on 14 May 1961, Kim 
was elected to the National Assembly in a supplementary election after three 
unsuccessful bids. He later recalled, “I have come to the conclusion that the real well-
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being of the people could not be attained unless a genuine democratic political system is 
firmly established by ending the dictatorship which ignores the will of the people and 
downgrades the National Assembly” (Kim, 2000a). 
 
However, within three days of his election, the National Assembly was dissolved 
following a military coup d'etat led by Major General Park Chung-hee. 
 
4.3.2 AS YOUNG LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES 
 
After Park Chung-hee seized control of the government through a military coup, Kim 
Dae-jung became a leading figure of the opposition to successive military government. 
The tough, authoritarian Park proved the perfect foil for the anti-Park oratory of the 
charismatic Kim (Clark, 2001). Even under the government’s harassment and 
oppression, Kim did not quit his political career and spoke out against the dictatorship 
in an outdoor rally. As a result, he was widely acclaimed for his vision and courage. 
 
Kim had risen to prominence – spearheading the unsuccessful 1969 parliamentary effort 
to prevent the dictatorship of Park – and was chosen as the New Democratic Party’s 
presidential candidate against the government. In the course of the following years, Kim 
experienced several assassination attempts and kidnapping.  
 
From the early 1960s to the late 1970s, Kim Dae-jung developed his political 
experience as opposition leader and challenged Park’s dictatorship, despite various 
attempts on his life.  
 122
The following section describes Kim’s political career as leader of the Democratic Party 
and subsequent New Democratic Party, and his rally campaigns against Park’s regime in 
the U.S. and Japan to establish democracy in South Korea.  
 
4.3.2.1 The Challenge of Kim Dae-jung as Leader of the NDP against Park Chung-
hee 
 
On 16 May 1961, at the age of forty-four, General Park Chung-hee led a group of 
officers, including Lieutenant General Chang Do-young, in a coup d'etat, forcing the 
resignation of Prime Minister Chang Myun, establishing a military government and 
declaring martial law. All functions of government were taken over by the Supreme 
Council for National Reconstruction – headed by General Park, who was to be the 
dominant personality in South Korea for the next eighteen years (Goldstein, 1999).  
 
Park’s prolonged dictatorship gained its stride by proclaiming martial law. This fact 
meant to deny the existence of the National Assembly and to prohibit political activity. 
Kim was arrested by the government and subsequently released after no specific charges 
could be found. On 20 May 1962, he was arrested again, this time on charges of 
planning to overthrow the military government, and detained in prison for a little more 
than a month. Again he was found innocent of any crime. Meanwhile, as the Democratic 
Party was dismissed by Park, some of the politicians – who continued to fight for 
democracy and human rights – established a new political party, the Minjungdang (the 
People’s Party), in 1963; it became the second leading opposition party with Yun Po-sun 
as chairman of the party. Kim Dae-jung was elected as spokesman.  
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Meanwhile, Kim’s wife, Cha Young-ae had died on 29 May 1960, after a long illness 
aggravated by the strains and pressures produced by the 1959 election defeat (Kim, 
2000a). Kim married for the second time on 10 May 1962. Lee Hee-ho, his second wife, 
was working as the general secretary of the Korean Young Women’s Christian 
Association at the time. She was highly educated not only in Ewha Women’s College in 
Korea but also in Scarritt College in Tennessee. Later Kim wrote, “She inspired me to 
improve women’s rights” (Kim, 2000a) – in fact, Kim called for the revision of family 
law to the National Assembly later in 1989.  
 
In July 1963, as a result of the people’s continuous protest, the Democratic Party rebuilt 
from the People’s Party and became a second opposition party. Kim was nominated as 
the Democratic Party candidate from his home district, Mokpo, in the National 
Assembly election. Kim won the election easily and this raised him to a politician of 
national standing. With 13 speeches during his first six months as a legislator, Kim 
made his mark as a fiery anti-Park orator. The more Kim was persecuted, the more 
popular he became; especially in the region of Cholla. Many residents of the provinces 
of North and South Cholla felt disadvantaged during the regime of Park, who was from 
the Taegu region in the southeast – their political rival. In 1960, Yun Po-sun objected to 
plans to normalise relations with the former occupation enemy, Japan. But Kim took the 
more moderate and pragmatic road. He said, “Many former colonies of England and 
France have entered into amicable relations with their former rulers. If we refuse to 
establish diplomatic relations with Japan, even though we are equal with Japan, we are 
heading against the common trend of the world” (Kim, 2000a). Furthermore, in 1970, 
against the backdrop of the Vietnam War, he again announced his liberal views on 
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North-South reunification. The government propaganda machine responded with a 
campaign to brand the young politician a communist outcast. 
 
In May 1967, the presidential election was held; Park remained president by defeating 
Yun, Po-sun, who represented the New Democracy Party (NDP) – established by a 
merger of the two major opposition forces. In June 1967, however, Kim again won a 
seat in the Seventh National Assembly, despite the defeat of other leaders of the NDP. 
The NDP wanted a presidential candidate for the 1971 election who was from a younger 
generation, so on 29 September 1970, the NDP chose Kim Dae-jung as their presidential 
candidate. Kim said in his acceptance speech, 
 
“A truly new era shall dawn from now on … A new epoch shall be marked for our 
party as well as for Korean politics. I shall fight for the freedom and well-being of 
our people as a vanguard of this new era. I shall prevent the perpetuation of the rule 
of Park Chung-hee at any cost and I shall bring forth a peaceful, democratic transfer 
of power, which has been the aspiration of our people since the foundation of our 
nation” (Kim, 2000a). 
 
Kim campaigned with the motto “Down with Dictatorship” and among the major issues 
on his platform were a guarantee of Korean security by the four superpowers (US, 
USSR, China and Japan); peaceful reunification of Korea through reconciliation and 
mutual exchanges between the two Koreas; promotion of a mass-participatory economy 
and a wealth tax system. The reactions of the Park regime were harsh and dictatorial. An 
explosion rocked Kim’s residence and thieves broke into the offices of the NDP policy 
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research department, stealing important documents. Additionally, the opposition tried 
smear tactics and stirred up regional animosities (Goldstein, 1999). Despite the 
government’s blockage, when Kim gave a campaign speech at Chang-Choong-Dan Park, 
nearly one million people gathered to hear his speech. On 27 April 1971, his first bid for 
the presidency won him a remarkable 46% of the vote, though he lost out to Park 
Chung-hee.  
 
A month after the election, Kim was headed for a rally in Seoul to deliver a speech 
when a truck turned directly into the path of his car, forcing him off the road. Kim was 
left with a permanent limp from the incident, which is widely believed to have been an 
assassination attempt.  
 
4.3.2.2 Kim Dae-jung’s Campaign in Japan against the Yushin Constitution  
 
Kim’s real troubles began when Park scrapped Korea’s Constitution and declared 
himself the country’s dictator-in-chief. It was 1972 and Kim was on a trip to Japan for 
medical treatment. Park’s new political framework, a manifest dictatorship, became 
known as the “Yushin” (called revitalising reform) system that prevailed through the 
second phase of Park’s rule. Under the terms of Emergency Decree No 1 (January 1974), 
which made it illegal to criticise the new Constitution, scores of students, politicians, 
intellectuals and religious leaders were arrested, jailed and tortured (Lee, 2000). The 
Yushin Constitution was ratified and Park was again re-elected as president – it gave the 
president power for life. 
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Rather than face arrest, Kim decided to proselytise against Park’s regime abroad. In 
addition, Park confined Kim’s family to their modest Seoul home and Kim’s aides were 
subjected to interrogation and often torture. From Tokyo, Kim issued a statement: 
 
“The measures promulgated by President Park Chung-hee are nothing but 
astonishing anti-democratic schemes to perpetuate his dictatorial rule under the 
pretext of promotion of reunification. These measures are outright violations of the 
constitution and a brutal suppression of the people’s yearnings to accomplish 
reunification of our fatherland from the position of strength by promoting 
democracy in South Korea. I am confident that Park’s act will be condemned by 
public opinion and is doomed to fail by the power of the great Korean people who 
overthrew the dictatorial regime of Syngman Rhee in pursuit of democratic 
freedom” (Kim, 2000a). 
 
He continued to issue statements of protest from Japan and from the United Sates. On 8 
August 1973, Kim was kidnapped by unidentified Koreans from Tokyo’s Grand Palace 
Hotel and taken out to sea in a small boat, where he spent several harrowing days 
readied for execution. When U.S Ambassador Philip Habib was informed of the 
abduction, he called Park Chung-hee and warned him of the repercussions for relations 
with the United States if Kim was killed (Kim, 1992). This intervention saved Kim’s life. 
In a report years later, the newspaper Dong-A Ilbo recounted the details of the abduction, 
citing secret government documents from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(KCIA). It said that assistant deputy director, Lee Chul-hee, admitted that the 
kidnapping was ordered by the head of KCIA.  
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Kim Dae-jung was returned to his Seoul home, battered but alive, and immediately 
placed under house arrest. He spent another year in prison during 1975 for “violation of 
the election law.” On 1 March 1976, the indomitable opposition leader joined other 
democracy fighters in issuing the “Independence Day Declaration for Democratisation,” 
which set off yet another wave of pro-democracy demonstrations in South Korea. 
Subsequently, Kim and the other seventeen opposition leaders were arrested and Kim 
was finally charged with a five-year sentence at the Supreme Court. He told a court of 
appeals: 
 
“In this country, nobody dares defy the wishes of the president of the current regime 
… the Yushin system is not aiming for reunification, nor for national security and 
anti-communism, but only for perpetuation of lifetime rule of one man … there will 
be no freedom of conscience, no freedom of religion and no freedom of academic 
institutions under the Yushin system … I am ready to die for the people who suffer 
from torture and oppression by government … A system in which people dedicate 
their loyalty is the only democratic system and I really wish to accomplish a just 
society” (Kim, 2000a).  
 
In late 1978, Kim was transferred to a hospital cell from prison; his sentence was 
suspended on 27 December 1978 and he was placed under house arrest again. On 26 
October 1979, President Park was assassinated by the head of the KCIA, Kim Jae-kyu. 
On 6 December 1979, Prime Minister Choi Kyu-ha was officially elected president and 
released Kim Dae-jung from house arrest. Kim had his civil and political rights restored 
and started to campaign for the elections that were expected to be held in 1980. On 12 
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December, however, expectations of democracy were dashed once again as the military 
quickly reasserted its dominance, declaring martial law. General Chun Doo-hwan 
assumed power and oppressed both the opposition leaders and public protest. Once 
again, Kim Dae-jung’s political life was faced by the threat of Chun’s dictatorship.  
 
4.3.3 AS POLITICAL PRISONER 
 
Kim Dae-jung was arrested as one of the leading opposition figures by General Chun 
Doo-hwan’s regime in May 1980. Chun’s regime accused Kim of fomenting subsequent 
demonstrations in Kwangju, which Chun bloodily put down. Jailed under a death 
sentence, which was reduced to life imprisonment as a result of international pressures, 
Kim was allowed to go to the United States for “medical treatment” in December 1982. 
He used his time in exile not only to campaign against Chun’s regime, but also to brush 
up on his English, working as a visiting fellow at Harvard University and cultivating 
influential American friends.  
 
The following section discusses Kim’s trial, his role in leading democratic protest in 
South Korea and organising political rallies while in exile in the United States.  
 
4.3.3.1 The Kwangju Uprising 
 
The void created by Park’s death was filled by General Chun Doo-hwan, a Park protégé 
and commander of the powerful Defence Security Command. Chun staged an internal 
coup to take control of the military, then, persuaded the new president, Choi Kyu-ha, to 
 129
impose martial law and name Chun as a chief of the KCIA. The situation came to a head 
in May 1980, four months after Chun’s coup and elevation as head of the KCIA, when 
labour activists, students and opposition politicians, chafing from the harsh military rule, 
began a series of nationwide demonstrations demanding democratic elections and an 
end to martial law. On 18 May, a massive public protest began in Kwangju and Chun’s 
regime sent the military to crack down on the demonstrators. The government claimed 
191 people were killed in the uprising, but Kwangju officials and survivors insisted the 
figure was closer to 2,000.  
 
Kim and twenty-six other opposition leaders were arrested on 17 May 1980 and accused 
of inciting the Kwangju uprising. Kim was also charged with belonging to pro-
communist groups in the 1940s, receiving help from a North Korean spy during the 
1971 presidential election, and organising student uprisings in Seoul. He was once again 
sent to prison and put on trial – in a military court this time – in September 1980. He 
testified: 
 
“In this country, evidently, there exist followers of the former president [Park] and at 
the same time, there are a great number of democratic forces which pursue the 
principles of democracy. It is my firm belief that neither of these two groups can 
lead this country by completely suppressing the other group. Our nation should 
adopt democracy and is capable of doing so” (Kim, 2000a). 
 
In response to the bogus charges, he denied his involvement with North Korea and said 
he did not even know about the demonstration at Kwangju until July that year, when 
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someone who visited him in prison told him about it.  
 
Meanwhile, during his years in jail, Kim had become an avid botanist and reader – 
devouring the works of Mencius and Plato, Bertrand Russell and Abraham Lincoln – 
and taught himself English. He educated himself through long hours reading books and 
recalled later: “If I had not been imprisoned, I could not have acquired such great 
philosophies and knowledge” (Kim, 2000a). Kim also wrote letters, although allowed 
only one letter a month to all members of his family. He often wrote to his wife about 
his expanding views and maturation of ideas through the books: 
 
“From a political and social viewpoint, the twentieth century might be regarded as 
the beginning of the masses. In order to overcome the greatest crisis in our history, 
that is, the division of our fatherland and the threat of communism and to attain 
genuine security, economic growth, and unification, the masses must be treated as 
the major force for change and must be treated as the master of their own destiny”  
(Kim, 2000b). 
 
As a result of his newfound knowledge, Kim developed and implemented his own Mass 
Participatory Economic Theory, to assist Korea in rebuilding its shattered economy, 
when he was elected as president. 
 
Meanwhile, in November 1980, a military court sentenced Kim to death. At the time, 
Ronald Reagan had just won the American presidency and members of his transition 
team joined forces with officials from the outgoing Jimmy Carter administration in 
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putting pressure on Chun to spare Kim. The sentence was later commuted to life 
imprisonment and then to a twenty-year term. In December 1982, his prison term was 
suspended and he was put on a plane to the United States.  
 
4.3.3.2 Kim Dae-jung’s Exile and Political Action in the United States 
 
Kim’s life in exile transformed him from a national dissident to a worldly political 
leader (Time, 1998). As a visiting fellow at Harvard University, he attracted a group of 
influential friends: the late scholar and Ambassador Edwin Reischauer, Senator Edward 
Kennedy, Congressman Stephen Solarz and Philippine dissident Benigno Aquino. At the 
same time, Kim gave speeches to reveal South Korea’s political situation in various 
places in the United States. Kim told the guests: 
 
“We do not want the intervention of the United States in our internal political affairs. 
We do not expect the United States to intervene on our behalf to restore democracy 
in Korea, which is in fact our own responsibility. We want to solicit only two things 
from the United States; First, it should give its spiritual support to our aspirations for 
democracy. Second, the United States should refrain from rationalising dictatorial 
regimes or from encouraging them on the pretext of guarding stability and national 
security” (Kim, 1987). 
 
Kim was also able to establish the Korean Institute for Human Rights, through which he 
hoped to strengthen his base among Korean-Americans and influence U.S. policy. The 
Washington Post (1998) recalled about his political life in U.S. a few years later: “Kim 
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is an admirable character and one of the closing year’s few examples of a victory over 
the sour adage “nice guys finish last.” A fanatic for democracy, he was treated 
shamefully by the oligarchs who ran his native South Korea … Through it all, he 
maintained his faith in popular rule and eventual vindication.”  
 
In 1983, Kim was informed that fellow dissident Kim Young-sam, who was also leader 
of the NDP, staged a month-long hunger strike to protest Chun’s heavy-handed rule. In 
addition, Aquino was assassinated in Manila when he stepped off a plane. This news 
shocked Kim and provoked him to face the problem directly. After more than two years 
away from home, he was ready to return to Korea, even though he faced seventeen more 
years of his sentence. Finally, Kim Dae-jung left Washington on 6 February 1985 – 
despite the political leaders’ concern about his security in South Korea.  
 
4.3.4 AS LEADER OF SOUTH KOREA WORKING TOWARDS 
DEMOCRACY 
 
The fifty-nine year old Kim Dae-jung arrived at Kimpo Airport with his family on 8 
February 1985. There was a crowd of thirty thousand to celebrate Kim’s return, but he 
and his family were whisked out of the airport through a back door. Kim’s return 
intensified the nationwide pro-democracy movement. Furthermore, Kim resumed an 
influential role in his nation’s reviving political life. Kim ran and was defeated in 
presidential elections in 1987 and 1992. 
 
In December 1997, at the age of seventy-one-years old, Kim was elected president of 
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South Korea. When he was inaugurated as the eighth President of the South Korea, it 
marked the first transition of power from the ruling to the opposition party in Korea’s 
modern history. Despite his advanced age, his outlook appeared focused on the future. 
He stressed economic recovery backed by a democratic system. Kim also propagated 
reconciliation with North Korea and the forgiveness for his past political opponents. 
Most remarkable about Kim’s resolution of Korea’s problems, is the former dissident’s 
patience – infused with a surprising willingness to forgive (Time, 1998). 
 
The following section describes Kim’s pro-democracy movement against the 
authoritarian government and discusses the role of Kim in leading reconciliation 
between people of all religions and political ideologies through his forgiveness. 
 
4.3.4.1 Kim Dae-jung’s Presidential Campaign against Authoritarianism 
 
Kim, accompanied by thirty-seven American well-wishers, returned to Seoul, where 
police violence caused a much-publicised airport scuffle on 8 February 1985. Kim was 
not recommitted to jail, however, but placed under house surveillance. He was to be so 
confined for eighty-seven days – surrounded by hundreds of police, isolated from the 
outside world and not allowed visitors.  
 
On 29 June 1985, “spring came as abruptly as a miracle” (Kim, 2000a). Kim was later 
to write about what he saw as the end of a long period of military regime. This “spring” 
came in the form of an eight-point declaration for eventual democratisation from Roh 
Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the Democratic Justice Party (DJP), which was 
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the ruling party under President Chun. Amnesty was granted and civil rights restored to 
more than two thousand political dissidents – including Kim Dae-jung (Goldstein, 
1999). In fact, Chun promised to relinquish power after the completion of his seven-
year term, but he picked Roh, a military acquaintance, to run as his successor. The 
announcement of Roh’s candidacy sparked a firestorm of protest, with student 
demonstrations turning violent in several cities. Roh calmed the situation by 
proclaiming his acceptance of the opposition’s demands for civil liberties, direct 
presidential elections and amnesty for political prisoners.  
 
The presidential election that took place in December 1987 was a four-way race that 
Roh won with a plurality of 36.6 percent. The pro-democracy opposition lost the contest 
because the two most prestigious leaders Kim Dae-jung (president of Peace and 
Democratic Party) and Kim Young-sam (president of Democratic Party), both insisted 
on running against Roh Tae-woo (as president of Democratic Justice Party) and, in so 
doing, split the vote.  
 
On 22 January 1990, President Roh – afraid of possible repercussions resulting from his 
past conduct – decided to establish a new coalition ruling party by forming an alliance 
with the two opposition parties, led by Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil. This strong 
political alliance, called the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), prevented Kim Dae-jung’s 
presidential victory yet again. This alliance, in addition, deepened regionalism caused 
by Park’s oppression of his political rivals.  
 
The DLP, which now commanded a two-thirds majority in the legislative body, won 
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landslide victories in local council elections on both 26 March and 20 June 1991. The 
election for the 14th presidential term was held on 18 December 1992. The three major 
candidates were the ruling DLP’s Kim Young-sam, the opposition Democratic Party’s 
Kim Dae-jung and the newly founded United People’s Party candidate Chung Ju-young, 
founder of the Hyundai Group. Kim Dae-jung lost again and declared his retirement 
from politics.  
 
Even though Kim Dae-jung was defeated, this presidential election returned Korea to 
the hands of a democratically elected civilian President for the first time since the 
military coup d'etat of 1961. Optimism about South Korea’s prospects for a truly 
comprehensive, stable democracy was now higher than ever before. Ironically, Kim 
Young-sam arrested former Presidents Roh Tae-woo - his fellow DLP member – and 
Chun Doo-hwan for inappropriate use of military force in the 1980 Kwangju uprising as 
well as for taking bribes from large corporations. They were both, subsequently, 
sentenced to death, but later freed by Kim Dae-jung. 
 
Within a few short years, however, hopes for a broader democracy were rudely 
disappointed while the economy plunged into an unanticipated abyss. In addition, 
President Kim Young-sam’s son was implicated in a massive financial scandal and 
sentenced to three years in prison.  
 
Meanwhile Kim Dae-jung began his new life visiting fellow politicians and studying at 
Clare Hall College at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom. After completion 
of his studies, Kim established the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation for the Asia Pacific 
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Region (KPF) to promote the peaceful unification of the Koreas; democratisation in 
Asia and greater world peace. Inaugurated at a high-profile international conference in 
Seoul early in 1994, it was followed by the creation of the Forum of Democratic 
Leaders in the Asia-Pacific. Kim was once again in the spotlight as a symbol of 
democracy (Goldstein, 1999).  
 
4.3.4.2 Reconciliation as President of South Korea 
 
The administration of Kim Young-sam was wracked by factional strife, scandal and 
economic crisis. Kim Dae-jung would not watch it happen from afar (Kim, 2000a); he 
announced his return to politics on 8 July 1995. He stressed the need for a strong 
opposition party to counter balance the one-party ruling structure and founded the 
National Congress for New Politics (NCNP). The NCNP emerged as the leading 
opposition party in the National Assembly elections of 1996 and set the stage for Kim’s 
triumphant presidential candidacy.  
 
On 18 December 1997, after five escapes from death, one hundred and eighty-three 
days of house arrest, six years in prison, two exiles and sixteen years of forced 
retirement from politics, Kim Dae-jung was elected the 15th president of South Korea, 
winning 40.3 % of the votes.  
 
This presidential election was deeply significant in Korean history, for President Kim’s 
election signalled the first peaceful, democratic transition of power from a ruling party 
to an opposition party in Korean history. Due to the conservative views of the Korean 
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people and their reluctance to change, compounded by the volatile situation in North 
Korea, the ruling party enjoyed constant support. The election was a kind of social 
revolution – one that could only have been achieved through the ardent desires of the 
Korean people. The dawning of a new age in Korea, as a result of their new found 
power, was eagerly anticipated. News media around the world described the 
inauguration as the day genuine democracy began in Korea and hailed President Kim as 
a world-class leader who could lead his nation out of crisis and rebuild it (Kim, 1992).  
 
Taking over the government in the midst of an unprecedented financial crisis, President 
Kim devoted himself to the task of economic recovery and managed to pull the country 
back from the brink of bankruptcy. He formed the Tripartite Committee of 
Representatives, made up of representatives of labour, management and government. He 
got right to work on restructuring the government and reducing the number of civil 
servants (CNN, 2000.) On the key issue of labour management relations, he wrote:  
 
“What is bad for the company is bad for the employee, and vice versa. Labour and 
management are in the same boat. Recognition of this fact is essential to realising 
full participation of all groups. The government, therefore, has a moral obligation to 
promote harmonious and cooperative labour management relations by playing a 
constructive role as an impartial but interested arbitrator” (Kim, 1997).  
 
South Korea’s economy shrank by 5.8 % in 1998 but bounced back in 1999 to grow by 
10.2 %. In addition, Kim asked incumbent former president Kim Young-sam to grant 
special amnesty to former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo and had them 
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sent home after two years in prison. Kim’s request to pardon the two former presidents, 
who had him sentenced to death while rising to power in a military coup in 1979, was 
made in an effort to bring about national reconciliation by reaffirming his tolerance and 
broad-mindedness.  
 
Furthermore, President Kim steadily pursued a policy of engagement toward North 
Korea. This policy of engagement, popularly called the “Sunshine Policy” (Moon, 
1999), was widely considered as the solution to the South-North question. The policy 
called for the South to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, along with 
reconciliation and cooperation with the North. President Kim’s efforts bore fruit in June 
of 2000, when North Korean leader Kim Jung-il met President Kim in Pyongyang for 
the first South-North summit talks on 13 – 15 June, 2000. The two leaders signed the 
historic South-North Joint Declaration. Heritage Foundation Lectures reviewed: 
 
“The most difficult knot to untie is, of course, security. As president Kim coaxes the 
North out of isolation and into more beneficial relations with the South, the North’s 
leaders, at least, are likely to see themselves as being more vulnerable … the best 
hope for their eventual resolution lies in the skilful leadership Kim Dae-jung has 
provided for the past three years” (Feulner, 2001). 
 
In recognition of Kim Dae-jung’s dedication to democracy and human rights in his own 
country and neighbouring regions and his work for peace and reconciliation with North 
Korea, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize for the 
year 2000. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Both Nelson Rolihlalha Mandela and Kim Dae-jung led the pro-democracy struggles in 
their respective countries as the leaders of their countries’ opposition movements.  
Despite continued harassment and oppression by the ruling parties of the time, they 
persevered.  
 
Their methodologies share the common characteristics of being overt; using their trials 
as political springboards; mobilising the masses by emphasising the continued unfair 
oppression of the people and employing their oratory capabilities to gain local and 
international support for the cause. 
 
As was clearly shown, their actions and speeches played an integral part in transforming 
their countries’ political ideologies peacefully and successfully. 
 
Therefore, in chapter five, the focus is on their common characteristics that contributed 
towards these successful and peaceful transitions – despite vastly differing histories.  
In order to do this, the leadership theory framework, mentioned in chapter three, is 
employed to analyse their leadership styles. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE LEADERSHIP APPROACHES OF NELSON 
MANDELA AND KIM DAE-JUNG IN THE PROCESS OF 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, the roles of the successful democratic South African and South 
Korean leaders – Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung – were described. In spite of 
differing social and historical backgrounds, there appear to be common leadership 
patterns, particularly regarding their speeches and actions aimed at transforming their 
respective countries into working democracies. 
 
As mentioned previously in chapter three, transformational leadership entails both 
leaders and followers raising each other’s motivation and sense of higher purpose. In 
addition, the transformational leaders seek to change the organisational culture, which 
alters the ways in which followers think about themselves and the organisation, and also 
their position within it. For instance, the majority of South Africans and South Koreans 
were oppressed by authoritarian regimes till early 1990 and both peoples desired a 
democratic country – as was shown by continuous public demonstrations against their 
respective governments. Mandela and Kim were the key role players in this 
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transformation.  
 
At the same time, the social environment surrounding the two nations had to face up to 
the political and economic challenges not only from inside the nations, but also from the 
outside world. These adaptive challenges forced both leaders, Mandela and Kim, to 
clarify their values, develop new strategies and learn new ways of operation – which is 
the main idea of the social learning approach to leadership.  
 
In this regard, the investigation of both Mandela and Kim’s leadership is based on the 
transformational as well social learning approaches, with a more detailed analysis being 
discussed in the following section. 
 
This chapter, in addition, briefly describes the two leaders’ leadership styles based on 
the other leadership theories in order to support the hypothesis: the two leaders comply 
with the transformational and social learning leadership styles. To analyse Nelson 
Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s behavioural and situational leadership styles 
comprehensively, however, questionnaire research through collection of questionnaires 
from themselves and their followers (their fellow politicians or comrades as well as 
ordinary South Africans and South Koreans) is required, according to more recent 
methodology. Unfortunately, as mentioned in the chapter one, there is a limitation to 
investigation through this form of research and, as a result, different methodology is 
employed. 
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5.2 ANALYSIS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF NELSON MANDELA AND KIM 
DAE-JUNG AGAINST THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
 
These analyses of theoretical approaches provide more detailed examples of the leaders’ 
common and distinct leadership styles, as well distinguishing factors between the three 
classical leadership approaches; the trait, behavioural and situational approaches and the 
new leadership approaches; the transformational and social learning approaches 
(Bryman, 1992). 
 
5.2.1 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE TRAIT APPROACH 
 
The trait approach was based on the premise that leaders were both more capable and 
possessed a different set of personality traits than non-leaders. In the early 20th century, 
leadership researchers examined research concerning the relationships between various 
personality traits and leadership effectiveness.  
 
Among the research, Stogdill’s (1948) first survey identified a group of important 
leadership traits that were related to how individuals in various groups became leaders. 
His results showed that the average individual in the leadership role is different from an 
average group member in the following ways: intelligence, alertness, insight, 
responsibility, initiative, persistence, self-confidence and sociability. Meanwhile, Mann 
(1959) identified leaders as strong in the following traits: intelligence, masculinity, 
adjustment, dominance, extroversion and conservatism. 
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The following sections illustrate Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s traits with 
examples according to the traits and characteristics set out by researchers such as 
Stogdill, Mann and Mc Call as mentioned in the chapter three. 
 
5.2.1.1 Evidence from Nelson Mandela’s Case 
 
While growing up, Mandela learned the value of respecting his own society’s culture 
and this indicated that he had the trait of being adaptable to situations. This is echoed by 
Tambo’s words, “Nelson was groomed from childhood for respectability, status and 
sheltered living,” as mentioned in section 4.2.1. During his studies at Fort Hare, his 
leadership traits appeared clearly. He was knowledgeable about group tasks and 
organised a boycott against authority. Later, in Johannesburg, he pursued his political 
career with an ambitious and achievement-oriented personality. Sisulu recalled, 
“[Mandela] was a very bright young man, impressive and open about things,” as 
mentioned in 4.2.1. 
 
While Mandela organised the Defiance Campaign and Umkonto we Sizwe (MK) and 
conducted the trials, he showed the ability to hold an audience in his thrall through 
powerful oratory skills. According to Atkinson (1984), speakers who are regarded as 
charismatic seem to employ a number of oratory devices in greater profusion than 
others. Mandela was often described as “a large lawyer, untravelled but enormously 
well read, slow speaking, nattily dressed” (Manchester Guardian, 1961) and as a “big 
handsome bearded man with a deep resonant voice” (Guardian,1961), when he 
conducted the trials.  
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For a decade in the history of South Africa, Mandela’s leadership appeared not so much 
as a climb up an organised hierarchy, but as successive images of the man in action -
leading from the front. He was the chief of volunteer defiers; the militant speech-maker 
charged with treason; the bearded Black Pimpernel in hiding; the tribal patriot in full 
costume “carrying Africa on his back”; the guerrilla commander in khaki fatigues, 
carrying a pistol. These images often seemed more theoretical than real, but carried a 
strong message of symbolism. In his ability to reflect the people’s mood and embody 
their aspirations, Mandela was portrayed as a natural born leader. 
 
5.2.1.2 Evidence from Kim Dae-jung’s Case  
 
According to Kim Dae-jung, he was taught a strong sense of right and wrong, instilled 
in him by a respectable father – who was a chief of the village (Leechang) – and a strict, 
but loving mother. During his school life, Kim excelled in all subjects and finished at 
the top of his class. According to Takashi’s interview with Kim’s hometown residents, 
Kim was the brightest and cleverest one in his elementary school (Takashi, 2000).  
 
Later, he went to the Mokpo Commercial High School and was elected class 
representative, even though most of his classmates were Japanese. In addition, Kim was 
successful not only in his marine transportation business, but also in getting support 
from his employees for the National Assembly election. This indicates his ability to 
dominate the people through commercial success.  
 
Kim Dae-jung also showed his capability of giving stirring speeches during his rallies in 
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the nation and beyond – such as Japan and the United States. An audience of around one 
million (three times larger than the audience present at Park Chung-hee’s presidential 
speech) came to listen to his presidential speech at Chang-Choong-Dang Park, in 
defiance of Park’s hindrance tactics. The speech was scheduled for Sunday, but Park 
organised a compulsory event for all civil servants, pubic officers and their family 
members to attend and, furthermore, offered free movie showings to civilians.  
 
During his presidential campaign, Kim Dae-jung was described as “presidential timber, 
knowledgeable about politics, diplomacy, economics and Korean unification” (Yang, 
1995). Moreover, Kim smiled and used humour, realising its importance as a tactic to 
endear him to the people when he delivered his speeches (Cotton, 1995). “He is a 
world-class leader – intelligent, sophisticated – and he has been through a tremendous 
amount,” said Donald Gregg, the former Seoul station chief for the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency who played a role in saving Kim’s life after he was kidnapped in 
1973 (CNN, 1998).  
 
5.2.1.3 Findings 
 
Although there were social, political and historical differences between South Africa 
and South Korea, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung persisted in their struggle to end 
authoritarian regimes using common traits: both possessed charm and spoke 
articulately; had intelligent business acumen; seemed tireless in their fight for 
democracy and both persisted against the opposition.  
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Furthermore, both leaders had physical ailments – Mandela’ pain from his knee, which 
had not recovered from his fall on Robben Island and Kim’ leg injury, which had not 
recovered from his car accident during the attempt on his life. Despite this, the two 
leaders’ physique and stamina amazed the people when they finally succeeded to serve 
as presidents at the ages of 75 and 74, respectively. 
 
Each leader, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung, is characterised by a strong drive for 
responsibility; vigour and persistence in pursuit of goals; drive to exercise initiative in 
social situations; self-confidence and sense of personal identity and an ability to 
influence other persons. Thus, this dissertation reinforces what has been detailed by the 
world press and reviews from each leader’s respective colleagues and followers, as 
mentioned above.  
 
5.2.1.4 Conclusion 
 
Both Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung show numerous characteristics that comply 
with the trait approach. These include charisma, oratory skills, intelligence and 
responsibility. 
 
Despite these similarities, the trait approach can neither be relied upon to explain all 
facets of their behaviour nor the different reactions of their followers. Because of this, 
the behavioural approach will also be investigated in order to achieve a more 
comprehensive understanding of the leadership styles of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-
jung.  
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Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been resurgence in interest in the trait approach 
in explaining how traits influence leadership (Bryman, 1992). Evidence of renewed 
interest in the trait approach, as a result, can be seen in the current emphasis many 
researchers place on visionary and transformational leadership (Bennis & Nanus, 1985). 
 
5.2.2 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH  
 
Despite the limitation of analysing by way of the behavioural approach, this section 
describes Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s behaviours based on the two leaders’ 
visible actions – which were described in their respective autobiographies, biographies 
(written by authorised and unauthorised writers) and other documents. 
 
Researchers studying the behavioural approach determined that leadership is composed 
of essentially two general kinds of behaviour: task behaviour (concern for production) 
and relationship behaviour (concern for people), as illustrated in section 3.4.1. Task 
behaviour facilitates goal accomplishment and relationship behaviour helps followers 
feel comfortable with themselves, with each other, and with the situation in which they 
find themselves. The central purpose of the behavioural approach is to explain how 
leaders combine these two kinds of behaviour to influence subordinates in their efforts 
to reach a goal.  
 
As the result of investigating certain of Mandela and Kim’s behavioural patterns, the 
case studies highlight the specific action examples shown by the two leaders. 
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5.2.2.1 Evidence from Nelson Mandela’s Case  
 
Mandela played an important role in drafting many policies of the ANC (Benson, 1980). 
As illustrated in section 4.2.2, he organised the Defiance Campaign and Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (Spear of the Nation or MK) and suggested the M-plan and stay-home strikes.  
 
As the leader of the opposition, he focused on task behaviour to achieve the end of 
apartheid. Mandela formed the Defiance Campaign and MK, each related to a specific 
task. For instance, during the Defiance Campaign, his aim was that of non-violent 
protest, involving only black people, as a tactic to abolish apartheid. When the Defiance 
Campaign failed to win concessions from the government, however, Mandela formed 
MK, and he aimed violent protests with various non-racial groups at the government. 
Moreover, he was personally involved in recruiting his own staff, training the soldiers 
and committing sabotage bombings of strategic targets, as illustrated in sections 4.2.2 
and 4.2.3.  
 
As president of South Africa, meanwhile, Mandela gave more of his attention to 
relationship behaviour in order to achieve reconciliation in South Africa. This was 
clearly shown during his negotiation process with De Klerk and Buthelezi in the early 
stages of setting up a democratic presidential election, as mentioned in section 4.2.4.1. 
Mandela recalled later: 
 
“I was criticised at the conference for engaging in ‘personal diplomacy’ and not 
keeping the rank-and-file of the organisation informed. As a leader of a mass 
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organisation, one must listen to the people … I also knew the delicacy of our talks 
with the government; and agreements that we arrived at depended in part on their 
confidentiality. Although I accepted the criticism, I believed we had no alternative 
but to advance on the same course” (Mandela, 1994).  
   
In addition, as president, Mandela amazed the staff and servants by shaking hands and 
chatting with all of them, including the gardeners (Sampson, 1999). “He had an 
exceptional ability,” De Klerk (1998) noted, “to make everyone with whom he came 
into contact feel special.” On the presidential plane or helicopter he chatted with the 
crew and pilot, being concerned about their meals and accommodation.  
 
5.2.2.2 Evidence from Kim Dae-jung’s Case 
 
Kim Dae-jung’s case is different from that of Mandela’s due to its deep involvement 
with the South Korean historical background - such as Confucianism and the 
relationship with North Korea (Ahn, 1994). Because of these social conditions, the 
populists and progressives appeared to be treated as Communists by the past 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
As the leader of opposition, Kim, who was once regarded as a progressive and radical 
politician, focused on relationship behaviour to change his image and acquire political 
support, not only from his region but also from the rest of South Korea. Kim considered 
his public address to be more important than other actions. When he was under house 
arrest, he continued his “house diplomacy” campaign and, furthermore, when he was 
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exiled, he persisted in delivering speeches about South Korea’s political situation to the 
world press.  
 
As president of South Korea, Kim gave his attention to relationship behaviour and he 
also stressed the “Sunshine Policy” to promote peace and stability with North Korea and 
persevered in his effort to hold a summit meeting with the leader of North Korea. 
Despite the people’s anxiety about communism, he finally led a historic South-North 
Joint Declaration as a result of his negotiations. Kim recalled: 
 
“The fact that Kim Jung-il has ruled North Korea so powerfully, has reminded me 
that he alone has the ability to promote negotiations and make decisions. Therefore, 
I had to persist in my efforts to knock on the firmly barred gate of North Korea and 
so start the beginning of a new relationship between South Korea and North Korea 
through communication” (Kim, 2000). 
 
5.2.2.3 Findings 
 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s behavioural patterns, as the opposition leaders of 
their respective countries, appear to be different due to the varying South African and 
South Korean situations. In Mandela’s case, the obvious required task was to end 
apartheid, so Mandela organised people and led them in resistance against the 
government. On the other hand, Kim needed to make people (who were concerned 
about security against North Korea) understand the problems of authoritarian 
government. 
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As presidents, Mandela and Kim both focused on relationship behaviour in order to 
reconcile their respective countries. After the end of authoritarian government, South 
Africa faced conflict and violence between people due to race, religion, ethnic 
differences and political ideology. South Korea faced an economic crisis and deeper 
regional conflict caused by unequal treatment from the previous regimes. Under these 
circumstances, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s governments strengthened the 
reconciliation of people through forgiveness of their political enemies in order to create 
stable conditions in their respective countries. The following Table 5.1 illustrates the 
above findings. 
 
Table 5.1  
 
Comparison of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s Behavioural leadership Styles 
 As Leader of Opposition As President 
Nelson Mandela Task oriented behaviour Relationship oriented behaviour 
Kim Dae-jung Relationship oriented behaviour Relationship oriented behaviour 
 
5.2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
The behavioural approach provides a valuable framework for assessing leadership, 
which distinguishes between the task and relationship dimensions. Nevertheless, the 
researchers failed to include situational variables, that is, variables which moderate the 
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relationship between leader behaviour and various outcomes (Bryman, 1992) in their 
research. Therefore, in the next section, the situational approach is employed to analyse 
the leadership styles of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung. 
 
5.2.3 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE SITUATIONAL APPROACH 
 
Fiedler’s contingency model recognises that leaders have general behavioural 
tendencies and specifies situations where certain leaders may be more effective than 
others. In comparing the contingency model to the situational theory developed by 
Hersey and Blanchard, the contingency model places more emphasis on flexibility in 
leader behaviour. 
 
According to Hughes (1993), the situational leadership theory maintains that leaders 
who correctly base their behaviours on follower maturity will be more effective, 
whereas the contingency model suggests that leader effectiveness is primarily 
determined by selecting the right kind of leader for a certain situation or changing the 
situation to fit the particular leader’s style. To analyse the contingency model, therefore, 
one needs to look first at the critical characteristics and behaviour tendencies of the 
leader and then at the critical aspects of the situation.  
 
In consequence, this dissertation shall comprise Fiedler’s contingency approach to 
analyse common and distinct situations surrounding Mandela and Kim’s political lives 
and their leadership styles – based on their characteristics and behaviours as described 
in previous sections.  
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Fiedler’s model suggests three major situational variables to determine whether a given 
situation is favourable to a leader (Fiedler, 1984): leader-member relations, task 
structure and position powers are mentioned in section 3.4.1.2. These variables 
emphasise the importance of matching an effective leader’s style with the demands of a 
situation.  
 
5.2.3.1 Evidence from Nelson Mandela’s Case 
 
Leader-member relations between Mandela and the members of the ANC are illustrated 
as ‘good,’ even though there was differing views among members about communism 
and violent protests. When Mandela suggested the ‘Youth League’, ‘Defiance 
Campaign’, ‘M-Plan’ and ‘Umkhonto we Sizwe’ (MK or Spear of the Nation) to the 
ANC, the old leaders appointed him as one of the prominent leaders of those plans and 
the Youth League supported him, as mentioned section 4.2. Furthermore, he became 
president winning 62.2 percent of the vote, even though there were ethnic and race 
conflicts. It also indicated he had a ‘good’ relationship with the majority of South 
Africans.  
 
Task structure of the Defiance Campaign and MK is described as having a ‘high’ degree 
of structure because each group comprised a specific task. For instance, the Defiance 
Campaign was aimed at active boycott, and striking in a peaceful manner, while MK 
was aimed at violent struggle against the government infrastructure. Moreover, the 
structure of MK was well defined: the High Command was at the top, there were 
Regional Commands in each of the provinces, and below that there were local 
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commands and cells. 
 
Mandela’s position power in the groups was strong. For instance, he recruited members 
of the High Command of MK and was involved in training soldiers for sabotage 
bombings. The High Command determined the tactics and general targets and was in 
charge of training and finance. Within the frame work laid down by the High Command, 
the Regional Commands had authority to select local targets to be attacked. 
 
5.2.3.2 Evidence from Kim Dae-jung’s Case 
 
Leader-member relations between Kim and the members of his groups, such as his 
political parties and the public, are illustrated as moderately poor. After he returned to 
South Korea from exile, he failed to be chosen as a presidential candidate by his party. 
As a result of this, he had to establish a new party in order to join the presidential 
election. Kim said later “I regretted making the decision in which I didn’t concede to 
Kim Young-sam being the only opposition party candidate for the presidential election” 
(Kim, 2000). Furthermore, he had suffered from his negative image as leftist and that of 
the representative of his region, Cholla, to the public. Kwangju city and Cholla 
provinces provided him with a secure voter base, giving him 92.6 percent of their vote 
in December 1997. However, the opposition region, Kyoungsang, accounted for only 
about 28 percent of his total electorate (Diamond & Kim, 2000). 
 
Task structure of Kim’s political parties – the Democratic Party and the National 
Congress for New Politics (NCNP) – are described as having a ‘low’ degree of structure. 
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Since the democratic transition of more than a decade ago, most politicians have 
continuously aligned and realigned according to the electorate of their charismatic 
leaders who have an unshakable regional stronghold. The three dominant leaders - all 
from different regions - Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil (often called 
the three Kims), founded, dissolved and re-founded political parties at will. It remains 
that all South Korean political parties are highly unstable and lack the requisite capacity 
to adapt to the changing political environment (Shin, 1999). Low institutionalisation is 
partly based on regionalism due to authoritarian regimes (Diamond Eds., 2000). Such a 
high level of institutional instability, in turn, has made it difficult for those parties to 
build broad bases of popular loyalty and support (Huang, 1997). The political parties 
also failed to build any network capable of aggregating and representing interest groups 
and other civic associations in the policy-making process (Kim & Suh 1994). As a result, 
Kim’s parties also retained a low degree of task structure. 
 
Kim’s position power in his parties was strong. For instance, he founded, dissolved, re-
established and renamed his own parties at will and the certain members of these parties 
faithfully followed his guidance and leadership. In the society culture based on 
Confucianism, every party boss exclusively controls the nomination of his party 
candidates for each and every electoral district of the National Assembly (Shin, 1999). 
Once the candidates are elected, the boss tells elected representatives how to vote on 
every major issue and censures them when they defy the guidelines. Thus, Kim was also 
portrayed as a powerful leader in his political parties.  
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5.2.3.3 Findings 
 
In Nelson Mandela’s case, the findings, as analysed above, indicated that leader-
member relations were good, task structure was high and Mandela’s position power was 
strong. These given situational variables are explained as Low Least Preferred Co-
workers (LPC) or Middle LPC. Leaders who score high on this scale are described as 
relationship motivated and those who score low on the scale are identified as task-
motivated. Low LPC leaders are primarily motivated by the task, which means that 
theses leaders primarily gain satisfaction from task accomplishment. However, if tasks 
are being accomplished in an acceptable manner, then low LPC leaders will move to 
their secondary level of motivation, which is forming and maintaining relationships 
with followers. Thus, low LPC leaders will focus on improving their relationships with 
followers after they are assured that assigned tasks are being satisfactorily accomplished. 
Mandela’s case obviously shows this Low LPC leader’s tendency as illustrated by his 
behavioural pattern in 5.2.2.1.  
 
In Kim Dae-jung’s case, the findings, as analysed above, indicated that leader-member 
relations were poor, task structure was low and Kim’s position power was strong. These 
given situational variables are explained as High Least Preferred Co-workers (LPC). As 
mentioned in Mandela’s case study, leaders who score high on this scale are described 
as relationship motivated. High LPC leaders are primarily motivated by relationships. 
These individuals derive their major satisfaction in an organisation from interpersonal 
relationships. The high LPC attends to tasks, but only after she or he is certain that the 
relationships between people are in good shape. Kim’s case obviously shows this High 
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LPC leader’s tendency as illustrated by his behavioural pattern in 5.2.2.2.  
 
Table 5.2  
 
Comparison of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s Situational Leadership Style 
 Leader-Member 
Relations 
Task Structure Position Power 
Nelson Mandela good High Strong 
Kim Dae-jung Moderately poor Low Strong 
 
Table 5.2 illustrates the findings of Mandela and Kim’s behavioural patterns related to 
situational variables. 
 
5.2.3.4 Conclusion 
 
The various situational approaches have brought to attention the need to take situational 
factors into account when examining the effects of leader behaviour. It is clear that 
styles of leadership that work well in one situation will not necessarily be appropriate in 
another context. However, this approach was criticised because it has not adequately 
explained that two leaders in the same situation may reach different conclusions about 
followers or take different actions in response to a similar situation. Moreover, this 
approach failed to provide guidelines for how demographic characteristics (such as 
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education, experience, age and gender) effect followers’ preferences for leadership 
(Hughes, 1993).  
 
All three above-mentioned approaches have proved lacking in clarifying the successes 
of two leaders, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung, in attaining their goals of 
democratisation in South Africa and South Korea. Furthermore, the three theories failed 
to find the common factors inherent in the leaders which encouraged the transformation 
in their countries.  
 
Thus, the transformational approach is examined to provide a more comprehensive 
comparison between the leadership approaches of the two leaders.  
 
5.2.4 ANALYSIS BASED ON THE TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACH 
 
Transformational leaders enhance followers’ confidence and hence, the expectation that 
they can attain greater performance. These effects on their followers operate in 
conjunction with the tendency of transformational leaders to seek to change the 
organisational culture, which alters the ways in which followers think about themselves 
and the organisation, and their position within it. Together these factors enhance 
followers’ preparedness to attain outcomes and hence, they produce a greater effort 
which leads to performance beyond expectations (Bryman, 1992).  
 
As seen in chapter three, transformational leaders are distinguished by certain personal 
traits and behaviours and they always have a vision (so, it is also termed charismatic 
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leadership, visionary leadership and strategic leadership). The vision emerges from the 
collective interests of various individuals and units within an organisation. 
Transformational leaders act as change agents, who initiate and implement new 
directions within organisations and create change (Northouse, 2004). They are also 
required to be social architects. This means they make clear the emerging values and 
norms of the organisation.  
 
Transformational leadership incorporates four different factors: charisma or idealised 
influence, inspiration or inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and 
individualised consideration (Bass, 1994). In this regard, this section analyses Mandela 
and Kim’s leadership styles based on the above factors, but their personal traits as 
charismatic leaders are omitted in this section because these are described early in 
section 5.2.1. As previously mentioned, the leaders’ traits are focused on charismatic 
characteristics of new leadership theories in recent years (Bryman, 1992). 
 
5.2.4.1 Evidence from Nelson Mandela’s Case 
 
As the leader of the opposition, Nelson Mandela’s vision was clear and comprised the 
desire to establish a multiracial democracy and the end of apartheid. By planning strikes 
and mass demonstrations through launching the Defiance Campaign and MK, he 
endeavoured to share his vision with the people. Furthermore, Mandela’s public address 
indicated that his appearance was calculated to encourage and inspire his followers who 
were faced with new challenges as illustrated in chapter 4.2.  
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Mandela made clear his willingness to accommodate all people in a non-racial society 
and, in keeping with the multiracialism since the 1950’s, he seemed genuinely without 
malice toward his oppressors. So long as he, as president of South Africa, could hold 
onto the diverse strains that characterised the opposition movement; continue to colour 
South African politics and, at the same time, accommodate those who were sceptical of 
his ‘vision’ of an open society, he was able to foster a peaceful de-escalation of tension.  
 
Mandela had a moral authority and concern for the truth with which few could compete 
(Samson, 1999). Throughout his three decades in jail, he had remained true to his 
principles and beliefs in the face of all the pressures and temptations - at a time when 
politicians in most countries were becoming more opportunist and changeable, and 
heroes and great causes were fading into history. For instance, Mandela rejected the 
offer of release from President Botha on the condition that Mandela and the ANC 
should reject violence as a political instrument. Instead of release from life 
imprisonment, Mandela decided to remain in prison and retain his loyalty and trust.  
 
In the years preceding his presidential inauguration, he worked with his former enemies 
and jailers in the National Party to take South Africa into a new future in a Government 
of National Unity, which was the result of the negotiations prior to the 1994 Election. 
He also worked hard to build bridges with Chief Buthelezi. Finally, Mandela led South 
Africa in its transformation to a multiracial democracy through motivating the people of 
his country – both friends and foes.  
 
As leader of South Africa, Mandela continued his outstanding leadership qualities, 
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urging South Africa “to come to terms with its past in a spirit of openness and 
forgiveness and proceed to build the future on the basis of repairing and healing” 
(Mandela, 1995). Mandela again showcased the vision for his racially and ethnically 
divided country. For instance, Mandela’s government had laid out the plans of an 
ambitious vision: the Reconstruction and Development Programme, to advocate 
reconciliation between the oppressed and the oppressor; to improve human rights and to 
establish a consolidated democracy in South Africa, as described in chapter four. 
Furthermore Mandela provided a visible pageant of the ‘Rainbow Nation,’ and 
supported Parliament to approve a new democratic Constitution.  
 
In the final chapter of his autobiography, it is clearly shown that Mandela was a figure 
of transformational leadership: 
 
“I never lost hope that this great transformation would occur. Not only because of 
the great heroes I have already cited, but because of the courage of the ordinary men 
and women of my country. I always knew that deep down in every human heart, 
there was mercy and generosity… We took up the struggle with our eyes wide open, 
under no illusion that the path would be an easy one” (Mandela, 1995). 
 
5.2.4.2 Evidence from Kim Dae-jung’s Case 
 
As the leader of the opposition, Kim’s vision was that of democracy and away from 
authoritarianism. Kim Dae-jung embodied the courageous and resilient resistance to 
decades of dictatorship, and he was imprisoned for his political vision and nearly lost 
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his life at the hands of military dictators. Even though he was under house arrest, he 
continued his pro-democracy oratory, known as “house diplomacy,” in his home – 
inviting international journalists and fellow politicians. His endless addresses inspired 
the people, who felt oppressed by and alienated from the government, and led them to 
demonstrate against the authoritarian government.  
 
Although he was labelled as dangerous and had the image of leftist or communist 
sympathiser – propagated by Park and Chun for 20 years in South Korea – Kim Dae-
jung had impressive assets as a charismatic leader who appealed to the worldwide press 
as the advocator of democracy. In fact, Kim was always the opposition leader against 
authoritarian rule and a representative of the disadvantaged groups – labour union and 
Cholla region – since he stepped up as a politician. Despite several defeats in 
presidential elections, his attempts finally succeeded in his being the people’s chosen 
leader for the future.  
 
His election to the presidency demonstrates that a genuinely horizontal transfer of 
power, which is an important indication of democratic consolidation, had finally 
occurred in South Korea (Kim, 2002). Despite his advanced age, his outlook appeared 
focused on the future as South Korean president. He promised a better future for his 
people and a new social and political order, which would release followers from the 
injustices and inequalities of that time.  
 
As leader of South Korea, Kim stressed economic recovery backed by a democratic 
system as his new vision. Kim Dae-jung presented a detailed plan for solving the 
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nation’s economic problems, entitled “How to Overcome the National Economic 
Crisis,” to the Korean Newspaper Editors’ Association. Kim formed the Tripartite 
Committee of Representatives, made up of representatives from labour, management 
and government. Kim stressed the need for technological development for South Korea 
to assume its rightful place as a first-rate nation with a strong economy, backed by a 
democratic system (CNN, 2000).  
 
Kim Dae-jung also motivated the people to participate in politics and said in an address 
posted on his Web site: 
  
“We must forge a clean nation where corruption and irregularities are rooted out 
completely through active public participation and surveillance. The government 
will establish an ‘Internet Shinmungo’ ( means petitioners’ drum), so that it will be 
able to hear complaints directly from citizens and reform the government 
accordingly…If we cannot cope creatively and positively with the knowledge 
revolution in the new age, we will be pushed aside to the periphery of world 
history.”  
 
Kim also inspired the people to support the campaign to collect gold to replenish the 
nation’s foreign currency reserves. As a result, around 21 billion US dollars were 
collected by the 3.5 million South Korean participants (Chosun Il-bo, 1998). 
Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung propagated reconciliation with North Korea and the 
forgiveness of his past political opponents. Most remarkable about Kim’s resolution of 
Korea’s problems, was the former dissident’s patience – infused with a surprising 
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willingness to forgive  
 
In the first chapter of his autobiography, it is shown that Kim was a figure of 
transformational leadership: 
 
“I have lived on learning and perceiving from the people and, then, linking the 
people. I endeavoured to connect South Korea with North Korea; the eastern regions 
with the western regions that were divided by regionalism; the different opposition 
groups resulting from threatening politics and, further, the crevice between the 
President of South Korea and the lower class retailer. The only reason for this is that 
I loved all of them and admired them” (Kim, 2000a). 
 
5.2.4.3 Findings 
 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s charismatic characteristics were illustrated in 
5.2.1. The two leaders possessed charm, spoke articulately and had intelligent business 
acumen. During democratisation of their respective countries, both had high standards 
of moral and ethical conduct. They were deeply respected by followers who were 
oppressed by government and provided followers with a vision and a sense of mission. 
Their charismatic qualities and the people’s response to them transformed an entire 
nation.  
 
Mandela and Kim also inspired the followers through sharing and motivating vision. 
They continued to communicate with their respective people through their speeches and 
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the followers’ self-esteem was reinforced by their leaders’ expressions of confidence in 
the followers. High expectations were set by the two leaders, which induced greater 
commitment to the struggle. They presented specific goals and clarified the values of 
the goals, as illustrated above.  
 
Table 5.3  
 
Comparison of in Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s  
Transformational Leadership style 
 Envisioning Motivating (Sharing Vision) 
As Leader 
of 
Opposition 
Establish  
a multiracial 
democracy 
By planning and participating in 
strikes and mass demonstration, as 
well as delivering public addresses Nelson 
Mandela 
As 
President 
Reconciliation 
(‘Rainbow Nation’) 
By forgiving his political enemies, he 
advocated reconciliation between the 
oppressed and the oppressor 
As Leader 
of 
Opposition 
Abolish dictatorship 
and establish 
democracy 
By advocating for disadvantaged 
groups through public addresses 
Kim  
Dae-jung 
As 
President 
Reconciliation 
(‘Great Harmony’) 
By forgiving his former enemies and 
promoting reconciliation between the 
regions as well as improving the 
relationship with North Korea 
 
Furthermore, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung provided vision, developed 
commitment to a vision among internal and external followers, implemented strategies 
to accomplish the vision and embedded the new values and assumptions into the culture 
of the organisation. For example, according to the research conducted by the Korean 
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Presidential Evaluation Committee (Chosun Il-bo, 2002), Kim Dae-jung was recorded 
as having attained the second position concerning the ability to show vision (gaining 
70.50 points), followed by Park Chung-hee who gained 74.35 points out of 100. 
 
As explained in chapter three, researchers studying transformational leadership style, 
provide common strategies utilised by leaders in the process of the transformation of 
organisations. The above Table 5.3 demonstrates the relationship between two common 
facts, envisioning and motivating, and the two leaders, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-
jung. The Table shows how the two leaders can be described as transformational leaders. 
 
5.2.4.4 Conclusion 
 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s leadership shows mostly a transformational style, 
rather than the other approaches. The two leaders clearly demonstrated their ability to 
provide and implement vision and inspire the people to transform from an authoritarian 
government to a democratic one. 
 
Under similar circumstances of authoritarian government and social division, resulting 
from these governments, both Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung tried to rectify the 
remnants of the previous authoritarian rule. They, additionally, attempted to establish a 
democratic system of government. During these processes, their transformational 
leadership style was effective in achieving their goals – such as the transformation to 
democracy.  
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5.2.5 ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH 
 
Changes in societies are forcing leaders to clarify their values, develop new strategies 
and learn new ways of operation. According to the social learning approach, adaptive 
challenges are often systemic problems with no ready answer because to adapt 
organisations’ behaviour is critical; executives have to break a long-standing 
behavioural pattern of their own, providing leadership in the form of solution and 
adaptive change is distressing for the people going through it (Heifetz, 1994). 
 
5.2.5.1 Evidence from Nelson Mandela’s Case 
 
As the leader of the opposition, Mandela adopted sabotage bombings of strategic targets 
as a new strategy through organising Umkonto we Sizwe. Even though the President of 
the ANC emphasised non-violence and passive resistance, Mandela suspected the 
ineffectiveness of this resistance. As a result, he realised non-violent protest would 
never defeat a white minority government – especially one that oppressed the black 
people with armed force. Mandela modified his behaviour and outlook to become an 
important leading figure in the transition to the underground and violent struggle.  
 
Mandela’s transition to an accommodating multiracialism involved, firstly, his 
acceptance of a nationalist subjectivity – partly through the influence of the Youth 
League (YL) founders. His desire to serve his people and his intellectual search for a 
more appropriate understanding of the changes occurring in the objective society, made 
him open to the nationalism of the youth. When his efforts to objectify this nationalism 
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by opposing the 1950 May Day strike failed to receive the anticipated support of the 
masses, Mandela modified his subjectivity, this time to reflect a multiracial 
understanding of the people. This move to multiracialism was not made by all in the YL, 
and this fact indicated the importance of Mandela’s personal integration of these 
objective events (Juckes, 1995). Regardless of the circumstances, Mandela’s main 
concern was always the involvement of the people. This is indicated by his repeated 
speeches and public addresses to the people, in order to include them, despite the 
personal risks involved. 
 
5.2.5.2 Evidence from Kim Dae-jung’s Case 
 
As a leader of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung suggested a different approach to solve the 
economic crisis resulting from the changes in the global market and Kim Young-sam’s 
failure to recognise said changes. Kim stressed his ‘Mass Participatory Economy’ theory, 
in which he developed detailed strategies for dealing with price stability, land 
speculation, the export crisis and various other problems - together with supporting 
small to medium-sized firms instead of large enterprises. He also highlighted 
cooperative labour-management relationships. 
 
Faced with the changing world situation, Kim Dae-jung also promoted a different point 
of view about the North Korean Policy. He promoted a vastly different policy from his 
predecessors by encouraging a passive approach, called the Sunshine Policy. This 
promoted improved relations between South Korean non-government organisations and 
businesses and the North Korean government.  
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5.2.5.3 Findings 
 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung showed the social learning leadership style in 
different positions. In Mandela’s case, he suggested different tactics in order to achieve 
each of the groups’ goals and guided the people towards a better understanding of his 
strategies. In Kim Dae-jung’s case, he propagated a brand new idea for solving the 
national problems, such as the economic crisis and the division of the nation. This is 
described in Table 5.4. This analysis is based on Heifetz as described in section 3.7.1.2.                
 
5.2.5.4 Conclusion 
 
The two leaders developed new strategies, in complete contrast to those of their 
predecessors, in order to adapt to their new environments. They also encouraged their 
followers to participate in these processes and supported their people in finding their 
own methods to accomplish goals or solve problems. 
 
5.3 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND LEADERSHIP MODEL  
 
Table 5.5 reviews the five leadership theories, the trait, behavioural, situational, 
transformational and social learning approach, and is a comprehensive comparison of 
the two men’s styles. 
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Table 5.5 
 
Review of Comparison of the Five Leadership Styles 
 Nelson Mandela Kim Dae-jung 
Trait 
Oratory skills 
Intelligence 
Persistence 
Responsibility 
Oratory skills 
Intelligence 
Persistence 
Responsibility 
As leader of 
opposition 
Task oriented Relationship oriented 
Behavioural 
leadership As 
president 
Relationship oriented Relationship oriented 
Leader-
member 
relations 
Good Moderately poor 
Task 
structure 
High Low 
Situational 
leadership 
Position 
power 
Strong Strong 
Envisioning 
Abolishing apartheid and 
establishing a multiracial 
democracy 
Abolishing dictatorship 
and establishing a 
democracy Transformational 
leadership 
Motivating 
Sharing vision and 
communicating with the 
people 
Sharing vision and 
communicating with the 
people 
Social learning leadership 
Identifying a need for 
strategies faced internal 
and external adaptive 
challenges 
and 
Changing his perspective 
caused people’s voice 
Identifying a need for 
new economic approach 
and relations with North 
Korea 
and 
Changing market system 
caused people’s voice 
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As stated in Table 5.5, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung demonstrate several common 
characteristics, such as charisma, oratory skills, intelligence and responsibility as 
illustrated in section 5.2.1. The two leaders show different behavioural patterns related 
to situational variables as described in section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. Those three theories, 
however, are not enough to explain every facet of their individual situations.  
 
Nevertheless, Mandela and Kim manifested transformational and social learning 
leadership style during the process of democratisation in their respective countries. Both 
had a clear vision for overcoming the challenges, as well as the ability to share with and 
inspire their respective followers. They continued to communicate with the people and 
changed their actions to meet the adaptive challenges. The two leaders, who shared 
transformational and social learning leadership style, were able to improve democracy 
in South Africa and South Korea.  
 
The difference of historical and political backgrounds between western developed 
countries and developing countries elsewhere requires a different leadership style in 
establishing successful democratisation in those developing countries. In order to find a 
suitable leadership model for countries in this predicament – such as oppression of 
authoritarian government, rise of people’s desire for democracy and influence of the 
international situation, this dissertation introduces a new leadership model. After 
reviewing, the various theories, Figure 5.1 is created to illustrate a new model for 
countries in this developing stage.  
 
This model aims to guide prospective leaders who are confronted with the new 
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challenges during the democratisation process. Figure 5.1 illustrates a new leadership 
approach, named Transformational Learning leadership, which is developed through 
researching two leaders, Mandela and Kim Dae-jung’s leadership style. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Transformational Learning Leadership Model 
 
 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Through the research of the roles of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung in chapter four, 
this chapter aims to analyse their leadership styles according to contemporary leadership 
theories.  
Transformational 
 Leadership  
• Envisioning 
• Sharing a vision 
• Inspiring 
• Communicating  
Transformational Learning 
Leadership 
Social Learning 
 Leadership  
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The first finding is that both leaders share the common traits of empathy for the masses 
and understanding of the social issues affecting the masses. Because of the close 
relationship between the trait approach and transformational leadership – which also 
focuses on leaders’ charisma as part of the theory – this finding supports the premise 
that both leaders respond to the requirements of transformational leadership. 
 
The second finding from the analysis of the behavioural and situational approaches 
indicates their different behaviours related to different situations. Nevertheless, both 
leaders focus on relationship behaviour towards their followers; reassuring them of their 
good intentions and allaying their fears. This clearly shows their concern for the people 
of their respective organisations and their ability to modify policies if so required.  
This is indicative of their learning leadership styles when faced by new challenges, one 
of the main ideas of the social learning approaches. 
 
An additional finding from the analysis of the transformational and social learning 
leadership approaches emphasises their successful transformation of their respective 
nations from authoritarian to democratic rule and their improvement of the nations’ 
unity.  
 
As a result of the above findings, most importantly, the two leaders portrayed unfailing 
vision at every stage of the transition from authoritarian regimes into working 
democracies. Along with this, the two leaders inspired people to offer resistance against 
oppression and discrimination, painting a clear picture of the end result. These two main 
facts – vision and inspiration – confirm them as transformational leaders during the 
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processes of democratisation in South Africa and South Korea. Additionally, their 
abilities to change policy and tactics whenever faced with challenges within their 
organisations, confirms their social learning leadership styles, as previously mentioned 
in this chapter. 
 
Chapter six, the final chapter, emphasises common denominators in the two leaders’ 
styles demonstrating the type of leadership style required to establish democratisation – 
both in their own and other countries with similar political situations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND 
KNOWLEDGE IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP IN 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
South Africa and South Korea are located on opposite sides of the earth, yet both 
nations have successfully established and carried out their transitions toward democracy 
on the African and Asian continents from the late 1940s to the early 1990s. Although 
there are incipient stresses in the newfound social cohesions that were the immediate 
outcomes of the South African and South Korean transitions, the patterns of inter group 
bargaining - that arose during the early 1990 transitions from authoritarian rule to 
democracy - are deeply embedded in many sectors of both countries’ societies, 
including the distinguished leadership of former presidents Nelson Mandela and Kim 
Dae-jung. Remarkably, their transformational and social learning leadership, steeped in 
the necessity of pragmatic moderation that propelled the transitions, has been sustained 
in the post-apartheid era and the post-military dictatorship era in South Africa and South 
Korea, respectively. 
 
Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung raised the hopes and demands of millions of their 
people and accomplished their goal – democracy – through transformational and social 
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learning leadership during these processes of democratisation in their respective 
countries, South Africa and South Korea. Both led peaceful transitions - such as the first 
democratic election in South Africa and the first transfer of power to an opposition 
leader in South Korea. 
 
In this regard, the following questions arose: What is the common denominator of their 
leadership? What can their leadership demonstrate to countries that are currently 
undergoing liberalisation and democratisation?  
 
This section, thus, gives an explanation of the answers by observing the results of the 
findings from the previous chapters. It also suggests the leadership style model for 
leaders faced with similar situations to Mandela and Kim.  
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATION 
 
Many developing countries remain under the rule of authoritarian governments and, as a 
result, the citizens of these countries suffer under oppression and civil war caused by 
religious and ethnic factionalism. The leaders of these countries show a marked lack of 
empathy and economic understanding towards the people they lead. If these countries 
desire an improved living condition, their current rulers are required to transform their 
authoritarian governments into democracies. The recommendation of this dissertation 
may be one way for them to gain the needed direction to accomplish the transition. 
 
Because of the vast differences between western developed countries and developing 
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countries elsewhere, that are ruled by authoritarian governments, the investigation of the 
historical and political backgrounds of developing countries should take precedence 
over following the tried and tested models of developed western countries. 
Consequently, this dissertation focuses on describing the two countries’ - South Africa 
and South Korea’s – historical backgrounds, which can be attributed to authoritarian 
governments and conflicts between the various segments of the population. Furthermore, 
their own leaders, who revealed the problems faced by the societies, were analysed 
through the processes of democratisation and shown to have had the roles of 
transformational leading figures.  
 
By studying the countries, sharing common problems, and their leaders, sharing 
common leadership styles, a more successful model for developing countries is 
provided. This dissertation, then, contends that transformational learning leadership, 
which is created by combing transformational and social learning approaches, is the 
recommended leadership style for establishing and consolidating democracy in 
countries that have similar circumstances to South Africa and South Korea.          
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
 
Since the late 1940s, South Africa and South Korea were ruled by authoritarian 
governments, which oppressed the people’s freedom and rights. The governments 
created the deeply divided societies that resulted in racism in South Africa and 
regionalism in South Korea. These similarities in the societies may have played a major 
role in allowing Mandela and Kim to develop strong emotional bonds with their 
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followers and to articulate their visions for the future.  
 
As opposition leaders, Mandela and Kim fought for freedom and human rights against 
the apartheid government in South Africa and military dictatorial government in South 
Korea. During these processes of democratisation, the two leaders displayed common 
charismatic traits and presented their visions of the end of the authoritarian regimes and 
the establishment of democracy; shared these visions with the people and encouraged 
and mobilised them in struggling together against the governments, as illustrated in 
chapters four and five.  
 
These qualities, including having extraordinary vision, the rhetorical skills to 
communicate this vision, a sense of mission, high self confidence and intelligence and 
high expectations of followers, facilitated the development of particularly strong 
emotional attachments with followers. Consequently, these relationships furthered 
reconciliation between the people in the previously divided societies of South Africa 
and South Korea. Furthermore, the two leaders’ learning leadership styles were effective 
in the unstable South African and South Korean societies, as well the unpredictable 
international circumstances. When they were confronted by new challenges, Mandela 
and Kim showed the ability to change strategies according to the concerns of their 
followers, as described in chapter five. 
 
Subsequently, the two leaders’ transformational and social learning leadership styles 
provide a successful role model to countries in which there are conflicts between the 
constituents of the society, as in East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East; a 
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desire for transformation towards democracy by the people, and where countries are 
confronted with new challenges - not only from inside but also outside of the nation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 181
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Adam, Heribert and Giliomee, Hermann (Eds). 1979. Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can 
South Africa Change? New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Anderson, Teny. 2000. Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea’s 
Tiananmen. Seoul: M.E. Sharpe Incorporated.  
Andrew, C. Nahm. 2000. Introduction to Korean History and Culture. Hollym. 
Ahn, Byoung-young. 1995. “Korean Politics after Slush Fund Scandal,” Korea Focus 3. 
ANC. 1994. The Reconstruction and Development Program: A Policy Framework. 
Johannesburg, ANC. 
Armstrong, Charles K. (Ed). 2002. Korean Society. Routledge. 
Bass, Bernad M. 1985.Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations, New York: 
The Free Press 
Bass, Bernad M. 1990. Bass and Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory 
and Research. New York: Free Press.  
Bass, Bernad M. 1998. Transformational Leadership, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Bennis, Warren G.. and Nanus, Burt. 1985. Leaders. New York: Harper & Row 
Benson, Mary. 1980. Nelson Mandela, Loundon: Panaf Books.  
Berger, Peter L. and Godsell, Bobby (Eds). 1988. A Future South Africa: Vision, 
Strategies and Realities. Cape Town: Human & Rousseau Tafelberg. 
Blake, Robert R. and McCanse Anne A. 1991. Leadership Delimmas-Grid® Solutions. 
Texas: Gulf Publishing Company. 
 182
Blake, Robert R. and Mouton, Jane S. 1984. The Managerial Grid III. Texas: Gluf 
Publishing Company.  
Bryman, Alan. 1992. Charisma & Leadership in Organisation, SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Bunce, Valerie. 1981. Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Princeton University Press. 
Burn, James M. 1978. Leadership. New York: Haper & Row. 
Callinicos, Luli. 2000. The World that made Mandela a Heritage Trail. Johannesburg: 
STE. 
Cartwright, John R. 1983. Political Leadership in Africa. London: Croom Helm. 
Chung Wa Dae. 2002. “The Kim Dae-jung’s Administration.” Chung Wa Dae (Office of 
President). 
< http://www.president.go.kr/warp/en/korea/history/modern/contemporary.html> 
Clark, Carol. 2000. “Kim Dae-jung: From Prison to President.” CNN.com. 
< http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/korea/story/leader/kim.dae.jung/> 
Cloete, Fanie. 1988. “Constitutional Change in South Africa” August 1988; unpublished 
paper.  
Corazon, Aquino and Oscar, Arisa (Eds). 1995. Democracy in Asia. Seoul: Asia-Pacific 
Peace Press. 
Czudnowski, Moshe M. (Ed). 1983. Political Elites and Social Change. Illinois: 
Northern Illinois University Press. 
Dahl, Robert. 1967. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Boston: Little. Brown, and 
Company. 
Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1959. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford 
University Press. 
Diamond, Larry and Kim, Byung-kook. 2000. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, 
 183
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
DuBrin, Andrew J. 2001. Leadership, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1993. Political Elites in Modern Societies: Empirical Research 
and Democratic Theory, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press. 
Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1982. Political Parties in American Society. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Field, G. Lowell and Higley, John. 1980. Elitism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Fieldler, Fred E. 1971. “Validation and Extension of the Contingency Model of 
Leadership Effectiveness,” Psychological Bulletn. Vol.75. 
Friedman, Steven (Ed). 1993. The Long Journey: South Africa’s Quest for a Negotiated 
Settlement. Johannesburg: Ravan.  
Finger, Matthias and Brand, Silvia B. 1999. “The Concept of the Learning 
Organisation” Organisational Learning and the Learning Organisation, London: 
Sage. 
Frost, Brian. 1998. Struggling to forgive: Nelson Mandela and South Africa’s search for 
reconciliation. London: Harper Collins. 
Gibney, Frank JR. 1998. “Jailed, Beten, Marked for Death. To Kim Dae Jung, It Was All 
Preparation for This Moment,” Time.com 
< http://www.time.com/time/magazine/1998/int/980302/cover1.html> 
Gerhard, Gail M. 1978. Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Goldstein, Norm. 1999. Kim Dae-Jung. Chelsea House Publishers. 
Gosnell, Harold. 1937. Machine Politics: Chicago Model. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 184
Gurr, Ted R. 1993. Minorities at Risk. Washington. D. C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press 
Halisi, C. R. D. and O’Meara, Patrick.1999. “South Africa,” Africa. Indiana University 
Press. 
Han, Sung-joo. 1990. “South Korea: Politics in Transition,” Politics in Developing 
Countries, Lynn Rienner. 
Handelman, Howard. 2003. The Challenge of Third World Development, Prentice Hall. 
Heifetz, Ronald A. 1994. Leadership Without Eeasy Answers. Harvard University Press. 
Hersey, Paul, Blanchard, Kenneth H. and Johnson, Dewey E. 2000. Management of 
Organizational Behavior, Prentice Hall. 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1991. A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering in a 
Divided Society. University of California Press. 
House, Robert J. and Mitchell, Terence R. 1974. “Path Goal Theory of Leadership,” 
Journal of Contemporary Business, Autumn. 
Huang, The-fu. 1997. “Party Systems in Taiwan and South Korea,” Consolidating 
Third-Wave Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Hughes, Richard L., Ginnett, Robert C. and Curphy, Gordon J. 1993. Leadership. 
IRWIN. 
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Jeong, Je-sik. 2001. Korea Religious Tradition and Globalization, Yonsei University 
Press. 
Juckes, Tim J. 1995. Opposition in South Africa, Praeger Publishers. 
Kahn, Robert L. and Katz Daniel. 1960. “Leadership Practices in Relation to 
 185
Productivity and Morale,” Group Dynamics Research Theory. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Kakuma, Takashi. 2000. Kimu De Jyung Daitouryou-Minjoku No Hokori Sidousha No 
Sisitsu. Japan: Shogakukan Inc. 
Kane-Berman, John S. 1993. Political Violence in South Africa. Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of Race Relations. 
Karis, Thomas and Carter, Gwendolen M. 1997. From Protest to Challenge. Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution Press. 
Karin, Pampallis. 2000. Nelson Mandela. Cape Town: Maskew Miller. 
Kellerman, Barbara. 1986. Political Leadership. University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Kim, Byong-kuk. 1992. Kim Dae-jung: Hero of the Masses, Conscience in Action. 
Seoul: Ilweolseogak. 
Kim, Byoug-kuk and Diamond, Larry. 2000. Consolidating Democracy in South Korea, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Kim, Byoung-kuk and Suh, Jin-young. 1997. “Politics of Reform in Confucian Korea,” 
Korea Focus (6). 
Kim, Dae-jung. 1996. New Beginning: A Collection of Essays. New York: Charles 
Schlacks.  
Kim, Dae-jung. 1997. Daejung Chamyeo Keongje Ron (Mass Participatory Ecomony), 
San-ha Publicher 
Kim, Dae-jung. 1998. Dasi Saerown Sijacle wehayue (For the New Beginning), Kim 
Young Sa Publisher. 
Kim, Dae-jung. 2000a. Nai Sam Nai Kill (My Life and My Way). San-ha Publisher. 
             2000b. Prison Writing. Seoul: Han-woll Publishser. 
 186
Kim, Jae-yul. 1993. “Democratisation in Korea,” Korea under Roh Tae Woo. Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin. 
Kim, Jong-wan.  1998. The Korean Political Culture in Conflict. Seoul: The Sejong 
Insititute. 
Kim, Jong-wan. 2001. A Cultural Analysis of Democracy and Its Implications for 
Korean. Seoul: The Se-Jong institution.  
Kirkpatrick, Samuel A. and Locke, Edwin A. 1991. Leadership. The Executive 5. 
Korean Government. 1999. Government of the People – Selected Speeches of President 
Kim Dae Jung. Vol. I. 
Korean Independent Monitor. 1987. “Building Peace & Democracy: Kim Dae-Jung 
Philosophy & Dialogues.” New York. 
Kun, Sang-eun. 1998. “ Gum Moigy Hangsa.” Chosun.com. 
<http://db1.chosun.com/cgi-bin/gisa/artFullText.cgi?where=PD=19980315& 
ID=9803151402> 
Lasswell, Harold D. 1948. Power and Personality. New York: Norton. 
Lasswell, Harold D. 1952. The Comparative Study of Elites. Stanford University Press. 
Lee, Ae-lee. 2000. “Democratisation and Civil Society in Korea: Development and 
Prospects.” Kyung Hee University. 
Lee, Hee-ho. 1997. My Love, My Country. University of Southern California, Center for 
Multiethnic and Transnational Studies. 
Lee, Ki-baik. 1989. A New History of Korea. Harvard University Press. 
Lijphart, Arend and Stanton, Diane R. 1987. “A Democratic Blueprint for South 
Africa,” The South African Quagmire. Cambridge: Mass Ballinger. 
Lodge, Tom. 1983. Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. London: Longman. 
 187
Mandela, Nelson. 1993. Nelson Mandela Speaks: Forging a Democratic Nonracial 
South Africa. New York: Pathfinder. 
Mandela, Nelson. 1994. “A time to build: addresses by the president, Mr. Nelson R. 
Mandela at his inauguration, the opening of parliament,” Pretoria: South Africa 
Communication Service. 
Mandela, Nelson. 1995. Long walk to freedom. London: Abacus. 
Mandela, Nelson. 1997. The essential Nelson Mandela. Cape Town: Philip. 
Mann, Robert. D. 1959. “A review of the relationship between personality and 
performance in small groups,” Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 56. 
Marks, Shula and Stanley, Trapido (Eds). 1987. The Politics of Race, Class and 
Nationalism in Twentieth -Century South Africa. New York: Longman. 
Maylam, Paul. 2001. South Africa’s Racial Past: the History and Historiography of 
Racism, Segregation, and Apartheid. Aldershort: Ashgate. 
Meredith, Martin. 1997.  Nelson Mandela: a biography. England, Penguin. 
Meer, Fatima. 1990. Higher than Hope. New York: Harper & Row. 
Meisel, James H. 1958. The Myth of the Ruling Class. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Nagle, Garrett. 1999. South Africa. Oxford: Heinemann Library. 
Neuhaus, Richard John. 1986. Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South 
Africans See It. Grand Rapids: Mich Eerdmans. 
No, Jung-hyun. 1997. Administrative Reform and Korean Transformation. Seoul: The 
Korean Institute of Public Administration. 
Northouse, Peter G., 2004. Leadership, Sage Publicationa, Inc. 
Oboe, Annalisa. 1994. Fiction, History and Nation in South Africa. Italy: Supernova. 
 188
Park, Chong-min. 1991. “Authoritarian Rule in South Korea,” Asian Survey 31. 
Pitkin, Hanna.1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Pityana, N. Barney (Ed). 1992. Bounds of Possibility: The Legacy of Steve Biko and 
Black Consciousness. Cape Town: David Philip 
Rothchild, Donald. 1997. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Washington. D. C.: 
Brookings Institution. 
Reynolds, Andrew (Ed). 1994. Election 94: South Africa. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Richardson, Deidre. 2001. Historic Sites of South Africa. Cape Town: Struik. 
Rustow, Dankwark. A. (Ed). 1970. Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership. 
George Braziller. 
Sampson, Anthony. 1999. Mandela. London: HarperCollins.  
Schattschneider, Elmer 1942. Party Government, New York: Rinehart. 
Schesinger, Arthur M. Jr. 1999. Kim Dae-jung – South Korean President. Chelsea 
House Publishers. 
Schneider, Martin. 1997. Madiba. Sandton: Schnider,. 
Schoeman, Elna. 1996. Mandela’s five years of freedom: South African Politics, 
Economics and Social Issues, 1990-1995. South African Institute of International 
Affairs. 
Scholl, Roger E. 1992. Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung, John Wiley & Son. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper. 
Seo, Dae-suk. 2000. Leadership and Political Culture in Korea. Yonsei University Press. 
Shin, Doc C. 1999. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 189
Shin, Doh-chull, Zoh, Myeong-han and Chey, Myung. 1994. Korea in the Global Wave 
of Democratisation. Seoul National University Press. 
Shin, Young-ha. 2001. Modern Korean History and Nationalism, Seoul: Jipmoondang. 
Sisk, Timothy. 1995. Democratisation in South Africa. Princeston University Press. 
Sodaro, Michael J. 2001. Comparative Politics, Boston: McGrawHill. 
Steyn, Rory. 2000. One Step behind Mandela. Rivionia: Zebra. 
Stogdill, Ralph M. 1948. “Personal factors associated with leadership,” Journal of 
Psychology. Vol. 25. 
Stogdill, Ralph M. 1974. Handbook of Leadership, New York: Free Press. 
The New Democratic Party. 1991. In the Name of Justice and Peace. Seoul. 
Thompson, Leonard. 1995. A History of South Africa. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Turker, Robert C. 1970. “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” Rustow, D.A. (Ed). 
Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership. George Brasiller. 
Tichy, Noel M. and Devanna, Marry A. 1986. Transformational Leadership. New York: 
Wiley.  
Venter, Lester. 1997. When Mandela Goes: the Coming of South Africa’s Second 
Revolution. Johannesburg: Doubleday. 
Wanne, Joe. 2001. A Cultural History of Modern Korea. Hollym. 
Walker, Jack L. 1966. “A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy”, American 
Political Science Review Vol. LX, June 1966. 
Weber, Max. 1949. On the Methodology of the Social Sciences, Glencoe Illinois: The 
Free Press. 
Wilson, Richard. 2001. The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 
 190
Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Han, Wook-eun. 1999. The History of Korea. Seoul: Elumoonhawsa. 
World Report. 2000. South Africa: Human Right Development.  
Yukl, Gary A. 1994. Leadership in Organisations, Prentice-Hall. 
 
 
